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Scotus' voluntarist approach to the atonement reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2009

Andrew S. Yang
Andrew S. Yang*
Affiliation:
Duke University, Box 90964, Durham, NC [email protected]
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Abstract

Many studies criticise John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) for reducing the atoning sacrifice of Christ to a merit of finite worth and making its atoning power completely dependent on the accepting will of God, such that if it pleased God, even a purely creaturely sacrifice of an angel or a saint would have sufficed to redeem the elect. This article discredits this sort of criticism by demonstrating that Scotus situates his argument for a finite worth of Christ's merit within the framework of his larger argument for the infinite sufficiency of Christ's merit. A cogent examination of the ways in which Scotus posits a merit of finite intrinsic worth and arrives at its infinitely sufficient atoning power reveals that only the merit of a God-man can achieve this sort of sufficiency and that the nature of Scotus' voluntarism that underlies his concept of divine acceptation is nowhere as radical as it is usually portrayed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 62 , Issue 4 , November 2009 , pp. 421 - 440
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2009

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References

1 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 2 (Wadding 7.1, p. 412).

2 Ibid., nn. 3–5 (Wadding 7.1: pp. 413–14). Accusations of Pelagianism heaped upon Scotus' doctrine of first grace (prima gratia) are unfounded. According to Harnack and Grensted, Scotus teaches that Christ merely merits the initial grace for the elect and leaves them to work the rest of their way to salvation. See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vols., vol. 3, Sammlung theologischer Lehrbücher (Freiburg: Mohr, 1890), p. 460. Grensted, L. W., A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962), pp. 160–1Google Scholar. On the contrary, the emphasis Scotus places on the first grace represents a strongly Augustinian criticism directed at what he considers a Pelagian element in Thomas Aquinas’ teaching, which makes the efficacy of Christ's merit contingent on the pilgrims’ union with Christ, which is in turn contingent on their disposition to this union. But how, asks Scotus, are the pilgrims supposed to develop this disposition in the first place, on their own or by grace? This is why Scotus argues that Christ merited, first and foremost, the prima gratia by which Christ unites to himself those who are not united and have never disposed themselves to this union.

3 Langston, Douglas C., ‘Scotus' Departure from Anselm's Theory of the Atonement’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 50 (1983), p. 238Google Scholar. Langston bases his translation on the Vivés edn of Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, which reportedly reads: ‘Quantum ad sufficientiam, dico quod meritum Christi fuit finitum, quia a principio finito essentialiter dependens . . .’ But based on the comparisons of the parallel texts from the Vatican edition of the Lectura, the Wadding edns of the Ordinatio and the Reportatio Parisiensis, it is clear that ‘Quantum ad sufficientiam’ is meant only to introduce a new subject matter – namely, sufficiency – following his discussion of efficacy, and is not intended to communicate the idea that the sufficiency of Christ's merit is finite. For example, both the Lectura and Reportatio texts insert ‘formaliter’ to modify ‘finitus’, which clarifies the meaning of the text – namely, that on the subject matter of sufficiency, the merit of Christ is formally finite.

4 Langston, ‘Scotus' Departure’, p. 238.

5 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 1 (Wadding 7.1, p. 412).

6 Ibid., n. 4 (Wadding 7.1, p. 413).

7 Ibid., n. 7 (Wadding 7.1, p. 417).

8 Some scholars allege that Scotus rejects the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum and falls into a Nestorian error as a result. For example, see Grensted, Short History, p. 159, n. 2, and Aspenson, Steven S., ‘Anselmian Satisfaction, Duns Scotus and the Debt of Sin’, Modern Schoolman 73 (1996), p. 144CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But as Minges correctly points out, Scotus does subscribe to communicatio idiomatum. See Reportatio III, d. 12, q. unica, n. 2 (Wadding 11.1, p. 461) and Minges, Parthenius, ‘Beitrag zur Lehre des Duns Scotus über das Werk Christi’, Theologische Quartalschrift 89 (1907), p. 249Google Scholar.

9 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 4 (Wadding 7.1, p. 413).

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., n. 13 (Wadding 7.1, pp. 421–2).

12 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 1 (Wadding 7.1, p. 412).

13 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 13 (Wadding 7.1, p. 422).

14 Also see Reportatio III, d. 19, q. 1, n. 14 (Wadding 11.1, p. 498).

15 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 14 (Wadding 7.1, p. 422).

