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BELIEF REVISION, PROBABILISM, AND LOGIC CHOICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2014

EDWIN MARES
EDWIN MARES*
Affiliation:
Victoria University of Wellington
*
*PHILOSOPHY PROGRAMME AND CENTRE FOR LOGIC LANGUAGE, AND COMPUTATION VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND, 6140 E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper presents a probabilist paraconsistent theory of belief revision. This theory is based on a very general theory of probability, that fits with a wide range of classical and nonclassical logics. The theory incorporates a version of Jeffrey conditionalisation as its method of updating. A Dutch book argument is given, and the theory is applied to the problem of choosing a logical system.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 647 - 670
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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