* This preliminary research report is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29-September 2, 1974. I am grateful especially for critical comments on the original manuscript from Edward L. Morse, Joseph S. Nye, Uwe Nerlich, John Yochelson, Lynn E. Davis, and Harald B. Malmgren. In addition to open sources, I have drawn on a series of interviews with government officials conducted over the past several years, and on my own experience as a member of the National Security Council staff during 1970–71. Appreciation is expressed to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, for support during various phases of this research.

¹ I use the term “model” to mean “conceptual framework” for the purpose of explanation of certain kinds of foreign policy decisions or actions. By implication, these models may also be used for prediction, but that is not the primary focus in this paper. Ibid.,

² See for example, Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley 1960)Google Scholar;Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1961)Google Scholar; Schilling, Warner R., “The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950,” in Schilling, Warner R., Hammond, Paul T., and Snyder, Glenn H., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press 1962), 1–267Google Scholar;Lowi, Theodore J., “Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press 1967), 295–331Google Scholar; and Hilsman, Roger, The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row 1971)Google Scholar.

³ Cf. Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 1971)Google Scholar; Allison, Graham T. and Halperin, Morton H., “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” in Tanter, Raymond, Ullman, Richard H., eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 40–80Google Scholar; Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1974)Google Scholar. See also Neustadt, Richard E., Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1970). For critical discussion, seeGoogle ScholarKrasner, Stephen D., “Are Bureaucracies Important?” Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), 159–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Art, Robert J., “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences, No. 4 (1973), 467–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Reedy, George E., The Twilight of the Presidency (Mentor Pocket Edition; New York: New American Library 1970), 99Google Scholar. For a related recent discussion, see also Perlmutter, Amos, “The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy,” World Politics, XXVII, No. 1 (10 1974), esp. 99–106Google Scholar.

⁵ George, Alexander L., “The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (09 1972), 751–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Janis, Irving L., Victims of Groupthing (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972)Google Scholar. The quotations are from p. 13.

⁷ Cf. Hodgson, Godfrey, “The Establishment,” Foreign Policy, No. 10 (Spring 1973), 3–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also, for general treatment, George, Alexander L., “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly, XIII (1969), 190–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Halperin (fn. 3), n-16. On Vietnam policy, see Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House 1972)Google Scholar; and Donovan, John C., The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite (Lexington, Mass., D. C., Heath 1974)Google Scholar.

⁸ The development is traced in Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973)Google Scholar.

⁹ The last President to appoint a major political figure as Secretary of State was Harry Truman, who offered the post to James F. Byrnes, his rival for the Vice Presidential nomination in 1944, and later regretted it. Cf. Koenig, Louis, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1964), 220Google Scholar. More recent partial exceptions are Melvin Laird and John Connally, Cabinet appointees under President Nixon who had some political following of their own.

¹⁰ Cf. Destler, I. M., Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), chap. 5Google Scholar.

¹¹ Quoted, ibid., 118.

¹² Nixon, Richard M., U.S. Foreign Policy for the igyo‘s, A New Strategy for Peace. Report to the Congress, 02 18, 1970, p. 22Google Scholar.

¹³ Not all of the committees, it should be noted, were successful. The Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) failed to gain control over the defense budget process. And the Under Secretaries Committee (USC), charged with monitoring policy implementation in several areas, turned in a mixed performance, as noted further on. For more detailed accounts of the structure of the NSC system, see ibid., Part I, and Nixon, , U.S. Foreign Policy for the igyo’s, Building for Peace. Report to the Congress, 02 25, 1971, Part VIGoogle Scholar; also the series of articles in the New York Times, January 18–24, 1971, later issued as a pamphlet entitled “United States Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration”; Kolodziej, Edward A., “The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications,” Public Administration Review, XXIX (11/12 1969), 573–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Orr, Samuel C., “Defense Report: National Security Council Network Gives White House Tight Rein over SALT Strategy,” National Journal, II (04 24, 1971), 877–86Google Scholar; Leacacos, John P., “Kissinger's Apparat,” Foreign Policy, No. 5 (Winter 1971/1972), 3–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Destler (fn. 10), especially chap. 5.

