A sea-change occurred in the early 1980s in the way the UK economy was organised. From then on, until the present day, openness to trade, light-touch regulation of commerce and free competition have been the watchwords, alongside low income tax rates and constraints on trade union action. Most importantly, the removal of a raft of restrictions on banks and building societies, combined with the abolition of controls on the international movement of capital, allowed a huge expansion in household borrowing. These liberalisation measures extended an earlier trend including the bonfire of war-time restrictions, international trade agreements to reduce tariffs, the move to floating exchange rates between 1971 and 1973 and the switch from direct to indirect controls on bank lending in 1971. However, even by the late 1970s, the UK economy was still strongly managed by government. Controls were still in place on capital movements, investment, prices and incomes. Trade unions remained powerful and the basic rate of income tax was at 30% with the top rate at 83%. Most lending to households was still undertaken by heavily controlled building societies. Government economic policies prior to the late 1970s still aimed to maintain full employment although the practice had become more difficult to achieve. After 1979, policy switched decisively towards controlling inflation, first through monetarism and later by using interest rates to meet inflation targets.

This is an edited version of the 2015 Fay Gale Lecture soon after the author’s retirement as Director of the University of South Australia’s Centre for Work + Life. It begins with the author’s personal work reminiscences as a touchstone for reflecting on continuity and change in women’s working lives. A first job in sheep-shearing sheds illustrates the insecurity and hard physical and emotional labour associated with manual work. Despite strides in Australian women’s qualification levels, discrimination is being ‘refreshed and remade’. Examples include recent Australian reversals in paid parental leave policy and the role of sexual harassment in patrolling work boundaries. The institutional basis of unequal pay and inflexible work/family time allocation is demonstrated in the Productivity Commission’s 2015 Workplace Relations agenda. This recommends reduced Sunday penalty rates that will disproportionately affect feminised, low-paid retail and hospitality work and rejects any strengthening of parents’ statutory right to request flexible work arrangements. Three remedies are proposed – creative approaches to research, campaigning and political action.

This article considers the political economy of the Productivity Commission in industrial relations reform; in particular, its review of the industrial relations framework foreshadowed in 2013 and conducted in 2015. Following a history of the establishment of the Productivity Commission and its predecessor agencies, it argues that the concepts of third-party independence and third-party endorsement are important for understanding the role of the Productivity Commission. A review of the politics of industrial relations reform leads into the central analysis of the political economy of the Productivity Commission’s 2015 inquiry into the Australian workplace relations framework. The concepts of third-party independence and endorsement are applied in analysing some of the inquiry’s key recommendations. The conclusion discusses several difficulties in the political economy of the Productivity Commission and its relationships to government and, indeed, to evidence, when the latter contradicted its mainly liberal market stance.

The Productivity Commission is Australia’s foremost policy advisory body. Its original incarnation as the Industries Assistance Commission derives from the 1960s push to dismantle the protective tariff regime that underpinned the Australian manufacturing sector. With success in tariff reductions and complementary reductions in rural sector assistance, the Commission’s investigatory role was gradually expanded to cover the entire gamut of government policy. The Commission’s history has generally been treated favourably. This article places the history of the original Industries Assistance Commission in context and takes a critical stance on its and the Productivity Commission’s vision and achievements.

Governments’ economic policies need to be based on a coherent view of the role of innovation and productivity in sustaining growth. This article analyses advice on fostering innovation from Australia’s main statutory economics adviser, the Productivity Commission. It argues that the Productivity Commission’s comprehensive 2007 report, Public Support for Science and Innovation, contributed to a policy vacuum hampering government support for innovation for nearly a decade. First, within the Productivity Commission’s understanding of innovation was a contradiction between its required policy targeting criteria and the impossibility of meeting these criteria. Second, the resulting stance on innovation policy was at odds with research and theory on the drivers of innovation and hence growth – particularly innovation systems theories and those based on evolutionary economics. The ensuing innovation policy vacuum suggests that the Productivity Commission placed the abstract ideological ‘purity’ of neoclassical economic theory above empirical exploration of how government can best support Australia’s future economic development. Since late 2015, moves to fill this policy vacuum have included a Senate inquiry, a government department restructure, and the creation of a new Innovation and Science statutory advisory board. Whether these initiatives foster sustained innovation will depend on the extent to which they adopt approaches based on innovation systems or evolutionary economics, and transcend the static neoclassical mindset espoused by the Productivity Commission.

The 2013 and 2014 announcements by major car manufacturers that they would wind down all their remaining Australian automotive operations by 2016/2017 pre-empted the March 2014 release of the Productivity Commission’s final report into motor vehicle manufacturing. The Commission suggested that government subsidies had only delayed car plant closures and reiterated its longstanding opposition to industry policy and redistributive regional adjustment programmes by government. Industrialists, employer associations, state governments and trade unions have, however, questioned the Commission’s forecasts for both economic spillover effects and social impacts in regions affected by automotive plant closures. In addition to challenging several underlying assumptions used to calculate the Productivity Commission’s forecasts, this article argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the quality of future work. It extends insights from previous studies of industrial decline by proposing a new research agenda based on the idea of ‘social spillovers’.

This article examines the Japan–Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement, an agreement that has allowed Japan to supplement its local healthcare workforce while continuing to sidestep the thorny issue of labour and immigration policy reform and Indonesia to increase its skilled workers’ access to the Japanese labour market at a time when it was making a concerted effort to reorient migrant labour flows away from informal sector occupations. Despite the programme’s many problems, it has contributed to the use of trade agreements as a mechanism for regulating labour migration, and so to the normalisation of migrant labour as a tradable commodity rather than a discrete area of policy-making, with all the attendant risks that normalisation brings.

This article examines real wage-earning, productivity and earning inequality in Indonesia, focusing on differentials among provinces and economic sectors. The post-1997 Asian crisis and democratic Indonesia mimic the global trend of disconnection between wages and productivity: labour productivity continues to rise while real wage-earning stagnates or declines. This disconnection has three consequences. First, it affects income or earning distribution as confirmed by rising overall earnings inequality. Second, while it explains the conventional wisdom of an economy-wide negative relationship between real wages and employment, it is of concern that these two variables do not move in the same direction as the productivity improvements that have occurred in large and medium establishments in the manufacturing sector. Third, the disconnection between productivity and earnings growth opens a new discussion on the broader issue of quality of growth, as the data show that robust economic growth in the post-crisis Indonesia has not been accompanied by parallel improvements in the quality of employment.