¹ For example, Klaus Knorr, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles,” World Politics, xvi (April 1964), 455, 465–66; Ransom, Harry Howe, “Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy,” World Politics, xxvii (October 1974), 145Google Scholar.

² “As that ancient retiree from the Research Department of the British Foreign Office reputedly said, after serving from 1903–50: ‘Year after year the worriers and fretters would come to me with awful predictions of the outbreak of war. I denied it each time. I was only wrong twice.’” Hughes, Thomas L., The Fate of Facts in a World of Men—Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, December 1976), 48Google Scholar. Paradoxically, “successes may be indistinguishable from failures.” If analysts predict war and the attacker cancels his plans because surprise has been lost, “success of the intelligence services would have been expressed in the falsification of its predictions,” which would discredit the analysis. Shlaim, Avi, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” World Politics, xxviii (April 1976), 378Google Scholar.

³ Compare the prescriptions in Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, “Intelligence: Seizing the Opportunity,” with George Carver's critique, both in Foreign Policy, No. 22 (Spring 1976).

⁴ Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962)Google Scholar; Whaley, Barton, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press 1973)Google Scholar; Weerd, Harvey De, “Strategic Surprise in the Korean War,” Orbis, vi (Fall 1962)Google Scholar; Whiting, Alan, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan 1960)Google Scholar; Schnabel, James F., Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army 1972), 61–65Google Scholar, 83–85, 274–78; Handel, Michael I., Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, Jerusalem Paper No. 19, 1976)Google Scholar; Shlaim (fn. 2); Ben-Zvi, Abraham, “Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks,” World Politics, xxviii (April 1976)Google Scholar; Perlmutter, Amos, “Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: Political and Military Misperceptions,” Orbis, xix (Summer 1975)Google Scholar; U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Intelligence [hereafter cited as HSCI], Hearings, US. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975; Draft Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, published in The Village Voice, February 16, 1976, pp. 76–81.

⁵ Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House 1972)Google Scholar; Blachman, Morris, “The Stupidity of Intelligence,” in Peters, Charles and Adams, Timothy J., eds., Inside the System (New York: Praeger 1970)Google Scholar; McGarvey, Patrick J., “DIA: Intelligence to Please,” in Halperin, Morton and Kanter, Arnold, eds., Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown 1973)Google Scholar; Cooper, Chester, “The CIA and Decision-Making,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50 (January 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adams, Sam, “Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With Numbers,” Harper's, Vol. 251 (June 1975)Google Scholar; Oberdorfer, Don, Tet! (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1971)Google Scholar. For a more detailed review, see Betts, Richard K., Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1977)Google Scholar, chap. 10.

⁶ Quoted in Brandon, Henry, The Retreat of American Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1973), 103Google Scholar.

⁷ Betts (fn. 5), 160–61, 192–95. On bias within CIA, see James Schlesinger's comments in U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [hereafter cited as SSCI], Final Report, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, 76–77.

⁸ ibid., Book IV, 56–59; Lee, William T., Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 6, 1977), 24–37Google Scholar; Wohlstetter, Albert: “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Foreign Policy, No. 15 (Summer 1974)Google Scholar; Wohlstetter, , “Rivals, But No Race,” Foreign Policy, No. 16 (Fall 1974)Google Scholar; Wohlstetter, , “Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves,” Foreign Policy, No. 20 (Fall 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There are exceptions to this pattern of military and civilian bias: see ibid., 185–88; Lieutnant General Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.), “The Intelligence Mythology of Washington,” Strategic Review, iv (Summer 1976), 61–62Google Scholar, 64; Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Knopf 1974), 309Google Scholar.

⁹ The U.S. intelligence community includes the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, the intelligence branches of each military service, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the intelligence units of the Treasury and Energy Departments, and the FBI. Before 1973, coordination for national estimates was done through the Office of National Estimates, and since then, through the National Intelligence Officers. The Intelligence Community Staff assists the Director of Central Intelligence in managing allocation of resources and reviewing the agencies' performance.

¹⁰ HSCI, Hearings (fn. 4), 656–57.

¹¹ Wilensky, , Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books 1967), 42–62Google Scholar, 126, 179.

¹² ibid., passim. The counterpoint of Cooper (fn. 5) and McGarvey (fn. 5) presents a perfect illustration.

¹³ Allison, Graham and Szanton, Peter, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection (New York: Basic Books 1976), 204Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Quoted in SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 82.

¹⁵ ibid., 267, 276; SSCI, Staff Report, Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 48–49. The Senate Committee deplored the tendency of decision makers to focus on the latest raw data rather than on refined analyses, a practice that contributed to the intelligence failure in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 443. But the failure in the October War was largely due to the reverse phenomenon: disregarding warning indicators because they contradicted finished intelligence that minimized the possibility of war. HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 78; Ben-Zvi (fn. 4), 386, 394; Perlmutter (fn. 4), 453.

