The arrest, trial and sentence for life of Joseph Cardnial Mindszenty, Primate of Hungary, has profoundly shaken the conscience of the Western world and provoked a wave of protests on a scale unheard of before. The incident occurred at the climax of the tension between West and East. The figure of the Cardinal became the personification of a world-wide struggle between two fundamentally different conceptions of life. His broken resistance—both physical and psychological—symbolizes the fate of the millions oppressed and silenced by a ruthless Communist minority in East Europe. The recntations and self-contradictory confessions in the course of the trial had all the characteristics of the usual travesties of justice in Communistdominated countries. Pope Pius XII rightly stated in his allocution of February 14, 1949, that the behavior of Cardinal Mindszenty “appeared an accusation not against himself but against his very accusers and condemners.”

ItIs incumbent on the advocate of World Government to show first that it is desirable, and secondly that it is possible. Initially, he has to prove that it is in accord, rather than incompatible, with the dominant ethical traditions of humanity. Because largely by reason of industrialism the values of Western civilization are profoundly influential in the world today, he must indicate its special relevance as a culmination of the Western tradition. He must then demonstrate that the psychological and sociological needs of contemporary man can best be satisfied by such government, and that men's wants and feelings are not irrevocably opposed to it. Similarly, he must make it clear that, whatever be the superficial oppositions, established folkways and mores do not constitute an insuperable barrier to its achievement. Finally, it is incumbent on him to point out how the constitutional and governmental issues raised in its establishment may be met.

Despite common portrayals of Ahab as beyond the pale of common humanity, Melville offers much reason in Moby-Dick to regard Ahab as a reflection of ordinary American political life. Two of Ahab's most definitive characteristics—his isolation and his desire for domination—do not differentiate him from the other characters in the book but rather underscore how much he is like them. Among the Pequod's crew in particular, those traits are the rule rather than the exception, a fact that helps to explain why the crew members are so quick to adopt Ahab's way of thinking: in large measure, it is already their own. Along these lines, looking at Ahab as a representative American man makes it possible to better understand Melville's true anxieties about the prospects for democratic flourishing in the United States.

Scarcely two decades have passed since Lord Bryce stated that democracy is universally accepted “as the normal and natural form of government.” What the author of the American Commonwealth regarded at the end of his long life as the result of the modern development had been announced by Alexis de Tocqueville even before Bryce was born. This French historian and political philosopher, who is today classed as one of the most important thinkers of all time, characterized the whole modern political and social trend as an irresistible advance towards democracy. He was afraid that democratic equality would destroy individual liberty. Like John Stuart Mill a generation later, he too was depressed by the fear that the despotism of a brutal majority rule might be a future threat to democracy. But this fear did not change the general trend of his prophecy.

The principal obstacle to the success of Edouard Drumont's campaign against the Jews in France following the enormous success of La France juive in 1886 was his inability to elaborate a program which could tie effectively “the revolutionary worker and the conservative Christian.” Antisemitism served as a binding force, but Drumont was not so successful in his use of that weapon as Hitler later was in Germany. Most French Socialists by 1891 or 1892 had clearly rejected antisemitism, and by 1892 as well many conservatives had become frightened by the apparent radical aims of the antisemitic campaign. Even those Catholics who were still supporters of Drumont when Captain Dreyfus was arrested in 1894 were followers of Drumont only because no other party or group could attract them.

The article first examines the ways in which Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power attempts to connect the activities of power-seeking presidents to the public ends their actions presumably further and then discusses what is problematic in these linkages. The critique focuses on the defects in Neustadt's concept of the “grain of history,” the diminished sense of public purposes revealed by the standard of “viability,” the difficulties in evaluating presidential actions with the criteria developed and the ways in which the failed linkage between the means to power and the ends served undermines Neustadt's own teaching. The paradoxical quality of Presidential Power, in which insightful analysis of the means to power is combined with unsatisfactory discussion of the purposes for which that power is to be employed, is seen as possibly rooted in Neustadt's tacit acceptance of positivist and historicist views, which are now increasingly called into question. The article contends that those concerned with the separation of the normative and the empirical begin efforts to reconnect presidential power to public purpose by going beyond the terms of Neustadt's argument and by reexamining the American Founding for what it may suggest about the intended ends of politics and the presidency.