16 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 1 (Wadding 7.1, p. 412).

17 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 14 (Wadding 7.1, p. 422). This is in stark contrast to Burns’ claim that Scotus' God ‘cannot love and accept some created reality in a way and to a degree which exceeds the goodness of the created reality itself’. Burns, J. Patout, ‘The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory’, Theological Studies 36 (1975), p. 302CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 7 (Wadding 7.1, p. 417).

19 Langston, ‘Scotus' Departure’, p. 238.

20 Ibid., p. 239.

21 Grensted, Short History, p. 161.

22 Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, p. 459.

23 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 7 (Wadding 7.1, p. 417).

24 The limitation Scotus places on divine acceptance has been misinterpreted by Ritschl and Burns, who take the following statement of Scotus in Ordinatio, III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 14 (Wadding 7.1, p. 422) as his explicit denial of the infinite sufficiency of Christ's merit: ‘Quamvis autem posset acceptare passionem illam pro infinitis, non tamen infinite: quia non potest diligere aliquod creatum a parte diligibilis infinite, quia non est infinitum’. See Albrecht Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1882), pp. 77–9, and Burns, ‘Concept of Satisfaction’, p. 302. However, Scotus immediately clarifies the statement by adding: ‘de facto tamen non fuit accepta nisi pro electis, quia pro eis tantum fuit oblata a Christo, efficaciter dico’. The addition of ‘efficaciter dico’ clearly shows that what Scotus wants to deny is the infinite efficacy, rather than the infinite sufficiency, of Christ's merit. When read in context, all that Scotus says is that, although God could have accepted Christ's merit for an infinite number of souls, he did not do so efficaciously. In the parallel texts in Scotus' earlier Lectura and later Reportatio Parisiensis, Scotus uses the distinction between iustitia commutativa and iustitia distributiva to strengthen his affirmation of the infinite sufficiency and his rejection of the infinite efficacy. See Lectura III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 35 (Vatican 21; p. 38) and Reportatio III, d. 19, q. unica (Wadding 11.1; pp. 498–9).

25 Ordinatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 7 (Wadding 7.1, pp. 417–18).

26 Ordinatio III, d. 27, q. 1, n. 19 (Wadding 7.2, p. 655).

27 Ordinatio, III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 7 (Wadding 7.1; pp. 417–18): ‘sed ex formali ratione sua, quam habuit, non potuit acceptari in infinitum, et pro infinitis, sed pro finitis. Tamen ex circumstantia suppositi et de congruo ratione suppositi habuit quandam rationem extrinsecam, quare Deus potuit acceptare illud in infinitum, scilicet extensive, pro infiniti. Si autem illud meritum fuisset alterius personae, tunc nec ratione operis, nec ratione operantis fuisset congruitas acceptionis illius pro infinitis’. Reportatio III, d. 19, q. 1, n. 9 (Wadding 11.1; p. 497): ‘ideo pro aliqua conditione personae merentis, quae est formaliter conditio actus merendi, potest acceptari illud meritum pro infinitis: et sic meritum Christi fuit quasi infinitum, non tamen formaliter infinitum, sed ut infinite acceptatum pro infinitis, quod non fuisset, si fuisset purus homo, quia ut infinitum acceptavit propter infinitatem personae merentis’. Cf. Lectura III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 23 (Vatican 21; p. 34). For scholars who correctly recognise Scotus' doctrine of the infinite sufficiency of Christ's merit from these texts, see P. Raymond, ‘Duns Scot’, in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot and É. Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1910), p. 1896. Karl Werner, Johannes Duns Scotus (repr. of a work originally published in Vienna, 1881–7; New York: Burt Franklin, 1960), p. 458. Reinhold Seeberg, Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1900), p. 279. Minges went even further, citing Scotus' statement that the sacrifice of Christ was both ‘infinite and sufficient for the infinite’ in Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 20, n. 1 (Wadding 12; p. 515). See Minges, ‘Beitrag zur Lehre des Duns Scotus', pp. 254–9.

28 For a comprehensive study of acceptatio divina, see Dettloff, Werner, Die Lehre von der acceptatio divina bei Johannes Duns Scotus: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtfertigungslehre (Werl/Westf.: Dietrich-Coelde-Verlag, 1954)Google Scholar.

