The aim of this paper is to place Richard Dawkins' book The God Delusion (2006) within a particular literary genre and, by so doing, to account for certain features of its written style, to identify its structuring claims and to offer an explanation for the popularity it has enjoyed with a broad readership. By offering a description of this kind, I hope to avoid engaging in the polemics which the book both offers and has elicited; the argument is situated at another level. My proposal may seem a surprising one: Dawkins' work comes within a spectrum that includes in its modern forms both science fiction and fantasy literature, a spectrum that uses the products of science to think with, in order to explore human dilemmas. In a word, this is a modern theodicy. I shall begin by sketching out the notion of thinking with science, before turning to characteristic stylistic features of Dawkins' work, and then examining the core claims of the book in the perspective outlined. I shall offer some concluding remarks, but there is little to be said about the author's argument with respect to religion or faith; his topic is a pretext for another kind of exercise.

This article seeks to summarise and critically analyse Colin Gunton's trinitarian theology in regard to the claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is a doctrine with radical consequences for human life. To this end it engages, first, in an examination of Gunton's trinitarian project following his thought from a cultural critical starting point finally leading to the establishment of three open transcendentals and, second, in a critical analysis of this approach, highlighting some essential inconsistencies in regard to Cappadocian theology, the concepts of relationality and personhood and practical consequences for human life. In conclusion, the article suggests that Gunton's strong emphasis on relationality and his search for open transcendentals could be understood as the result of his passionate aspiration to heal the wounds of an egocentric, individualistic and alienating modern culture through an ontology of communion.

The article considers the relationship between divine will and being as revealed in election, particularly according to Karl Barth's unique formulation of the doctrine. It comes at the salient features of this relationship by way of a public disagreement between Bruce McCormack and Paul Molnar. In agreement with McCormack, the author contends, on the basis of Barth's provocative claim that Jesus Christ is not just object but subject of election, that we cannot speak of God's being apart from his will for humanity, and this from all eternity, or in God's most intimate primordiality. Yet echoing Molnar, this observation does not entail the logical priority of grace to being. The author argues that a thoroughgoing commitment to conceiving of the being of God in the act of electing means affirming the eternal simultaneity and indeed reciprocity of will and being, as Jesus Christ is the full and total revelation of both. One cannot serve as ground for the other. As such, a preferable way of construing election is as the decisive statement of Godself – the primordial, eternal iteration of God for humanity – or the specification of divine being.

The concept of ‘desire’ offers an interesting bridge between cultural phenomena of contemporary society and the theological tradition. The exploration of some key elements of this tradition concerning desire supports the launching of a ‘theology of desire’. Although the natural desire for God, as discussed in the so-called ‘théologie nouvelle’, provides very valuable material for this exploration, ‘desire’ is conceived here in a somewhat broader sense. Three levels of desire are distinguished. The ‘lover's desire’ refers to the conscious affirmation of the presence of God's love. The second level, called the ‘seeker's desire’, concerns a more general desire for happiness. Third, the desire for God as an ontological term refers to the relationship between God and humankind. The desire for God, revealed by Jesus Christ, demonstrates the ultimate capacity of our human nature. Thus christology, and especially the creed of Chalcedon, offers the key to systematic anthropology. Finally, the daily reality of the desire for God is discussed with the help of Gregory of Nyssa's concept of asceticism. The integrating power of the Holy Spirit makes the channelling of our desires possible, so that the desire for God forms a part of daily life. Three challenges to encourage continuation on the way toward a theology of desire form the conclusion. The reconsidering of an ontological approach in theology, the priority to christology in systematic anthropology and the ethical and missionary possibilities of the desire for God are invitations for theologians to further explore the theology of desire.

Many studies criticise John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) for reducing the atoning sacrifice of Christ to a merit of finite worth and making its atoning power completely dependent on the accepting will of God, such that if it pleased God, even a purely creaturely sacrifice of an angel or a saint would have sufficed to redeem the elect. This article discredits this sort of criticism by demonstrating that Scotus situates his argument for a finite worth of Christ's merit within the framework of his larger argument for the infinite sufficiency of Christ's merit. A cogent examination of the ways in which Scotus posits a merit of finite intrinsic worth and arrives at its infinitely sufficient atoning power reveals that only the merit of a God-man can achieve this sort of sufficiency and that the nature of Scotus' voluntarism that underlies his concept of divine acceptation is nowhere as radical as it is usually portrayed.

