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Volume 14 - November 2002

Contents

Page 2 of 2

Research Article

  • Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction

  • Bashshar Haydar
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2009, pp. 96-107

  • This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or rejecting the incompatibility thesis, namely the underlying conception of responsibility. There are, I contend, two relevant conceptions of responsibility, the globalist and the localist. In order for the compatibilist argument to go through, the globalist conception must be adopted. I aim to provide a formulation and defence of the dependency of the compatibilist view on the globalist conception of responsibility. I will not, however, argue for one conception of responsibility over the other.

Discussions

Research Article

  • The ‘Two Hats’ Problem in Consequentialist Ethics

  • D. Goldstick
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2009, pp. 108-112

  • A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the ‘imposed and illusory dissociation’, if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of ‘the theorist in oneself from the self whose dispositions are being theorized’. Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.

Book Reviews

Review Article

Book Reviews

Front matter

  • UTI volume 14 issue 2 Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2009, p. f1
    • Article
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Book Reviews

Announcement

  • Announcement

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2009, p. 413
    • Article
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Other

Front matter

  • UTI volume 14 issue 3 Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2009, p. f1
    • Article
      • You have access
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  • UTI volume 14 issue 1 Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2009, p. f1
    • Article
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Page 2 of 2