Initially Locke is inclined to pour cold water on Moore's enthusiasm for spreading the word about Secret Reference. Locke believes it will remain a pearl hidden in the bushes of neglect. Moore, on the contrary, sees Secret Reference exercising a far-reaching influence on the way we approach our understanding of misunderstanding. For a start, Moore believes realizing meaning is inherently, not accidentally, indeterminate might help. Subsequently Locke begins to warm to Moore's beliefs. He proposes a possible way forward, though still not wholly convinced much can really be achieved given the kind of society we live in.

Bullshit is a prevalent phenomenon in this info-crazy world of ours. With the help of Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt, I want to provide a brief philosophical account of this phenomenon, and offer some practical tips to how we could deal with it.

Most people believe that happiness is the supreme good; that it is achievable by everyone and that everyone has a right to it. It is usually identified with the passive possession of some other material or non-material good or goods and the state of being these confer. Aristotle was one of the first thinkers to attempt an analysis of happiness. For him it consists of the active exercise of characteristic human excellence as manifested in intellectual activity and moral action. This article sets out to explain Aristotle's views and to suggest what is wrong with them.

The gospels tell us that Judas betrayed Jesus, and that this was an incredibly wicked act. Lots of people believe that at least many of the events portrayed in the New Testament did not actually happen. I argue here that if we suppose on the contrary that they did, then Judas did not in fact act wickedly, and that the only person who acted immorally in this situation was Jesus. I refer in this article first to the wonderful story ‘Three Versions of Judas’ by Borges, who draws a somewhat different conclusion from mine, and later to Amos Oz's novel Judas.

Should we congratulate runners who participate and finish a marathon without winning it? Although it might seem that all who muster the will to do so deserve praise, this article questions whether self-regarding virtues, such as running a marathon, deserve it.

Many are unwilling to donate their vital organs in death. To affirm this choice is to prefer the integrity of one's corpse over possibly saving and improving the lives of others. This position enjoys no sound defence. Refusing to donate amounts to a gratuitous moral failure.

In this dialogue I discuss the connection between eternalism (the view that past, present and future are equally real) and fatalism. I do not think, as some do, that eternalism implies fatalism, but I do think that eternalists can avoid fatalism only by denying a seemingly intuitive claim about what a traveller to the past cannot do.

Persons are widely believed to be rational, planning agents that are both author and main character of their life stories. A major goal is to keep these narratives coherent as they unfold, and part of a fulfilled life allegedly stems from this coherence. My aim is to challenge these convictions by considering two related claims about persons and their lives. (1) Contrary to the widespread theoretical conviction in philosophy of mind and action, persons are fundamentally emotional and affective rather than rational and deliberative beings. And so, (2) on a practical level, persons need not constantly aspire to integrate their past, present, and future into a coherent whole in order to live fulfilled lives. Needless to say, I cannot hope to defend these claims and their relation in great detail with a few brief strokes. In addition to theoretical reflections, I discuss some practical implications and potential benefits that come with discarding the daunting task of continuously keeping track of one's life story. Drawing on insights from a contemplative Buddhist tale, I venture that the practice of letting go can break the spell, and give rise to an alleviating source of liberation from life's troubles.

When pressed, many atheists offer three reasons why they reject theism: there is strong evidence against theism, there is no strong evidence for theism, and theism is so outrageous that it needs a great deal of support in order for us to believe it in a reasonable manner. I examine the third reason, arguing that it fails.

The key focus in ethics should be on victims. Victims are those that suffer from unnecessary and preventable pain and misery. Non-human animals can also suffer and should therefore be included in the moral circle. Ethical living is striving to avoid harm to others and striving to help alleviate or prevent suffering. Being good isn't easy.

What would you think if someone told you they heard voices when no one was there, or could sense the presence of the dead? In some historical periods and in some societies today these experiences are made sense of positively in religious or spiritual terms, but in modern western societies they tend to be regarded as symptomatic of mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. I argue that interpreting these experiences in terms of illness can negatively affect them, turning them into something pathological when they needn't necessarily be so. I also discuss wider issues regarding illness, medicine, authority, interpretation and meaning.

Should positional sexual misconduct (sexual advances or interaction where one party is known, or should be known, to have a significant power over the other) be included in the list of morally forbidden behaviours? I explore benefits and costs of this moral reform with the help of J. S. Mill.

Philosophy, by no longer performing its original therapeutic function of helping people to become wise, choosing instead to offer analysis, has left us at risk of losing the techniques which had evolved to facilitate the task of teaching wisdom throughout its history. In the process of endeavouring to re-establish Philosophy as Therapy after the war, with the aim of helping people to think for themselves rather than just study the ideas of others, Wittgenstein and Wisdom rediscovered the need for many of these techniques, especially for a way of revealing to people their underlying and unconscious assumptions.

A discussion of the under-representation of women in academic philosophy, focusing on the perception both of the nature of women and of the nature of philosophy itself.

An essay on trust.