The Christian doctrine of creation is predicated upon two convictions: the transcendence of God and the creative activity of God in the world. While recent studies have shown the compatibility of these two seemingly conflicting convictions, the grounding for them has received less attention. This paper argues that a proper Christian understanding of these convictions and their relationship is dependent upon seeing their basis in christology and trinitarian doctrine. It thus traces the close relationship between Christ and creation and that between creation and redemption in scripture, the patristic period and their more recent retrieval in Schleiermacher and Barth, comparing such conceptions to pagan and neo-pagan alternatives for understanding the God–world relation.

When Jürgen Moltmann's Theology of Hope first appeared in 1965, it was seen as ushering in a new era of theological thinking. Karl Barth, however, sharply criticised the work as too heavily dominated by a ‘principle of hope’ that he believed Moltmann had inherited from the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. This interpretation has largely been taken as fact among interpreters of Moltmann's theology of hope. This has caused most interpreters to see his turn to panentheism and ecotheology in God in Creation (1983) as being less of a shift of emphasis than a total change of trajectory or even break. There is evidence, however, that a different source contributed to the overall orientation of Moltmann's theology – an orientation that has remained throughout his life. This other source is the life and thought of the radical Schwäbean Pietists, Johann Christoph Blumhardt (1805–80) and his son Christoph Blumhardt (1842–1919). In this article the authors flesh out the thesis that the Blumhardts are the prior, deeper and more long-lasting influence on Moltmann by focusing on three key theological motifs that permeate his theology: 1) Christianity as eschatology; 2) the ‘theology of the earth’; and 3) the ethics of hope. Furthermore, they argue that when the ‘hidden’ influence of the Blumhardts is acknowledged, Moltmann's later ‘shift’ can be understood as essentially in continuity, rather than discontinuity, with his earlier thought.

This article examines Luther's theology of the cross in relation to his treatment of vocation and explores the contemporary utility of both. It is argued that theologians who reduce Luther's theology of the cross to an existential descriptor fail on two accounts. First, they do not comprehend the manner in which a theology of the cross does not describe anxiety but rather induces it so as to create theologians of the cross out of theologians of glory. Second, a reduction of a theology of the cross to an existential descriptor fails to apprehend the public significance of the same insofar as a theology of the cross is intimately related to Luther's treatment of vocation and its concomitant explication of the two reigns of God. Luther's treatment of vocation points to the manner in which the Christian is shaped by the cross in the give and take of human community. This is not to gainsay certain deficiencies in Luther's treatment of vocation. Chief among these are Luther's tendency to restrict language of vocation to individuals and his insistence on vocational intransigence. A contemporary engagement of the cross and vocation entails both a critical analysis of the manner in which the private has now eclipsed the public and an attempt to move beyond Luther by way of Luther in underscoring the gift of ecclesial vocation.

With a long and venerable history in both Catholic and Protestant traditions the doctrine represented by the term extra Calvinisticum has fallen out of favour within contemporary theologies of the cross. Through an examination of the history of the doctrine and its constituent features the present article advocates the reclamation of the doctrine as a necessary component for a contemporary theology of the atonement, with special emphasis on the trinitarian dimensions of the death of God on the cross. The extra Calvinisticum is then adopted to refute contemporary theologies of a suffering God.

