¹ Many of the contemporary separatist movements are covered in Walker Connor, “Self-Determination: The New Phase,” World Politics, xx (October 1967), 30–54; more detailed descriptions of separatist movements in Wales, Brittany, and Quebec may be found in Davies, E. Hudson, “Welsh Nationalism,” Political Quarterly, xxxix (July-September 1968), 322–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hayward, J.E.S., “From Functional Regionalism to Functional Representation in France: The Battle of Brittany,” Political Studies XVIII (March 1969), 48–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wilson, Frank L., “French-Canadian Separatism,” Western Political Quarterly xx (March 1967), 116–32Google Scholar.

² A history of Scottish nationalism may be found in Coupland, Sir R., Welsh and Scottish Nationalism (London 1954)Google Scholar. This is brought up to date in Kellas, James G., Modern Scotland: The Nation Since i8yo (New York 1968), 201–206Google Scholar.

³ Whereas 79 percent of the local Labour and Conservative leaders interviewed in this study were above the age of 37, only 43 percent of the S.N.P. leaders were above dais age.

⁴ Only 10 percent of the local S.N.P. leaders had previously been members of other political parties and an additional 7 percent had done limited door-step work. Forty percent of the S.N.P. local leaders had been members of the Party for less than 3 years and 68 percent had been members for less than 5 years. In addition, information sheets handed in to the Party headquarters by 122 S.N.P. candidates for council office indicate that only 8 percent of these candidates recalled any previous political activity, that approximately 62 percent had been members of the S.N.P. for 3 years or less, and that 78 percent had been members for 5 years or less.

⁵ BBC-I, “The Disunited Kingdom? An Enquiry into the Forces of Nationalism in Scotland and Wales,” transmitted on June 12, 1968, reported a public opinion poll in which 17 percent of the Scottish sample desired complete Scottish independence and an additional 46 percent wanted a regional Scottish government. The figures can be found on BBC-I, 5318/5610, Section h, p.ii. Polls carried out in both Glasgow and Dundee in the spring of 1968 indicated that from 20 to 30 percent of the public intended to vote S.N.P. in general elections. See, for example, The Scotsman, July 8, 1968.

⁶ The importance S.N.P. local leaders attach to democratic methods is indicated by their answers to the following question: “Is there anything essentially different about the S.N.P. from the other parties to which you attach great importance besides the policy of Scottish independence?” Although it is an open-ended question, 63 percent of the respondents said the S.N.P. was more democratically organized and more responsive to local demands and pressures. A second indication of the importance most S.N.P. local leaders attach to democratic methods is that 83 percent of them said that no political party (not even a unionist party) should be outlawed if Scotland becomes independent.

⁷ Of 40 S.N.P. local leaders interviewed, 36 said that any member who used violence ought to be immediately expelled from the Party, regardless of circumstances.

⁸ “Now's the Day, Now's the Hour,” The Economist (May 11, 1968), 9.

⁹ The centrality of psychological variables to most theories of violence is argued in Gurr, Ted, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” World Politics, xx (January 1968), 245–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Gurr, Ted, in “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” American Political Science Review, LXII (December 1968)Google Scholar, found that “relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for strife” (1122) and that, as a necessary precondition, relative deprivation accounted for 47 percent of the total magnitude of civil strife (1120–21). These findings pertain to only two of the four major psychological variables used in this study.

¹¹ This is the case especially because regional data for some indicators is not available, so that die researcher is forced to turn to odier indicators.

¹² Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, No. 105, 1968.

¹³ Denison, Edward F., Why Growth Rates Differ: Post-War Experience in Nine Western Countries (Washington 1967)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The population of local party officials was calculated on the basis of two active local (constituency) officials per party per constituency. Given 71 Scottish constituencies, this produces a total of 436 active local party officials for the Conservative, Labour, and Scottish National parties. A random order of 55 constituencies was taken. One S.N.P. local official, who the central party thought was very active, and either one Conservative or one Labourite, was interviewed in 40 constituencies. Again, the central party provided information on the officials it thought were very active. If either the S.N.P. or Conservative or Labour Party local leader could not be interviewed (vacations, no time, etc.), the next constituency on the list of 55 was taken. The total sample of 86 represents approximately 20 percent of the population of 436.

¹⁵ See, for example, “A Theory of Stable Democracy,” in Eckstein, Harry, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton 1966)Google Scholar; Smelser, Neil J., Theory of Collective Behavior (New York 1963); and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Eckstein, 239–40 (parentheses added).

¹⁷ Ibid., 255.

¹⁸ This is not meant to be critical of Eckstein, for his test focuses on the structural variables rather than on the more immediate psychological variable. Nevertheless, since is is the psychological variable common to these theories, our test focuses on this variable.

¹⁹ Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Champaign, Illinois 1962), 12Google Scholar, by permission of the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing. It is, of course, impossible to know how much the S.N.P. local leaders have changed since they became members of the Party. But there is no significant correlation between the scores and the length of membership in the Party. The distribution of those who have been in the Party less than 2 years is the same as of those who have been in the Party longer dian 2 years.

