The Contract Regulation Club has been the dominant force in Australian industrial relations since the latter part of the 1980s. Its membership includes major business and employer organisations, leaders of the Liberal and National parties, various regulatory bodies, ‘New Right’ think tanks and media commentators. Its modus operandi is doublethink. It advocates deregulation of employment contracts while intervening in their operation and demanding more regulation to ensure that they are loaded in ‘favour’ of employers. The Club has a vision of an industrial relations nirvana where employees voluntarily align their behaviour to the needs of the enterprise. The paper argues that this vision is fundamentally flawed and is the basis of the Club's demand for more regulation. The paper examines the origins and consolidation of the Club, activities and interventions after the election of the Howard Coalition in 1996 and major features of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)

The Work Choices legislation represents a concerted attempt to tilt the balance of labour regulation in favour of employers. It does this by allowing them to offer agreements that reduce or eliminate award or statutory entitlements, by making it harder for both workers and unions to contest management decisions, and by sidelining the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. It also seeks to ‘move towards’ a national system of regulation by providing that the majority of employers will be exclusively subject to federal rather than State regulation, at least for some purposes. Yet for all the radical nature of many of the changes, this is not the ‘big bang’ it might have been. Many features of the old arbitration system have been retained and there are genuine compromises at the heart of some of the changes. It also remains to be seen just how quickly employers will move to exploit the opportunities the new legislation offers, given its complexity, opposition from unions, and indeed the natural pragmatism or conservatism of many managers — and whether this will prompt further intervention by a government that appears uncomfortable with leaving it to employers to make their own choices.

The Howard Government’s industrial relations reforms represent a significant step towards a uniform system of workplace regulations. To achieve this, the Commonwealth Parliament has expressly attempted to place much of the new regime within the scope of the Commonwealth's corporations power. This article will trace the High Court’s development of the jurisprudence related to that power and argue that the central tenets of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) accords with the contemporary direction of the power.

The Work Choices package of legislative reforms has significantly altered both the institutions and the instruments of the federal regulatory architecture for setting minimum working conditions. This paper surveys the reduced role of awards and of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, before considering the function and content of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard and Australian Pay and Classification Scales, as well as the role of the newly created Australian Fair Pay Commission. It argues that the Work Choices reforms have shifted power over the setting of minimum working conditions to the government, which will set many conditions directly, and to employers, who will be entitled to require employees to be party to workplace agreements that displace very many of the minimum working conditions that are otherwise purportedly guaranteed. These shifts have opened up the space for significant reductions in minimum working conditions, as well as for falls in real wages for those not able to benefit from wage bargaining.

The Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) is the latest institution to be created by the Federal government in the industrial relations arena and is one of the key pillars of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) No. 153. In this article we examine the rationale for the establishment of the AFPC, outline the structure and operational details associated with the AFPC and compare it with the UK Low Pay Commission. The creation of the AFPC presumes some failings of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission with respect to its safety net wage case deliberations. We attempt to identify what these failings were. Finally, we consider what the implications of the creation of the AFPC will be. On this point the establishment of the AFPC must be placed in a context of ongoing legislative change to welfare access and in the other major developments in the Work Choices legislation, especially the creation of the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard.

This article provides an overview of the radical changes in workplace agreement-making introduced by the ‘Work Choices’ amendments to the Workplace Relations Act. It outlines the six types of statutory workplace agreement and the procedures, termination rules and content requirements associated with them. While some agreement-making procedures have been simplified, this has come at the cost of independent oversight. Furthermore, the government's overall regulatory approach is shown to be prescriptive, punitive and one-sided. The article contrasts the new workplace agreements with contracts and observes that alternative regulatory frameworks could readily have been created, with greater respect for party autonomy.

This paper details how AWAs are made under the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005. The Work Choices amendments introduce significant changes to agreement-making. The most significant of these changes are the abolition of the no-disadvantage test, the effect of termination of agreements, and the new ‘safety net’ provided by the Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. Employers have welcomed these changes as a step closer to a system of common law regulation of the employment relationship. However, for employees, the simplification of the approval process and the removal of the vetting of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), may expose them to AWAs which contain low wages and very limited conditions of employment. How far down this path some employers will attempt to go is yet unknown but it is clear that for some AWA employees, there will be considerable detriment to their working conditions and entitlements.

The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) effects significant changes to the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) governing industrial action in the federal workplace relations system. This paper examines these changes, situating them in the context of the historical relationship between law and industrial action in Australia, and evaluating the impact of the changes on the balance of power in voluntary collective bargaining. The paper argues that the Work Choices changes have elevated the power of employers, and protection of third party welfare, above access to the right to strike for employee participants in collective bargaining.

The 2005 ‘Work Choices’ legislation builds on earlier legislative and policy measures of the Howard Coalition Government that have restricted the activities and undermined the traditional legal rights of unions. This article highlights the key aspects of the 2005 legislation affecting trade unions. The constitutional basis of the new framework for regulating registered organisations is considered, as it presents unions with the challenge to revisit the validity of their registration under Federal law or to ‘opt out’ of registration altogether. The new union ‘right of entry’ provisions provide employers with far greater scope to resist or limit unwanted union influence at the workplace. Amendments to the freedom of association ‘provisions will restrict unions’ capacity to engage in a range of tactics to support the collective representation of workers’ interests, and limit their ability to block de-unionisation or individualisation strategies by employers. We conclude that the 2005 Act constitutes the most serious threat to Australian unions yet, but that the high-profile debate generated by the reforms, and the erosion of conditions which will inevitably follow for some workers, provide opportunities for unions to re-establish their relevance and reverse declining membership levels.

This article examines the amendments made to the Australian system of unfair dismissal law by the federal Work Choices Act. The main theme underlying those changes is one of contraction. Notably, a much larger proportion of the Australian labour force will now not have recourse to challenge their dismissal on the basis that it was “harsh, unjust or unreasonable”. This is the effect of the Work Choices exemption of corporate employers with up to 100 employees, the operational reasons exemption, the exemption of seasonal workers and the extension of the qualifying period from three to six months. It is also the effect of moving towards a national system of unfair dismissal.