¹⁴ An experienced government official has suggested the following typology of kinds of policy discussions that have occurred at the level of the SRG or VP:

1) Kissinger knows what he wants and argues for it at the outset. He tends to dominate the group. Others take him on only if they are forceful personalities and very sure of their arguments. There is sometimes a danger of groupthink tendencies if people are afraid to disagree.

2) A “group grope” when nobody is sure of his ground on a new or unexplored policy issue.

3) Kissinger is open at the start and other agency representatives go into a meeting with strong, fixed views. A hybrid solution emerges which Kissinger accepts as a consensus.

4) A flight from decision-nobody wants to resolve a question.

¹⁵ Cf. Destler (fn. 10), 140–41, 148–53.

¹⁶ Important among these are Lawrence S. Eagleburger, his Executive Assistant: Helmut Sonnenfeldt, now Counselor of the Department with special responsibilities for Soviet and European policies; Winston Lord, who heads Policy Planning; and William Hyland, now Director of Intelligence and Research, who is a crack Soviet analyst.

¹⁷ See Gelb, Leslie H., “Nixon Role in Foreign Policy Altered; Some Assert Kissinger Is Now In Charge,” New York, Times, 12 24, 1973Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See, for example, Gelb, Leslie H., “Schlesinger for Defense, Defense for Detente,” New York Times Magazine, 08 4, 1974Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Our definition of Europe is political rather than geographic here, and we therefore include cases dealing with the Soviet Union.

²⁰ Indeed, according to the list published by John P. Leacacos, there was no NSSM on overall U.S.-Soviet relations between 1969 and the fall of 1971, although there were NSSM's on specific problem areas, such as SAL T and Berlin. See Leacacos (fn. 13).

²¹ See the account in Brandon, Henry, The Retreat of American Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1973), chap. 16Google Scholar, on which I draw here.

²² See the accounts in Kalb, Marvin and Kalb, Bernard, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown 1974), esp. chap. 12Google Scholar.

²³ The most detailed account of the Middle East crisis so far, and the one on which I rely most here, is contained in Kalb and Kalb, ibid., chaps. 17 and 18. See also David Binder's articles in the New York Times, November 21 and 25, 1973.

²⁴ The text of the “Year of Europe” speech is reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 68, May 14, 1973.

²⁵ See Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, XXVII (10 1974), esp. 42–50Google Scholar.

Several European and American drafts of the declarations of Atlantic principles were published in the New York Times with accounts of the negotiations: the EC Nine draft on relations between the Common Market and the U.S., to which Washington objected, New York Times, September 24, 1973; the EC Nine “European identity” declaration, December 15, 1973; two French drafts of the NATO declaration, the first quoted in the New York Times, November 9, the second reprinted in full on November 19. 1973.

²⁶ The final declaration of Atlantic security principles, which has since become known as the Atlantic Declaration, was agreed to at the NATO Ministerial meeting at Ottawa and printed in the New York Times, June 20, 1974.

²⁷ I have drawn here on a good, but incomplete and not flawless account contained in Brandon (fn. 21), chap. 14, supplemented by several interviews with government officials.

²⁸ Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1973)Google Scholar. This unusual inside account could only have been written with the blessing of Dr. Kissinger and with access to many of the government officials most involved.

²⁹ Ibid., chap. 3.

³⁰ Ibid., 179.

³¹ Ibid., 170–78.

³² Ibid., 179–81.

³³ Ibid., 186.

³⁴ Ibid., 245–46.

³⁵ For example, NSDM 117, issued in July 1971 without much consultation with the bureaucracy, was opposed on several points by the delegation. A revised position emerged in NSDM 120. “The delegation was conceded some points, but overruled on others, including the (ICBM) freeze dates.” Ibid., 224.

