In 2012, the politician Todd Akin caused a firestorm by suggesting, in the context of an argument about the moral permissibility of abortion, that some forms of rape were ‘legitimate’ (i.e., carried out with great force or violence). This seemed to imply that other forms of rape must not be legitimate (i.e., carried out with less force or violence). In response, several commentators pointed out that rape is a ‘heinous crime’ and that there are ‘no varying degrees of rape’. While the intention of these commentators was clear, I argue that they may – inadvertently – have played into the very stereotype of rape (implicitly) endorsed by Akin. Such a response, I claim, actually obscures a range of sexual harms, including some that may not rise to the level of being a crime. I also offer some thoughts on the moral psychology behind anti-abortion arguments of the kind advanced by Akin.

In discussions of racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice, two kinds of fallacious reasoning sometimes appear: the ‘appeal to subjective response’ and the ‘accusation of privilege’. The first fallacy treats someone's subjective response to a comment as sufficient evidence of prejudice or insensitivity. This fails to acknowledge that the reasonableness of the response is always an open question. The second fallacy involves dismissing what people accused of prejudice say in their defence on the grounds that the privileged always speak that way. This insultingly treats what is said as an effect of causes rather than the result of rational reflection. Both forms of specious reasoning risk bringing the worthy cause of combatting prejudice into disrepute.

Descartes believed not only that I think therefore I am but also that consciousness is not physical, unlike the brain. That makes consciousness different, which evidently it is, but also incapable of causing arm movements, which is unbelievable. Abstract functionalism is in the same boat. Disagreement between these and more ideas and theories surely has much to do with not talking about the same thing, no adequate initial clarification of the subject matter. We can get such a thing from a database. Consciousness is therefore something's being actual. What that comes to on further reflection is that it has characteristics that add up to its being subjectively physical – and partly outside a brain and partly inside. This theory of consciousness, Actualism, also passes other tests, including individuality and freedom.

In a previous essay (in THINK 21), Richard Ryder argued against Utilitarianism's aggregation of pains across individuals. He continues this argument and rebuts several criticisms of his moral theory of painism. Painism not only rejects the aggregation of pains across individuals, it also questions the trade-off of pains against pleasures.

In this paper, I outline a toy argument for metaphysical fatalism – i.e. there is no sense in which the world could have been different than it is. First, I explain a couple of assumptions that I make about the nature of time. These assumptions appear to be plausible and widely held – or, at least, they are reasonable positions to hold. Second, I outline and explain a thought experiment designed to bring our fatalist-friendly intuitions to the forefront.

This article provides an argument against ethical subjectivism as a normative theory. It highlights how ethical subjectivism does not correspond with the phenomena of how we argue. Ethical subjectivism suggests that ethics is a matter of subjective preferences, but we do not usually enter into a serious debate on such matters. On the contrary, when we argue we believe that what we argue for is objectively true. This may pose a serious problem to an ethical subjectivist who holds that ethical conceptions are neither superior nor inferior to each other. The article also outlines the implications of the position of an ethical subjectivist and how they go against our deepest moral intuition that ‘might is not right’.

According to the fairness argument, same-sex marriage must be permitted because without it there would not be equal treatment for homosexuals and heterosexuals. In (THINK 36), Piers Benn holds that the argument does eventually deliver this conclusion, but not as readily as intuitively appears. He concludes that some conservative points against same-sex marriage achieve at least a stand-off from the point of view of the argument. I argue that he accords the conservative points much more significance than they actually deserve and misconstrues the metaphysical dimension that is an important part of how the fairness argument operates.

In his Does God have a Nature, Alvin Plantinga aims to explore three interrelated questions: (i) does God have a nature? (ii) if so, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? and (iii) how is God related to such abstract objects as properties and propositions? It seems clear from the introduction of the book, however, that his main and primary concern is to support two Divine widely accepted attributes namely God's aseity and sovereignty.

2014 marked the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War. This paper considers whether there are moral reasons to remember wars. It is argued that the most convincing reason for remembering wars is that they provide valuable lessons about human nature. The First World War elucidates several aspects of human nature, including our tribalism, sheepishness, drive for honour and over-confidence. Taking heed of these lessons may help avert future conflict.

Critical thinking is widely regarded as one of the main objectives of education in general terms, and also of science education. The idea of thinking critically, that is, to evaluate adequately and eventually embrace a certain claim only if there are good reasons for it, however, seems to contradict some popular conceptions about other educational ideal: open-mindedness. The purpose of this essay is to discuss how critical thinking and open-mindedness are not exclusionary ideals, and how those ideas are important for science education.