¹⁶ Churchill, , The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1948), 587–88Google Scholar.

¹⁷ “Where the end is knowledge, as in the scientific community, time serves intelligence; where the end is something else—as in practically every organization but those devoted entirely to scholarship—time subverts intelligence, since in the long run, the central institutionalized structures and aims (the maintenance of authority, the accommodation of departmental rivalries, the service of established doctrine) will prevail.” Wilensky (fn. 11), 77.

¹⁸ Quoted in SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), 1, 274.

¹⁹ Kent, Sherman, “Estimates and Influence,” Foreign Service Journal, xlvi (April 1969), 17Google Scholar.

²⁰ Hughes (fn. 2), 43.

²¹ “The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reliable intelligence, and should never cease to be suspicious, but what is the use of such feeble maxims? They belong to that wisdom which for want of anything better scribblers of systems and compendia resort to when they run out of ideas.” Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, ed. and trans, by Howard, Michaeland Paret, Peter (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 117Google Scholar.

²² Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 132Google Scholar; Jervis, , Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 4; Floyd Allport, Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure, cited in Shlaim (fn. 2), 358. Cognitive theory suggests that uncertainty provokes decision makers to separate rather than integrate their values, to deny that inconsistencies between values exist, and even to see contradictory values as mutually supportive. Steinbruner, John, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 105–8Google Scholar.

²³ See McGuire, William J., “Selective Exposure: A Summing Up,” in Abelson, R. P. and others, eds., Theories of Cognitive Consistency (Chicago: Rand McNally 1968)Google Scholar, and Janis, Irving L. and Mann, Leon, Decision Maying: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press 1977), 213–14Google Scholar.

²⁴ CIA Intelligence Information Cable, “Remarks of the Chief of the Nanking Military Academy and Other Chinese Leaders on the Situation in South Vietnam,” June 25, 1964, in Lyndon B. Johnson Library National Security Files, Vietnam Country File [hereafter cited as LBJL/NSF-VNCF], Vol. XII, item 55.

²⁵ See for example, U.S., Department of Defense, The Senator Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press 1971)Google Scholar [hereafter cited as Pentagon Papers], Vol. II, 99; Fitzgerald, Frances, Fire in the Lake (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown 1972), 364Google Scholar; Special National Intelligence Estimate 53–64, “Chances for a Stable Government in South Vietnam,” September 18, 1964, and McGeorge Bundy's covering letter to the President, in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, Vol. XIII, item 48.

²⁶ McGarvey, Patrick J., CIA: The Myth and the Madness (Baltimore: Penguin 1974), 16Google Scholar.

²⁷ Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B., The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House 1962), 56Google Scholar, 176, 180; Armbrister, Trevor, A Matter of Accountability (New York: Coward-McCann 1970), 116–18Google Scholar, 141–45, 159, 187–95; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report, Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents [hereafter cited as Pueblo and EC-121 Report], 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 1622–24, 1650–51; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents [hereafter cited as Pueblo and EC-121 Hearing], 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 693–94, 699–700, 703–7, 714, 722, 734, 760, 773–78, 815–16.

²⁸ SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 61–62; HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 82.

²⁹ McGarvey (fn. 26), 16.

³⁰ Shlaim (fn. 2), 375–77. The proposals follow, with their U.S. analogues noted in parentheses: appoint a special intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister (Director of Central Intelligence) to supplement the military chief of intelligence; reinforce the Foreign Ministry's research department (Bureau of Intelligence and Research); more autonomy for non-military intelligence (CIA); amend rules for transmitting raw intelligence to research agencies, the Defense Minister, and the Prime Minister (routing of signals intelligence from the National Security Agency); restructure military intelligence (creation of DIA in 1961); establish a central evaluation unit (Office of National Estimates). On the U.S. intelligence failure in 1973, see the HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 78–79.

³¹ Shlaim (fn. 2), 379; Handel (fn. 4), 62–63.

³² ibid., 55.

³³ Shlaim (fn. 2), 358–59. The Israeli command estimated a higher probability of attack in May 1973 than it did in October. Having been proved wrong in May, Chief of Staff Elazar lost credibility in challenging intelligence officers, complained that he could no longer argue effectively against them, and consequently was unable to influence his colleagues when he was right. Personal communication from Michael Handel, November 15, 1977.

³⁴ Washington Post, November 27, 1977, p. A17.

³⁵ Garthoff, Raymond, “On Estimating and Imputing Intentions,” International Security, 11 (Winter 1978), 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ Westmoreland, , A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1976), 316Google Scholar. See the postmortem by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, quoted in Schandler, Herbert Y., The Unmaking of a President (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977), 70Google Scholar, 76, 79–80.

³⁷ Wohlstetter (fn. 4), 69.