29 Scotus describes acceptatio divina aeterna in contrast to, and subsequent to his discussion of, acceptatio divina passiva in Ordinatio I, d. 17, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 149 (Vatican 5; p. 210). For more on the ontological ground that the eternal acceptation provides, see Minges, Parthenius, ‘Der Wert der guten Werke nach Duns Scotus’, Theologische Quartalschrift 89 (1907), pp. 76–93Google Scholar.

30 For example, see Langston, ‘Scotus' Departure’, p. 239. Also see Willis, David, ‘The Influence of Laelius Socinus on Calvin's Doctrines of the Merits of Christ and the Assurance of Faith’, in Tedeschi, John A. (ed.), Italian Reformation Studies in Honor of Laelius Socinus (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1965), p. 235Google Scholar.

31 Reportatio III, d. 18, q. 2, n. 6 (Wadding 11.1; p. 491).

32 Ordinatio III, d. 20, q. unica, n. 10 (Wadding 7.1; p. 430).

33 Ordinatio III, d. 18, q. unica, n. 9 (Wadding 7.1; p. 390).

34 Reportatio III, d. 18, q. 1, n. 5 (Wadding 11.1; p. 486).

35 Ordinatio III, d. 18, q. unica, n. 6 (Wadding 7.1, p. 387).

36 Lectura III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 23 (Vatican 21; p. 33).

37 Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 1, n. 7 (Wadding 9; p. 107).

38 Ordinatio III, d. 20, q. unica, n. 9 (Wadding 7.1; p. 429).

39 Ordinatio III, d. 18, q. unica, n. 6 (Wadding 7.1; p. 387).

40 Lectura III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 23 (Vatican 21; p. 33).

41 Ordinatio, III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 7 (Wadding 7.1; pp. 417–18).

42 See, for example, Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 1, n. 5 (Wadding 9; p. 105); Reportatio III, d. 18, q. 2, n. 3 (Wadding 11.1; p. 491).

43 Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 1, n. 5 (Wadding 9, pp. 105–6).

44 Ordinatio III, d. 20, q. unica, n. 10 (Wadding 7.1; p. 430).

45 Pace Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (London: Macmillan & Co., 1925), p. 384.

46 Werner, Johannes Duns Scotus, p. 455. Reinhold Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 4th edn, 4 vols, vol. 3 (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt Graz, 1953), p. 663. Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 131.

47 Ordinatio III, d. 20, q. unica, n. 10 (Wadding 7.1; p. 430). Also see n. 7 (Wadding 7.1; p. 428).

48 Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre, p. 80. Hodge, Archibald Alexander, The Atonement (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1867), p. 285Google Scholar. Langston, ‘Scotus' Departure’, p. 240. Burns, ‘Concept of Satisfaction’, 302.

49 Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 1, n. 2 (Wadding 9; p. 103). Ibid., n. 5 (Wadding 9; p. 105).

50 Clark argues that, in Scotus' account, Christ does not satisfy ‘divine justice by offering an actual equivalent for the penalty which man's sin had incurred’: Henry W. Clark, The Cross and the Eternal Order (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 96, n. 11. But Scotus clearly affirms the doctrine of satisfaction according to divine justice. See Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 1, nn. 5–7 (Wadding 9; pp. 104–7).

51 Ordinatio IV, d. 15, q. 1, n. 6 (Wadding 9; p. 106).

52 Ordinatio IV, d. 2, q. 1, n. 7 (Wadding 8; pp. 138–9).

53 Dale, R. W., The Atonement (London: Congregational Union of England and Wales, 1902), p. 286Google Scholar. This statement has been endorsed by Mozley and McDonald. See Mozley, J. K., The Doctrine of the Atonement (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), p. 137Google Scholar. McDonald, H. D., The Atonement of the Death of Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1985), p. 293Google Scholar. A similar idea is found in Hodge, The Atonement, p. 285. There are also those who view Scotus' doctrine as heretical. See Miley, John, The Atonement in Christ (New York: Phillips & Hunt, 1881), p. 206Google Scholar.

54 Ordinatio III, d. 20, q. unica, n. 10 (Wadding 7.1; p. 430).

55 Reportatio III, d. 19, q. unica, n. 15 (Wadding 11.1; p. 499). Ordinatio III, d. 18, q. unica, n. 10 (Wadding 7.1; p. 390).