‘Neuroreductionism’ is the tendency to reduce complex mental phenomena to brain states, confusing correlation for physical causation. In this paper, we illustrate the dangers of this popular neuro-fallacy, by looking at an example drawn from the media: a story about ‘hypoactive sexual desire disorder’ in women. We discuss the role of folk dualism in perpetuating such a confusion, and draw some conclusions about the role of ‘brain scans’ in our understanding of romantic love.

What is living well? We describe two contrasting lives and ask whether one is better lived than the other. Many philosophers, among them Susan Wolf, Richard Kraut and Stephen Darwall would say so. We criticize their position, which views certain activities as intrinsically more worthy than others. Instead, we conclude that persons are living well if they act morally and find long-term satisfaction, regardless of the pursuits they choose.

This article responds to Tibor Machan's criticisms of government provision for needy citizens. It argues that although charity may be morally worthy, private charity is inadequate to the task of providing our fellow citizens with the security they deserve; the tremendous social good of secure access to a life of dignity can only be produced by a public social safety net. Moreover, individual rights to property do not stand in the way of providing a public social safety net. Since there are social inputs in wealth creation, reasonable levels of taxation do not violate people's rights to their wealth.

This short paper argues that two attempts in this journal to argue for the moral permissibility of homosexual activity do not succeed.

Retribution enjoys an unwarranted appeal from the public and its politicians. This is because it is impractical and perhaps even incoherent. This does not mean that we should reject the importance of morality for criminal justice nor should we reject the link between desert and proportionality. Nevertheless, we can reject the way retribution has understood these ideas in defense of a more plausible and compelling alternative.

Forcehimes argues that any argument concerning copyright law which favours the existence of public libraries will necessarily also justify the downloading of ebooks without the copyright owners’ authorisation. As the justification for copyright protection is an economic one, it is submitted that, economically, there is a material difference between permitting public libraries making physical books available and allowing such online distribution of ebooks. Prohibiting the online distribution of ebooks without the copyright holders' consent, while permitting access to physical books via public libraries, is a policy which, at present, is consistent with the rationale for copyright protection.

I argue that amongst its many benefits, the history of philosophy is an excellent resource for the cultivation of certain intellectual virtues, most notably gratitude, humility, and justice. Acquaintance with the history of philosophy can, therefore, be edifying, in the sense of being conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues. These virtues can be cultivated in many ways, but the history of philosophy offers unique means for securing them, and some familiar pedagogical and intellectual uses of the history of philosophy in fact reflect its edifying functions.

Kant's monumental Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) begins with his account of perception. Look around you. An experience is the result. You seem to see a chair and a person, say – your spouse at rest. A welcome sight. A gift from the world, in more than one sense. Yet not all aspects of the experience – even perhaps of its content – are coming to you from the world, according to Kant. What else is involved?

Based on Robert Baker's metaphorical view of damaging language, I argue that morally responsible individuals are obligated to refrain from using the word ‘gay’ as a negative adjective directed towards that which the speaker dislikes. According to the metaphorical view, while a speaker may understand her use of the word ‘gay’ as devoid of homosexual connotations, the hearer – particularly a young person still coming to understand his own sexuality – is likely to conclude that his ‘gayness’ puts him in the same hated category as all of those other objects, events, and persons who are negatively called ‘gay’.

This essay examines the results of my attempt to use humorous video clips in a ‘Philosophy of Humor and Laughter’ course taught in the Fall of 2010 and 2011. The regular display of these clips was designed to enhance my students' understanding of the central concepts of the course, participation in class discussions and to encourage them to think more critically and creatively. The results of a survey I administered at the end of the semester suggest that there is a positive correlation between the use of the humorous clips and my students' understanding of the content, engagement in the lessons and ability to think critically. Both the quantitative and qualitative results of the survey as well as other methods of data collection indicate that watching and analyzing the humorous clips provided the students with a very valuable perspective that illuminated the ideas that we read. The results of this study also suggest that a course on the philosophy of humor and laughter can be very effective in getting students to think philosophically and appreciate the value of philosophy for their lives.