The question of national identity has been a central theme in Mexican thought since the Revolution of 1910. The writings of Octavio Paz, one of Mexico's most prominent literary figures, are an important and provocative locus for this question. The contribution of Paz to an analysis of Mexican identity must be seen in the broader context of an intellectual revolution in Mexico. This began in the late 1920's and was directed against the prevailing philosophical romanticism represented by Antonio Caso and Jose Vasconcelos. This was, in part, a protest against the anti-intellectualism inherent in an “aesthetic-intuitive” approach of these writers. But it was also the demand for a philosophical perspective more relevant to an emerging Mexican nationalism already being articulated in literature and art. The writings of the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset were of crucial importance in influencing Mexican philosophy towards realism. The key concept taken from Ortega was that of “historical perspectivism”: the view that reality cannot be grasped independently of the point of view from which it is being observed. Perspectives do not distort reality; they constitute it. Philosophy, then, is changed from something abstract and eternal to something concrete and historical. Ortega's historical perspectivism became the inspiration for Mexican thinkers who wished to develop a national philosophy and a concept of “Mexicanidad.”

In current ethical theory we have been getting two second-order phenomena, each a rebound from a first-order phenomenon.

The first-order phenomena, though with partly the same prompting, come from totally different fields and are miles apart. Even so, a main point of this paper is that the sets of second-order phenomena, rebounding from widely different data, may be tending to converge and, taken radically, may be saying the same thing.

The classical theory of totalitarianism provided unequalled insights into the nature of the Stalinist system. Its prevailing interpretation, however, proved grossly inadequate to conceptualize and explain the changes of the post-Stalinist period. Because of this, there appeared a strong tendency to reject the “totalitarian model” and, in addition, to discredit it politically, as serving the aims of the cold war. The present article tries to show that emphasizing the importance of changes did not require a wholesale dismantling of the totalitarian theory. On the contrary: the notion of totalitarianism should be preserved as an ideal-typical construct, adequately explaining the militantly ideological phase in the development of communism; the evolution of the system in its postideological phase should be explained as detotalitarization, that is, essentially, as a disintegrating process, paving the way for the so-called collapse of communism. The author analyzes the consecutive stages of the detotalitarization process in post-Stalinist Poland and thus explains the collapse of Polish communism not as a sudden, miraculous change, but as the last link in a long chain of events. He rejects the view that Polish People's Republic was “totalitarian to the end” as having no theoretical justification at all—although still being useful in the political struggle against postcommunist forces.

Mark Gibian's major study of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.'s political theory casts Holmes as a democratic pluralist in the line of Richard Rorty who instantiates his commitment in the literary form of untrammeled table talk. Gibian's thesis can be challenged through a close reading of Holmes's main political work, The Professor at the Breakfast Table, revealing that Holmes's defense of free expression as the core of American national identity is counterpointed by a more fundamental appeal to nondiscursive reconciliation. Treating The Professor as a “dramatized essay” or “proto-novel” opens the possibility that the work's meaning is most fully disclosed by placing conversation in tandem with the deeds and recorded gestures that develop its plot. Through a dramatic reading, Holmes emerges as a humanist balancing aristocratic and democratic principles, rather than as a liberal discourse analyst.

Much of what states do in the international system they do as a response to their perceived obligations, commitments, or responsibilities. Not all of these obligations are owed to the same sort of recipient, however: some may be owed to other identifiable parties with whom one has arrived at a bargain or an exchange of benefits, but obligations may also be owed to a chosen rule of conduct or guide to action, as in the case of deterrence, and to oneself, as in the case of selfpreservation or one's sense of honor. All three types of international obligation have been recognized in international law and practice, but no one of the three categories encompasses all the duties of states. A complete understanding of international relations requires attention to all three parties to which international obligations may be owed.

The antiquary, professed collector of the manuscripts and records of the past, is popularly ranked with the harmless butterfly-collector. Lytton Strachey characterized him as an “amiable muddler,” and Alexander Pope pilloried his dreary obscurantism.

But who is he in closet close y-pent

Of sober face, with learned dust besprent?

Right well mine eyes arede the myster wight

On parchment scraps y-fed and Wormius hight.

To future ages may thy dulness last

As thou preservst the dulness of the past.

There dim in clouds, the poring scholiasts mark,

Wits who, like owls, see only in the dark,

A lumber-house of books in every head,

For ever reading, never to be read.

These opinions are peculiarly shortsighted, for antiquarianism, the collection and study of old records, has been neither obscure nor harmless in its consequences. Hans Kohn and Carlton Hayes have made clear the considerable part played by antiquaries in stimulating a consciousness of nationalism, the most powerful public emotion of modern times.