How do we understand the relationship between ‘national security’ and a global capitalist economy? I argue in this article that liberal constructivist scholars have tended to ignore the constitutive effects of the global economy in the process of distancing themselves from ‘materialist ontologies’ and ‘rationalist epistemologies’. I contend that an important aspect of state identities is that they are dynamic and are historically constituted in and through a relationship to global capital. Only by paying close attention to this fluctuating terrain, can one make sense of the security practices of nation-states. In the latter half of the article, I illustrate my argument with an analysis of the Indian nuclear tests of 1998.

This article seeks to develop a concept of ‘security governance’ in the context of post-Cold War Europe. The validity of a governance approach lies in its ability to locate some of the distinctive ways in which European security has been coordinated, managed and regulated. Based on an examination of the way governance is utilised in other political fields of political analysis, the article identifies the concept of security governance as involving the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes. Three issues are examined to demonstrate the utility of the concept of security governance for understanding security in post-Cold War Europe: the transformation of NATO, the Europeanisation of security accomplished through EU-led initiatives and, finally, the resultant dynamic relationship between forms of exclusion and inclusion in governance.

In cases such as World War I grief or trauma were nearly universal in the European context and a direct consequence of a political experience of war. This article asks whether widespread social suffering may have a social and political expression that is larger than the sum of traumatised or bereaved individuals. Section 1 explores Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion, particularly as it relates to grief and compassion and uses this to build two contrasting typologies of grief and trauma. Central to this contrast is the idea that grief, as an emotion, is embedded in a community, while trauma and emotional numbing correspond with a breakdown of community and an isolation, which may give rise to solipsism. The latter would appear to make any notion of social trauma a contradiction in terms. Section 2 draws on the philosopher Wittgenstein's critique in the Philosophical Investigations of his early work in the Tractatus, to argue that even the solipsist exists in a particular kind of social world. This provides a foundation for arguing, in Section 3, that social trauma can find expression in a political solipsism, which has dangerous consequences. Section 4 theorises the relationship between trauma, identity and agency at the international level.

This article assesses the relationship between money, collective identity, and European integration. The recent move of the European Union (EU) toward a common currency – the euro – seems to contradict the conventional ‘one nation/one money’ assumption about the association between states, territory and money creation. However, from a broad macro-historical perspective, the process of European monetary unification is not as exceptional and unique as it is often made out to be. I argue that the relationship between money and collective identity is reciprocal. On the one hand, money is a purposeful political tool in the construction of identities. On the other hand, in order to function properly, money requires some degree of collective identity among its users. Thus, the article examines the role of the euro as part of an explicit project to facilitate the development of a European identity as well as the required level of European identity necessary for a successful functioning of the euro. The key identity aspect at stake in the relationship between money and identity is not an affective relationship between citizens and country, but rather a relationship of trust. During the process of modernisation, trust has become rather abstract and institutionalised. To support a modern relationship of trust, identity does not have to rest on deep affective feelings of belonging. Diffuse identity, based on utilitarian or contractual factors and as part of evolving hybrid identity structures, is sufficient.

Diplomacy has long been neglected as a preoccupation of international theory. To repair this deficiency, this essay focuses upon bargaining over interstate disputes and makes two distinctions. One is between diplomacy as independent and as dependent variable. Analysis of diplomacy as independent variable studies diplomatic practice as causal influence, as when overcoming pressures that increase the danger of war or deadlock. This perspective is important for developing a diplomatic ‘point of view’. Dependent diplomacy analysis is preoccupied with constraints upon diplomatic statecraft and with adaptation to them. A second distinction is between negotiated bargaining, to reconcile divergent state interests, and non-negotiated bargaining that converges upon common interests between states. The essay dwells upon the link between independent diplomacy and negotiated bargaining, on one hand, and dependent diplomacy and convergent bargaining, on the other.

Recent trends in Democratic Peace theory have called into question the orthodox ‘separate democratic peace’ position that liberal states are peace-prone only in relations with other liberal states. This article seeks to recast the bases and scope (or parameters) of the relationship between liberalism – primarily left-liberalism – in domestic politics and peace-proneness in foreign affairs, to the effect that whilst this is manifest more broadly than conventionally understood, it is far from universal or undifferentiated. Whilst liberal ‘norms’ – as indicators of the legitimacy of force – are an important factor in determining when liberals will and will not support the use of force, liberals are also shown to have a higher threshold for the use of force than other groups on the mainstream domestic political spectrum (usually to the Right), indicating greater unwillingness to use force. The cases examined are reasonably neutral, not cherry-picked, in that they are drawn from the three major conflicts of the twentieth century and, as a starting point for the examination of liberal imperialism, Gladstone's Second Ministry (1880–1885).

