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PLACING PROBABILITIES OF CONDITIONALS IN CONTEXT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2014

RONNIE HERMENS
RONNIE HERMENS*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen
*
*FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, OUDE BOTERINGESTRAAT 52, 9712 GL GRONINGEN, THE NETHERLANDS E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper I defend the tenability of the Thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This is done by adopting the view that the interpretation of a conditional may differ from context to context. Several triviality results are (re-)evaluated in this view as providing natural constraints on probabilities for conditionals and admissible changes in the interpretation. The context-sensitive approach is also used to re-interpret some of the intuitive rules for conditionals and probabilities such as Bayes’ rule,Import-Export, and Modus Ponens. I will show that, contrary to consensus, the Thesis is in fact compatible with these re-interpreted rules.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 415 - 438
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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