The relationship between religion and public life is a universal problem, but discussions of it quickly become very local. They begin with the global reality of religious diversity, then the analysis descends into the particulars of the legal and constitutional system immediately in view, assuming always the sociological features of religious diversity most familiar to the audience at hand. French analysts typically take laïcité as the standard for modern solutions to the problem, while they view with alarm the cultural gap which separates older French citizens from recent Muslim immigrants. American writers, by contrast, usually have a more benign view of cultural diversity, which has grown up over generations of immigration. They turn quickly to the ambiguities of church–state law which govern religious expression in public space. Roger Trigg provides a thoughtful alternative to these parochial analyses. His Religion in Public Life explores a variety of national settings and he formulates his questions in terms which avoid legal or religious assumptions that are already in place where the question is asked. At the same time, he makes no premature claims to rational universality or global solutions. Religion in Public Life is primarily an investigation of European and North American contexts, or in other places which share a British legal and cultural heritage. In these places, religion and public life are shaped by the realities of modern law and the modern state and appeals to reason still mean something, even if they cannot mean quite as much as liberal theorists thought they meant only a few decades ago. But even among these nations, linked by culture, commerce and commitment to democracy, there is a surprising range of legal arrangements relating to religious expression and religious institutions and there are considerable differences in the social facts behind the legal differences. This, Trigg suggests, is a large enough world to allow us to discuss real differences without succumbing to the confusion which sometimes results from too much information. It is also a world in which we are acutely aware that public life has problems in need of solutions. Instead of hurrying to keep religion out of sight or under control, we are perhaps more willing to see what it has to contribute.

Contrary to what might be expected from such a thinker, Jonathan Edwards was restrained in conversation with the Reformed debate about the order of the divine decrees, known as the infralapsarian/supralapsarian debate. I will address Edwards's caution regarding this particular debate: first, by tracing the contours of the broader Reformed debate on the divine decrees and its evolution from engagement of Arminian theology to that of theodicy; second, by noting where Edwards does not speak to this debate and exegeting the few passages where he does take it up; third, by analysing the particular questions that Edwards addresses when he does engage the debate; fourth, by pointing to constructive lessons gained by understanding why a careful thinker might be atypically silent. I will demonstrate that Edwards engaged the lapsarian debate insofar as was necessary to rebuke the Arminian denial of unconditional election, yet he refused to engage the debate as a means of articulating a theodicy. In both his engagement and disengagement, Edwards refused to answer the debate on its standard terms and offers an example of carefully crafting doctrine according to theological and contextual concerns.

Until the recent discovery of a page of Isaac Newton's observations on John Locke's Paraphrase and Notes on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans, it was not known whether Newton had received or remarked upon Locke's work or, in turn, whether Locke had ever received Newton's comments. Since its discovery, however, it is possible to trace Locke's corrections and speculate on the extent and direction to which Newton may have influenced Locke. This article first establishes the theological relationship between Newton and Locke and, second, argues that Locke's revisions in light of Newton's suggestions reveal an anti-trinitarian spirit to his discussion. A previously unpublished transcription of Newton's manuscript fragment is also included.

In this important new volume, William Stacy Johnson, a lawyer and a chaired theology professor at Princeton Theological Seminary, provides a detailed and helpful typology of seven positions on same-sex relationships at work in American churches. These range from the ‘non-affirming’ positions of (1) prohibition, (2) toleration and (3) accommodation, to the ‘affirming’ positions of (4) legitimation, (5) celebration, (6) liberation and (7) consecration.

This book is designed to present an arc: on the one side, at the beginning of the last century, a theology based in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and on the other side, at the century's end, a non-Thomist ‘nuptial mysticism’. The ‘model Thomist’ of the book is Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (p. 10), those in the middle, who leave such ‘Thomism’ behind, are Chenu, Congar, Schillebeeckx, Lonergan, Rahner and Küng and the advocates of a nuptial theology are de Lubac, John Paul II, von Balthasar and Ratzinger (each of these men has a chapter to himself). That looks like the basis for a solid, informative description of twentieth-century Catholic theology, on the lines marked out by the many objective historical accounts of modern theology and theologians by the author's confrère, Aidan Nichols.

Throughout his life, Augustine faced the charge that, despite his apparent conversion to the orthodox Christian faith of the Catholic Church, his thought nonetheless retained vestiges of his roughly ten-year sojourn with the Manichees. No one was more relentless in this accusation than Augustine's Pelagian nemesis of his twilight years, Julian of Eclanum. Throughout most of church history, Augustine's reputation was little troubled by these allegations of crypto-Manichaeism. However, over the last century or so, the charge has once again taken on life. This article begins with a brief orientation to some of the main philosophical and theological tenets of Manichaeism, with an emphasis on those elements that will be important for assessing the Augustine question. Next, the history of the accusation that the Christian Augustine remained, in important if unconscious ways, a crypto-Manichaean will be traced from the time of Augustine to the present. Finally, one methodological direction in which an eventual resolution to this long-standing question may lie will be considered.