³⁶ Ibid., 246. As Theodore Sorensen has written, “In choosing between conflicting advice, the President is also choosing between conflicting advisers, conferring recogni tion on some while rebuffing others. He will, consequently, take care to pay more attention to the advice of the man who must carry out the decision than the advice of a mere ‘kibitzer.’ He will be slow to overrule a Cabinet officer whose pride or prestige have been committed, not only to ease that officer's personal feelings but to maintain his utility and credibility.” Decision Maying in the White House, 79, cited in Destler (fn. 10), 134n.

³⁷ Newhouse (fn. 28), 203–19.

³⁸ Ibid., 206.

³⁹ Ibid., 243 ff.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 253.

⁴¹ From “The Berlin Agreement: An Assessment,” Address by Kenneth Rush before the Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry, September 22, 1971, in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65, November 1, 1971, p. 493.

⁴² In the following discussion, I draw in part on Yochelson, John, “The American Military Presence in Europe: Current Debate in the United States,” Orbis, XV (Fall 1971), 784–807Google Scholar.

⁴³ Ibid., 794–95.

⁴⁴ See Hodgson (fn. 7), 29–32.

⁴⁵ NATO, favoring U.S. and Soviet reductions first to a common ceiling in ground-force manpower, began the negotiations by calling for phased cuts of 10% in Western (largely U.S.) ground forces and 20% in Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces, to a ceiling of about 700,000 men. The Eastern bloc, desirous of preserving its present numerical advantage, has preferred instead equal numbers or percentage cuts in all types of forces, including air and nuclear forces, as well as immediate cuts in both stationed and indigenous forces. See the New York Times, September 16, 1973; and NATO Review, xxn (June 1974), 29–32, for a status report as of spring 1974. For the original NSC options, see the President's Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973, pp. 204–7.

⁴⁶ A question which cannot be answered here is whether this kind of policy-making group encourages groupthink tendencies, stifling critical discussion of alternatives. Much depends on the personality of the chairman. My own guess is that this phenomenon occurs less here, but more frequently in meetings chaired by Kissinger in which he’ leads the discussion forcefully on a question on which he has already made up his mind.

⁴⁷ MBFR negotiations will probably last for years, and the resulting reductions could be modest. For a critical view of U.S. MBFR policy, see Yochelson, John, “MBFR: The Search for an American Approach,” Orbis, XVII (Spring 1973), 155–75Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Cf. Bergsten, C. Fred, “Mr. Kissinger: No Economic Superstar,” New York Times, 12 12, 1973Google Scholar. The NSC staff has been only marginally involved in foreign economic policy. It usually had one or two competent staffers working on the area, but Kissinger-usually busy with other matters-frequently did not give them sufficient support to allow them to operate effectively vis-a-vis the foreign economic bureaucracy.

⁴⁹ New York Times, September 23 and October 4, 1974.

⁵⁰ For further analysis of the domestic and international political economy of U.S. trade policy, see Bare, C. Gordon, “Trade Policy and Atlantic Partnership: Prospects for New Negotiations,” Orbis, XVII (Winter 1974), 1280–1305Google Scholar; and Diebold, William Jr, “U.S. Trade Policy: The New Political Dimensions,” Foreign Affairs, LII (04 1974), 472–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The final version of the International Trade Act of 1974 is summarized in the York Times, March 10, 1975.

⁵¹ Cf. Brandon (fn. 21), chap. 14, on which I draw in the following discussion, as amended by a number of my own interviews with government officials.

⁵² This category and some others to be discussed below have been suggested by Robert J. Art (fn. 3), as preliminary issue-area tests of relevance of the bureaucratic paradigm.

⁵³ This is slightly different from the category of “institutionally-grounded issues” £ suggested by Art (fn. 3).