³⁸ George, “The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (September 1972). My usage of the term multiple advocacy is looser than George's.

³⁹ Graff, Henry F., The Tuesday Cabinet (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970), 68–71Google Scholar; Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, forthcoming), chap. 4; Ball memorandum of October 5, 1964, reprinted as “Top Secret: The Prophecy the President Rejected,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 230 (July 1972)Google Scholar; McCone, memorandum of April 2, 1965, in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, Troop Decision folder, item 14b.

⁴⁰ Betts (fn. 5), 199–202; Schandler (fn. 36), 177. George (fn. 38), 759, stipulates that multiple advocacy requires “no major maldistribution” of power, influence, competence, information, analytic resources, and bargaining skills. But, except for resources and the right to representation, the foregoing are subjective factors that can rarely be equalized by design. If they are equalized, in the context of imperfect data and time pressure, erroneous arguments as well as accurate ones will be reinforced. Non-expert principals have difficulty arbitrating intellectually between experts who disagree.

⁴¹ Quoted in Steinbruner (fn. 22), 332.

⁴² Clausewitz (fn. 21), 117–18; HSCI, Hearings (fn. 4), 634–36; William J. Barnds, “Intelligence and Policymaking in an Institutional Context,” in U.S., Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy [hereafter cited as Murphy Commission], Appendices (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., June 1975)Google Scholar, Vol. VII, 32.

⁴³ HSCI, Hearings (fn. 4), 778.

⁴⁴ SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), IV, 57; Hilsman, Roger, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1956), 40Google Scholar. During brief service as just a low-level staff member of the National Security Council, even I never had time to read all the intelligence analyses relevant to my work.

⁴⁵ SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 344, and IV, 95 (emphasis deleted).

⁴⁶ Cline, Ray S., Secrets, Spies, and Scholars (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis 1976), 20Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Fitzhugh, Gilbert W. and others, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, By the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., July 1970), 45–46Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Alexander George, “The Devil's Advocate: Uses and Limitations,” Murphy Commission, Appendices (fn. 42), II, 84–85; Jervis, Perception and Misperception (fn. 22), 417.

⁴⁹ ibid., 416.

⁵⁰ U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Capability and Objectives, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978; New York Times, December 26, 1976, pp. 1, 14; Washington Post, January 2, 1977, pp. Ai, A4.

⁵¹ Poteat, George H., “The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise,” International Studies Notes, iii (Fall 1976), 15Google Scholar.

⁵² Cline (fn. 46), 140.

⁵³ SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 352. A valid criticism is that military personnel systems and promotion standards penalized intelligence officers, thus encouraging competent officers to avoid intelligence assignments. This situation was rectified in the service intelligence agencies by the early 1970's, but not within DIA. ibid.; Betts (fn. 5), 19697.

⁵⁴ SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 77–82. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, National Security Act Amendment, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 14–24.

⁵⁵ Zumwalt, , On Watch (New York: Quadrangle 1976), 459Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Wilensky (fn. 11), 164.

⁵⁷ Jervis, Perception and Misperception (fn. 22), 181–87.

⁵⁸ Knorr (fn. 1), 460.

⁵⁹ SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), I, 276, and IV, 85; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1977, 515–621; Washington Post, February 15, 1977, p. A6; Blackstock, Paul W., “The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration,” Armed Forces and Society, 1 (February 1975), 238CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶¹ See, for example, Blaker, James and Hamilton, Andrew, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1977)Google Scholar

⁶² SSCI, Final Report (fn. 7), 1, 61; Belden, Thomas G., “Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations,” International Studies Quarterly, xxi (March 1977), 192–93Google Scholar.

⁶³ Pentagon Papers, IV, 111–12, 115–24, 217–32. CIA critiques of bombing results began even before the Tonkin Gulf crisis. CIA/OCI, Current Intelligence Memorandum, “Effectiveness of T-28 Strikes in Laos,” June 26, 1964; CIA/DDI, Intelligence Memorandum, “Communist Reaction to Barrel Roll Missions,” December 29, 1964. But ambivalence remained even within the CIA, which occasionally issued more sanguine evaluations—e.g., CIA Memorandum for National Security Council, “The Situation in Vietnam,” June 28, 1965 (which McGeorge Bundy called directly to the President's attention), and CIA/OCI, Intelligence Memorandum, “Interdiction of Communist Infiltration Routes in Vietnam,” June 24, 1965. (All memoranda are in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, Vol. I, item 5, Vol. Ill, items 28, 28a, 28b, Vol. VI A, items 4, 5, 8.) See also Pentagon Papers, IV, 71–74. See also the opposing assessments of the CIA, the civilian analysts in the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs in NSSM-i (the Nixon Administration's initial review of Vietnam policy), reprinted in the Congressional Record, Vol. 118, part 13, 92d Cong., 2d sess., May 10,1972, pp. 16749–836.