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In a previous essay (in THINK 21), Richard Ryder argued against Utilitarianism's aggregation of pains across individuals. He continues this argument and rebuts several criticisms of his moral theory of painism. Painism not only rejects the aggregation of pains across individuals, it also questions the trade-off of pains against pleasures.
1 Joost Leuven and Tatjana Visak, ‘Ryder's Painism and his Criticism of Utilitarianism’, J. Agric. Environmental Ethics, 23 February, 2012. online.
2 Richard D. Ryder: Speciesism Painism and Happiness : A Morality for the Twenty-First Century (Imprint Academic, 2011), and Painism and Speciesism in The Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, (ed.) Ruth Chadwick (Academic Press, 2012).
3 Richard D. Ryder: Animal Revolution : Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism, Basil Blackwell, 1989.
4 Richard D. Ryder: Speciesism Painism and Happiness : A Morality for the Twenty-First Century (Imprint Academic, 2011).
5 The Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, (ed.) Ruth Chadwick (Academic Press, 2012).
6 Richard D. Ryder: Painism – Historical and Ethical Aspects, Symposium on The Science and Philosophy of Pain (Vlaams Diergeneeskundig Tijdschrift, 2000), 69, 401–406