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THE TIME SHUFFLING MACHINE AND METAPHYSICAL FATALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 September 2015

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Abstract

In this paper, I outline a toy argument for metaphysical fatalism – i.e. there is no sense in which the world could have been different than it is. First, I explain a couple of assumptions that I make about the nature of time. These assumptions appear to be plausible and widely held – or, at least, they are reasonable positions to hold. Second, I outline and explain a thought experiment designed to bring our fatalist-friendly intuitions to the forefront.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

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