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When Sino-American Struggle Disrupts the Supply Chain: Licensing Intellectual Property in a Changing Trade Environment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2020

Mark A. Cohen
Affiliation:
UC Berkeley Law School, USA
Philip C. Rogers*
Affiliation:
UC Berkeley Department of Political Science, USA

Abstract

Through legislative changes, tariff wars, and executive actions, the Trump Administration has injected a new urgency into international technology and supply chain management, particularly between the United States and China. Analytically, the situation invites a perspective that links practical/on-the-ground responses by commercial actors in the politics of technological competition between superpowers, i.e. a discussion that bridges the gap between policy and process. This article therefore approaches management of supply chain disruption in terms of a key security issue motivating recent changes to the trade environment: the protection of intellectual property. After reviewing critical policy developments and trade statistics, we draw upon data on IP-intensive industries from global patent offices, trade classifications for products made by these IP-intensive industries, and concordance data on patent classifications to illustrate the centrality of IP to extended supply chains. With these key relationships in mind, we outline specific opportunities that intellectual property licensing provides for managing supply chain linkages between the United States and China in the current geopolitical environment. Viewing intellectual property as both a driver of and a solution to trade difficulties highlights the sorts of cross-jurisdictional nuances that can better inform policy and business decisions alike in the broader international trade regime.

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Segments of this article's analysis are published elsewhere in alternative forms: Cohen, M. and P. Rogers (2020), ‘A Techo-Globalist Approach to Intellectual Property and Supply Chain Disruption’, www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/tech/ip-strategy-techno-nationalism/

Cohen, M. (2019), ‘A New Era of Licensing with China’, Competition Policy International,www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/CPI-Cohen.pdf

Cohen, M. (2019), ‘Licensing Intellectual Property in a Changing Trade Environment’, Intellectual Asset Management, www.iam-media.com/law-policy/licensing-intellectual-property-changing-trade-environment

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