This article introduces a special issue that examines the effects of strategic competition on the future of the global trade regime. We argue that traditional work in economics and the current set-up of global economic regimes ignores economic statecraft as a key element in understanding trade conflict. Specifically, we outline three examples of contemporary economic statecraft – industrial policy, trade restrictions, and new investment rules – that have been used to block foreign direct investment on the basis of national security claims. Based on this analysis, we explore how the WTO and other economic regimes might address the global economic governance of economic statecraft. In concluding, we outline the theoretical and empirical work in the subsequent case studies that examine the use of economic statecraft in the United States, China, India, Japan, and South Korea.

After almost two decades of dealing with asymmetric threats, America's strategic focus on technological superiority carefully honed during the Cold War, began to fracture, eroding its military and economic advantage. But China's recent emergence as a credible geopolitical rival has reinvigorated US efforts to sustain high-tech leadership as the basis of its military primacy. At the center of these efforts are the defense and defense-related agencies of the national security state (NSS) whose mission is to dominate the new technological frontiers of military power and achieve future competitive advantage. Alongside the quest for breakthroughs in foundational technologies, NSS agencies are seeking to correct long neglected deficiencies in advanced manufacturing, by rebuilding the industrial ecosystem's supply chains depleted after decades of offshoring. With this suite of initiatives, the US is following a course of action more consistent with the exercise of (economic) statecraft than industrial policy. However, unlike its authoritarian rival, the US faces the challenge of having to balance security imperatives with commercial interests and, not least, having to contend with a dysfunctional and maladapted presidency.

The paper examines the global and regional implications of China's revitalized state capitalism model through the sectoral lens of the Chinese automotive industry, which stands at the intersection of both traditional and green industrial policy. At the multinational level, China skillfully facilitates local policy implementation that creates excess capacity by propping up local and national champions through convenient compliance with the WTO. At the bilateral level, China closely links purchasing and coercive diplomacy with protections for Chinese players both at home and abroad. Key endeavors like the Belt and Road Initiative open up overseas markets to develop global champions and secure foreign footholds for Chinese champions. Additionally, China's increasing reliance on exclusionary diplomacy provides political justifications to discriminate against foreign competitors within the Chinese market while moving forward with industrial upgrading of domestic players. When linked together, these factors – all byproducts of China's approach to state-led capitalism – combine to explain China's efforts to create a race to the top.

This article examines how Japan has adapted economic statecraft to serve changing strategic aims through case studies of trade arrangements, official development assistance, and dual-use technology. After World War II, Japan continuously adapted these economic tools to pursue shifting non-economic goals related to international reintegration, comprehensive security, human security, and traditional security. More recently, in response to escalating US–China strategic competition, Japan has employed economic statecraft to simultaneously reduce international instability and to counter China in targeted ways as part of a broader hedging approach. First, Japan has attempted to bolster multilateral trade arrangements amid a volatile policy environment, while also using them to both engage and counter China. Second, Japan has used official development assistance to stabilize and build defense capacity in Asian countries facing pressure from China. Third, Japan has increasingly militarized its dual-use technologies to enhance its ability to respond to Chinese activity in outer space.

India's ambition of playing a prominent role in regional and global affairs has been particularly visible since the assumption of office by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014. The ambition has resulted in India's external engagement, abandoning the posturing of non-alignment for a more proactive multi-alignment strategy. Its efforts to engage with major powers such as the US and China, as well as other global middle powers such as Japan, the UK, and Australia, have been positioned on rapid economic progress, enabled by one of the fastest rates of growth among major economies. Attempts to expand global strategic influence, a natural outcome of robust economic expansion, should have seen India pursuing an aggressive outward-oriented external trade policy for increasing its share in global trade. India, though, has shown a marked resistance to open trade, including being reluctant to engage in regional and bilateral trade negotiations. This paper examines the dichotomy between India's desire to play a prominent global role and its aversion to open trade policies. Attributing the inward-looking approach to lack of competitiveness of Indian industry, absence of domestic pro-trade constituencies, and discomfort in negotiating new-generation trade issues, the paper argues India's quest for greater global strategic influence might be adversely affected by its restrictive trade policies.

Using detailed information on policy interventions by US sub-national governments between 2009 and 2019, the contribution of such public bodies to Sino-US geopolitical rivalry is examined, in particular since President Trump took office in 2017. While US sub-national governments accounted for 28% of all US policy interventions that harmed Chinese commercial interests, awarding firm-specific subsidies in 88% of cases, the timing and sectoral incidence of such intervention suggests that economic statecraft considerations could only be part of the explanation for their actions. Ironically, the interventions of US sub-national governments and their weak commitment to transparency have much in common with their frequently maligned Chinese counterparts.

Through legislative changes, tariff wars, and executive actions, the Trump Administration has injected a new urgency into international technology and supply chain management, particularly between the United States and China. Analytically, the situation invites a perspective that links practical/on-the-ground responses by commercial actors in the politics of technological competition between superpowers, i.e. a discussion that bridges the gap between policy and process. This article therefore approaches management of supply chain disruption in terms of a key security issue motivating recent changes to the trade environment: the protection of intellectual property. After reviewing critical policy developments and trade statistics, we draw upon data on IP-intensive industries from global patent offices, trade classifications for products made by these IP-intensive industries, and concordance data on patent classifications to illustrate the centrality of IP to extended supply chains. With these key relationships in mind, we outline specific opportunities that intellectual property licensing provides for managing supply chain linkages between the United States and China in the current geopolitical environment. Viewing intellectual property as both a driver of and a solution to trade difficulties highlights the sorts of cross-jurisdictional nuances that can better inform policy and business decisions alike in the broader international trade regime.