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ON PATHOLOGICAL TRUTHS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2014

LUCAS ROSENBLATT  and
DAMIÁN E. SZMUC
LUCAS ROSENBLATT*
Affiliation:
CONICET and University of Buenos Aires
DAMIÁN E. SZMUC*
Affiliation:
University of Buenos Aires
*
*PUAN 480, INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA, FACULTAD DE FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS, UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, C.P. 1406, CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, E-mail: [email protected]
†PUAN 480, INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA, FACULTAD DE FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS, UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, C.P. 1406, CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In Kripke’s classic paper on truth it is argued that by adding a new semantic category different from truth and falsity it is possible to have a language with its own truth predicate. A substantial problem with this approach is that it lacks the expressive resources to characterize those sentences which fall under the new category. The main goal of this paper is to offer a refinement of Kripke’s approach in which this difficulty does not arise. We tackle this characterization problem by letting certain sentences belong to more than one semantic category. We also consider the prospect of generalizing this framework to deal with languages containing vague predicates.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 601 - 617
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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References

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