The Protestant church, for Reinhard Hütter, relinquished its ecclesial public character when it turned from ‘binding doctrine’ as the means for establishing and maintaining its concrete ‘time-space’. Christendom disguised this basic theological flaw, but with its collapse the public basis of the Protestant church fell away. This reduced the church's witness and destroyed its communal structure. His positive proposal re-establishes the church as a public by reference to the communion nature of God, and to church practices as mediate forms of the Spirit's acting. Hütter's account shadows an argument made fifty years before by Johannes C. Hoekendijk, observing an intensified focus on word and sacrament and the promotion of a culture as a solution to the problem of the church's witness. Yet, for Hoekendijk, this logic exemplifies the problem. The institutions of the church come to bear the full evangelistic load. Mission replicates the basic structures of a particular way of life as a necessary precursor to the gospel. The act of witness becomes propaganda because of an insufficient doctrine of the church. This insufficiency is a failing in the doctrine of the Trinity: God's own life is defined without sufficient attention to his act of reconciliation and redemption as itself material to understanding the nature of his in se life.

Blaise Pascal once said, ‘Knowing Jesus Christ strikes the balance [for theology] because he shows us both God and our wretchedness’. Indeed, the majesty of Christ is that in him the despair of wretchedness and the hope of God are held together. Theology often does not reflect this balance, leading towards either anthropocentrism or nihilism. The ubuntu theology of Desmond Tutu does, however, by proclaiming the inherent interconnectedness of humankind. Tested by the context of South African apartheid, this notion called ‘ubuntu’ counters segregation and violence with reconciliation and justice. It refuses to execute retribution upon transgressors, instead committing itself to re-membering the disinherited of Christ's inclusive body. Forgiveness is the only future for this body and, though it remains an aporia in the context of radical evils such as apartheid, it is the only way to achieve justice without economising balance. That is, only forgiveness can realise ubuntu because it progresses forward toward justice not backward toward vengeance. Ubuntu is the prophetic balance of a divine gift that transforms the wretchedness of human atrocities. It represents Tutu's attempt to realise the way of God in his context, an attempt from which all theologising can benefit.

In her remarkably forceful and learned book, Light in Darkness: Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ's Descent into Hell, Alyssa Lyra Pitstick offers a comprehensive critique of Hans Urs von Balthasar's theology of the descent into hell. Pitstick contributes to a sharpening of readings of Balthasar and forces one to make precise interpretative judgements. Clearly, she has produced a work with which anyone interested in Balthasar must engage, and the conversation and debate the book has started will, to be sure, continue for many years ahead. This said, I am afraid that Dr Pitstick's unrelenting and totalising prosecution of Balthasar's theology leads her to disallow any charitable reading and critical appropriation of Balthasar's creative and, at times, sublime theology. Although not necessarily the final evaluative word on Balthasar, or on the doctrine of the descent into hell, Pitstick's book provides a tremendous spark for those interested in Balthasar's theology and for much needed reflection on the significance of the church's confession that Jesus Christ descended into hell.

John Milbank is one of the most recent and arguably most radical proponents of an understanding of nature as graced. This article critically examines Milbank's understanding of nature and grace, specifically as elaborated within his reading of Thomas Aquinas. In the first part I will outline Aquinas's most direct discussions of nature and grace in the Summa Theologica, drawing attention to several central, albeit subtle, distinctions that these contain. In the second and third parts, I will examine Milbank's reading of Aquinas in Truth in Aquinas, and examine whether it adequately reflects and negotiates Aquinas's distinctions. On this basis I will argue Milbank's reading, while drawing attention to some important and often neglected areas of Aquinas's thought, ultimately remains limited.

I wish that I could commend William Stacy Johnson's book, A Time to Embrace, as a rigorous and fair assessment of Christianity and homosexuality from a homosexualist perspective. Unfortunately, Johnson so regularly violates scholarly standards for honesty and accuracy in representing secondary literature, conceals from readers the most important counter-arguments to his position and shows gaps in logic, that I cannot embrace A Time to Embrace. Given space constraints, it is impossible to give a systematic presentation of the book's errors in fact or argumentation. I refer readers to my website for material that could not fit here and for a rejoinder to Johnson's response (http://robgagnon.net/ArticlesOnline.htm).