This paper analyzes Aristotle's discussion of courage, the first and paradigmatic virtue in his account of moral virtue, as the perfection of human beings’ natures as both political and rational. It identifies unrecognized complexities in his definition of courage as “a mean with respect to fear and confidence,” in his subtle analysis of political courage, and especially in what he reveals to be the conflict-riddled reasons people find courage noble and good. While working to moderate the excessive fieriness of traditional heroism and to render citizens’ courage more sober and moderate, Aristotle shows why political courage can in fact never be made perfectly rational, pointing to a key limit to human rationality altogether.

Many critics of Augustine target his “pessimism,” arguing that his fixation on evil denies the value of this-worldly goods. This article challenges this view by exposing a methodological assumption that often underwrites it—the idea that Augustine's texts can be abstracted from their rhetorical contexts. To illustrate, I offer a close reading of City of God 22.22–24, a passage frequently cited as evidence of Augustine's pessimism. By analyzing how Augustine uses rhetoric to “instruct” and “encourage” his readers, I argue instead that this passage should be interpreted as an exercise of hope that helps readers resist temptations toward presumption and despair. This account complicates the common binary between optimism and pessimism and supplies a novel interpretation of key passages in City of God.

This essay offers an interpretation of Alfarabi's Book of Religion, in which the tenth-century philosopher addresses more directly than in any of his other works the relationship between human and divine wisdom. I argue that, despite his apparent silence about the orthodox view of divine law, Alfarabi's primary purpose in the work is to challenge precisely that view, along with the theological opinions on which it depends. To this end, the Book of Religion encourages the examination, by political science, of religion's claim to lead men to happiness. Previous scholarly work has not explored the extent to which the Book of Religion contains a confrontation with orthodoxy and is therefore unable to explain how Alfarabi justifies his thoroughly rational account of religion. Based on the interpretation presented here, Alfarabi comes to light as a philosopher open to the most fundamental alternatives, rather than a dogmatic rationalist.

While it is often assumed that reconciliation culminates in the comprehensive resolution of conflict between deeply alienated parties, the article argues that reconciliation can only be achieved through complex mechanisms of estrangement that reveal alternative vistas or collective renewal. Art performs an important role in this process. The article theorizes estrangement as both an artistic and a political technique that can have world-disclosing, rather than alienating, effects on its audience: what Svetlana Boym calls estrangement for, rather than from, the world. I tease out the implications of this insight by examining the South African theater piece Ubu and the Truth Commission, which employs a number of estrangements devices in order to problematize the ambiguities and uncertainties of the post-Apartheid transition period. By subverting audience identification, yet triggering emotional contagion, the play imaginatively opens up the possibility of a common world in which agonistic relations are productively negotiated, rather than fully suppressed.

I contrast two perspectives adopted to theorize political authorities. The first is the modern perspective. It conceives of political society as a civic union of free and equal citizens and regards the state as the political organization of this society. This perspective is primarily concerned with the principles that should govern the use of state power. The second is the political pluralist perspective. It recognizes a multiplicity of normative orders as equally legitimate. The focus is put on the civic processes by which a diverse citizenry should negotiate its interactions. I illustrate these perspectives by considering how they approach diversity, and more specifically the political claims of indigenous peoples. The pluralist perspective is argued to be normatively motivated by a consideration for the actual freedom of citizens to sustain diverse normative orders, to negotiate the structure of political society, and to jointly search for justice.

Not so long ago, a unified chorus of scholars, politicians, and activists declared that the time had come to move “beyond” toleration. Such an offensive orientation of de haut en bas indulgence towards difference may have been appropriate to warring Christian sects after the Reformation. But in this brave, new, and emphatically global world of unprecedented cultural, racial, and gender diversity, “mere” and musty toleration must give way to something more—to respect, recognition, even acceptance, or perhaps a positive conception of tolerance comprising the better features of all three.