²⁰ Ibid., 12.

²¹ Ibid., 19.

²² Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe 1963)Google Scholar. Allied sociological and political theories are noted, 21–25. Th e close relationship between mass behavior and violence is made clear by Kornhauser when he quotes Selznick: “Mass behavior is associated … with increasing reliance on force to resolve social conflict,” 45.

²³ For the variety of groups, see Potter, Allen, Organized Groups in British National Politics (London 1961)Google Scholar; for a case study of their influence, see Eckstein, Harry, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of The British Medical Association (Stanford 1960)Google Scholar.

²⁴ Kellas, 206–209.

²⁵ Ibid., 207–208.

²⁶ The figure pertaining to council candidates is based on the information sheets that 122 S.N.P. council candidates filed at the Party's central headquarters.

²⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, Le mouvement Poujade, quoted in Kornhauser, 204–205.

²⁸ Figures on net emigration from Scotland are found in Central Statistical Office, 16.

²⁹ Figures for 1966 may be found in The Scotsman's Diary, 1968, frontispiece; figures for 1961 may be found in the 1961 Census, Occupation and Industry, and are reported in Kellas, 244–45.

³⁰ The Scotsman's Diary, 1968, frontispiece; figures for 1961 are found in the 1961 Census, and are reported in Kellas, 244–45.

³¹ Figures found in Kellas, 244–45 show that the Scottish and English-Welsh economies were fairly similar in 1961. At that time, the somewhat outmoded industries accounted for 12.4 percent of the English and Welsh working populations and 17 percent of the Scottish working population. Th e prosperous industries accounted for 30.2 percent of the English and Welsh working populations and 25.4 percent of the Scottish working populations.

³² Ted Gurr, “A Causal Model.” The relation between his approach and other frustration-aggression approaches is found in Gurr, “Psychological Factors.”

³³ Although Gurr does not direct his argument to regional movements, its application to them may be deduced from the argument.

³⁴ S.N.P., Scotland v. Whitehall, No. 1, 14, from a Parliamentary answer by Mrs. Shirley Williams.

³⁵ Butler, David and Freeman, Jennie, British Political Facts 1900–1967 (London 1968), 59–65Google Scholar.

³⁶ Central Statistical Office, 247.

³⁷ Ibid., 336.

³⁸ The Times, July 22, 1968.

³⁹ Although these economic deprivations have been present for some time and are in this sense persistent, they do not involve discrimination in the sense implied in our discussion of persistent deprivation.

⁴⁰ See Table IV. See also Kellas, 246.

⁴¹ Kellas, 243.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ It should be noted that income per head in Scotland is higher than it is in either Wales or Northern Ireland. See Report of the Commissioners of H. M. Inland Revenue, 109, Cmnd. 3200. Moreover, per capita family income (based on median) is about 20 percent lower in the American south than it is in the northeast and 23 percent less than it is in the west. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book of the Year, 1960, “Developments in the States, 1968,” 24. These figures can be compared to the figure of 10 percent for Scotland in relation to the United Kingdom.

⁴⁴ These people believe that deprivation occurs because Scottish parliamentarians can be easily outvoted. In any case, the loyalty of Scottish parliamentarians tends to be more to party than to Scotland. Since the major parties are based in London, and since the British economy depends so heavily on the health of the English economy, party policies are defined by English interests. Perceptions of party discipline helped elicit this view. Also of importance may be the quite low degree of regularized contact many MP's have with their constituencies. See Dowse, Robert E., “The MP and his Surgery,” Political Studies, XI (October 1963), 333–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar and The Times, July 6, 1968.

⁴⁵ It is reasonable to assume, on the basis of incremental budgeting processes, that Scotland has been favored for some time. On incrementalism, see Wildavsky, Aaron, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston 1964)Google Scholar. The incremental process is based on pragmatic bargaining. An analysis of pragmatism in British politics may be found in Christoph, James, “Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology,” American Political Science Review, LIX (September 1965), 629–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁶ Walker Connor, 39.

⁴⁷ BBC-I, Section ic, iii and v.

⁴⁸ Budge, Ian and Urwin, Derek W., Scottish Political Behaviour (London 1966), 112–20Google Scholar. The significance of class perceptions in British and Scottish politics may be found in Alford, Robert, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago 1963), 123–71Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Doob, Leonard, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations (New Haven 1964)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ It is possible that regionalism became politically salient as an identity not only because of its own strength but also because the competing source of identity (class) was declining. Considering the recent changes in British class structure, this possibility is not out of the question. A good assessment of the tenor of class change is found in Dahrendorf, Ralf, “Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies,” Daedalus, XCIII (Winter 1964) 225–70Google Scholar.

⁵¹ This leads us to the notion that, when we are dealing with certain variables in studies of violence, we may find that aggregate data are appropriate substitutes for attitudinal data.

⁵² Indeed, approximately half of the S.N.P. local leaders spontaneously asserted that they did not dislike the English. According to The Economist, moreover, “Mrs. Ewing is careful to stress the natural friendship of the Scots and English, on and off the platform.” The Economist, May 11, 1968, 9.