The Contract Regulation Club has been the dominant force in Australian industrial relations since the latter part of the 1980s. Its membership includes major business and employer organisations, leaders of the Liberal and National parties, various regulatory bodies, ‘New Right’ think tanks and media commentators. Its modus operandi is doublethink. It advocates deregulation of employment contracts while intervening in their operation and demanding more regulation to ensure that they are loaded in ‘favour’ of employers. The Club has a vision of an industrial relations nirvana where employees voluntarily align their behaviour to the needs of the enterprise. The paper argues that this vision is fundamentally flawed and is the basis of the Club's demand for more regulation. The paper examines the origins and consolidation of the Club, activities and interventions after the election of the Howard Coalition in 1996 and major features of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)

This paper seeks to look at the underlying framework of the New Consensus models of macroeconomic policy for inflation and unemployment, providing a post-Keynesian critique. In the light of this critique, the model is reformulated, with its basic structure intact, but with alternate post-Keynesian specifications of the Phillips curve being considered. It is shown that such modifications, either allow a long run trade-off between the rate of inflation and the level of output, the rate of capacity utilisation and, therefore, unemployment, or, in our preferred specification, changes in output and capacity have no implications for inflation over a large range of capacity utilisation. In either case, macroeconomic policy is restored to its role in maintaining full employment.

The Work Choices legislation represents a concerted attempt to tilt the balance of labour regulation in favour of employers. It does this by allowing them to offer agreements that reduce or eliminate award or statutory entitlements, by making it harder for both workers and unions to contest management decisions, and by sidelining the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. It also seeks to ‘move towards’ a national system of regulation by providing that the majority of employers will be exclusively subject to federal rather than State regulation, at least for some purposes. Yet for all the radical nature of many of the changes, this is not the ‘big bang’ it might have been. Many features of the old arbitration system have been retained and there are genuine compromises at the heart of some of the changes. It also remains to be seen just how quickly employers will move to exploit the opportunities the new legislation offers, given its complexity, opposition from unions, and indeed the natural pragmatism or conservatism of many managers — and whether this will prompt further intervention by a government that appears uncomfortable with leaving it to employers to make their own choices.

A meaningful discussion of the role and effectiveness of fiscal policy is not possible within the context of the antiquated textbook models, which in their current and likely future form (the ‘New Neo-Classical Synthesis) have been used to endorse the deflationary bias in macroeconomic policy formulation during recent decades. This paper present a critique of the ‘mainstream’ textbook modelling of fiscal policy, and suggests a more meaningful framework in which to consider the role of fiscal policy; a framework which in particular recognises the realities of endogenous money and interest rate targeting by central banks.

This paper attempts to assess the relative performance of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Coalition governments in their management of the Australian macroeconomy. Given the problem of defining an appropriate counter/actual, we make comparisons using a number of different methods. Firstly we compare the averages of the key macroeconomic variables for the period of each government and then compare changes over the tenure of each government. Secondly, we use the method of ‘difference in differences’; that is, we compare the performance of the Australian economy with the US economy. This allows us to control for any features of the world economy that may be driving all the economies. A crude comparison suggests that the Labor party performed better on inflation and the real rate of interest while the Coalition performed better on growth and unemployment. However, there is no clear cut answer.

The Howard Government’s industrial relations reforms represent a significant step towards a uniform system of workplace regulations. To achieve this, the Commonwealth Parliament has expressly attempted to place much of the new regime within the scope of the Commonwealth's corporations power. This article will trace the High Court’s development of the jurisprudence related to that power and argue that the central tenets of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) accords with the contemporary direction of the power.

There have been a number of labour market programs that have attempted to increase rates of employment of Indigenous Australians by influencing job search behaviour. This paper provides the first ever baseline of data on the job search behaviour of Indigenous job seekers and how it compares to the job search of non-Indigenous job seekers. Clear differences between the job search behaviours of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians are apparent. Indigenous Australians rely disproportionately on friends and relatives as a source of information about jobs, although their networks tend to have less employed members, and therefore are less effective than non-Indigenous networks in securing employment. Non-Indigenous job seekers are also more likely to use more proactive search methods than are Indigenous job seekers.

The Work Choices package of legislative reforms has significantly altered both the institutions and the instruments of the federal regulatory architecture for setting minimum working conditions. This paper surveys the reduced role of awards and of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, before considering the function and content of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard and Australian Pay and Classification Scales, as well as the role of the newly created Australian Fair Pay Commission. It argues that the Work Choices reforms have shifted power over the setting of minimum working conditions to the government, which will set many conditions directly, and to employers, who will be entitled to require employees to be party to workplace agreements that displace very many of the minimum working conditions that are otherwise purportedly guaranteed. These shifts have opened up the space for significant reductions in minimum working conditions, as well as for falls in real wages for those not able to benefit from wage bargaining.

The Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) is the latest institution to be created by the Federal government in the industrial relations arena and is one of the key pillars of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) No. 153. In this article we examine the rationale for the establishment of the AFPC, outline the structure and operational details associated with the AFPC and compare it with the UK Low Pay Commission. The creation of the AFPC presumes some failings of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission with respect to its safety net wage case deliberations. We attempt to identify what these failings were. Finally, we consider what the implications of the creation of the AFPC will be. On this point the establishment of the AFPC must be placed in a context of ongoing legislative change to welfare access and in the other major developments in the Work Choices legislation, especially the creation of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard.

The amendments to Schedule 1B of the Workplace Relations Act have given the government substantially new means of controlling the internal affairs of industrial organisations. At the government's behest, the Review of Current Arrangements for Governance of Industrial Organisation (the review), used concepts borrowed from the Corporations Act as a basis for recommendations regarding union accounts, accounting procedures, fiduciary obligations of office-holders and organisational rules. This study is a critique of the review and the consequent amendments. It argues that notions borrowed from the Corporations Act are inappropriate for unions and will cause problems for them. The amendments also contradict the government's avowed policy of deregulation of labour market institutions.

This article provides an overview of the radical changes in workplace agreement-making introduced by the ‘Work Choices’ amendments to the Workplace Relations Act. It outlines the six types of statutory workplace agreement and the procedures, termination rules and content requirements associated with them. While some agreement-making procedures have been simplified, this has come at the cost of independent oversight. Furthermore, the government's overall regulatory approach is shown to be prescriptive, punitive and one-sided. The article contrasts the new workplace agreements with contracts and observes that alternative regulatory frameworks could readily have been created, with greater respect for party autonomy.

This paper considers an aspect of the assessment of net gains from outsourcing, which has received, it is argued, inadequate attention in the analytical and empirical literature: This aspect is the analysis of team productivity, the essential element for the existence of ‘the firm’ in economic theory. The simple model presented here derives from the labour market literature of internal labour markets and insider-outsider models. The net gains from outsourcing within this framework are assessed by comparing the cost saving from production synergies within the administrated internal labour market, with cost savings from exploiting relative wage differentials in the external labour market. This analysis seeks to identify the determinants of the magnitude of these cost savings and provide a framework to allow their assessment to contribute as one facet of the ‘make or buy’ decision.

This paper details how AWAs are made under the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005. The Work Choices amendments introduce significant changes to agreement-making. The most significant of these changes are the abolition of the no-disadvantage test, the effect of termination of agreements, and the new ‘safety net’ provided by the Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. Employers have welcomed these changes as a step closer to a system of common law regulation of the employment relationship. However, for employees, the simplification of the approval process and the removal of the vetting of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), may expose them to AWAs which contain low wages and very limited conditions of employment. How far down this path some employers will attempt to go is yet unknown but it is clear that for some AWA employees, there will be considerable detriment to their working conditions and entitlements.

Much as it has occurred in the United States, over the last two decades the household saving rate in Canada has fallen sharply to unprecedented levels, as it now hovers essentially about the zero rate. Accompanying this fall, we have witnessed a parallel rise in household debt ratios — a phenomenon that some have dubbed a state of “affluenza”. The object of this article is to provide an explanation of this phenomenon by pointing especially to the role played by fiscal policy in shifting the burden of debt from the government to the household sector. Moreover, the article raises serious concern about the sustainability of this particular growth process.

The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) effects significant changes to the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) governing industrial action in the federal workplace relations system. This paper examines these changes, situating them in the context of the historical relationship between law and industrial action in Australia, and evaluating the impact of the changes on the balance of power in voluntary collective bargaining. The paper argues that the Work Choices changes have elevated the power of employers, and protection of third party welfare, above access to the right to strike for employee participants in collective bargaining.

The 2005 ‘Work Choices’ legislation builds on earlier legislative and policy measures of the Howard Coalition Government that have restricted the activities and undermined the traditional legal rights of unions. This article highlights the key aspects of the 2005 legislation affecting trade unions. The constitutional basis of the new framework for regulating registered organisations is considered, as it presents unions with the challenge to revisit the validity of their registration under Federal law or to ‘opt out’ of registration altogether. The new union ‘right of entry’ provisions provide employers with far greater scope to resist or limit unwanted union influence at the workplace. Amendments to the freedom of association ‘provisions will restrict unions’ capacity to engage in a range of tactics to support the collective representation of workers’ interests, and limit their ability to block de-unionisation or individualisation strategies by employers. We conclude that the 2005 Act constitutes the most serious threat to Australian unions yet, but that the high-profile debate generated by the reforms, and the erosion of conditions which will inevitably follow for some workers, provide opportunities for unions to re-establish their relevance and reverse declining membership levels.