Whilst the above findings are presented as highly significant for understanding the character of liberal peace-proneness and an advance on the separate democratic peace position, the argument is necessarily qualified in an effort to reflect the political complexities of the phenomenon and the limitations of liberal norms as an explanatory factor. It is, however, these very qualifications that put the politics back into the research agenda and connect the knowledge claims to a wider body of academic scrutiny which, ultimately, should lead to a fuller understanding of the relationship between liberalism, democracy and peace.

The case of the EU points to the need to re-conceptualise the relationship between self and other in the IR literature. I argue that the literature forces us into an artificial choice between the liberal constructivist approach of disregarding the constitutive role of difference in identity formation and the critical constructivist approach of assuming a behavioural relationship between self and other, and therefore cannot account for the diversity in the EU's interactions with various states on its periphery. I identify three constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to produce or not produce relationships of Othering: nature of difference, social distance, and response of other. I analyse how the EU's interactions with Morocco, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European states are situated differently on these dimensions, and evaluate the question of whether the EU is a postmodern collectivity based on these analyses.

In a growing number of countries diplomatic systems are being overhauled so that the commercial activities of diplomatic services have been centralised, the commercial activities of diplomats have been extended, and business interests have been formally integrated within diplomatic systems. These changes result directly from the tendency of governments to reorganise, and in many cases merge, their trade and foreign ministries, as well as the strategy of building formal business–government links within diplomatic institutions. While none of these features is unfamiliar to previous diplomatic systems, what is exceptional is the relative neglect of the commercial aspects of diplomacy within diplomatic studies. This lack of attention to the commercial and business elements of diplomacy in traditional theories of diplomacy means that we find ourselves trying to analyse contemporary changes to diplomatic organisation and practice without a suitable conceptual and analytical framework. Highlighting the significance of a political economy approach to diplomacy, and also engaging with orthodox approaches to diplomacy, this article begins to develop some analytical and conceptual tools to better identify, explain and understand changes in diplomatic systems as well as the increased influence of private interests in diplomatic practice now under way.

Prevailing analyses of INGO influence have focused on their advocacy role, claimed that they are motivated by values and assumed state monopoly over legitimate coercive power. As INGOs increasingly implement policy where state power is weak or non-existent, their commitment to their mission frequently causes action that violates their proper role. This article examines one case to probe how the INGOs community responds when the principles to which it is committed conflict and generates two findings. First, when principles conflict, they structure competing responses to a problem and who falls on which side reflects a kind of ‘bureaucratic politics’ of the transnational community. Second, principled actors have a hard time reasoning through trade-offs when values conflict. The same principled commitments that yield more success in advocacy roles may hinder success in policy implementation.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari wrote of the territorialising of the world, describing the commodification of space; its parcelling out and regimentation ensuring stable, unvarying coherence. Territorialised space, when well regulated, becomes a settled base for the political and for notions of political identity, heritage and kinship. Kenan Ferguson describes this as ‘the location and creation of civilization in a specific consumption of the land, as well as the subsequent delegitimation of those with different conceptions of it.’ The contemporary state is the receptacle of human ambition and desires, with history, allegiance and kinship understood in terms of its borders; there is a retrospective history premised on strategic forgetting and the cultivation of a collective memory coherent before the contemporary state.

Every social revolution has elicited some form of counter-revolutionary response from the international system. The impulse to reverse revolutionary transformation has much to tell us about the dynamics of social revolution as well as the nature of international order. The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between counter-revolution and international order. First it establishes a basic conceptual framework of international counter-revolution and argues that counter-revolution should be understood as more than just an active opposition to revolution and also examines the motives of counter-revolutionaries. Second, using two interpretations of the international system – those of Henry Kissinger and Raymond Aron – the article draws several conclusions about the international tendency to attempt to overturn revolution and concludes that there exist international systemic pressures, of a non-neorealist kind, which provide the basis for international order. These pressures not only produce order but, at certain times, impel states to counter radical transformations in parts of the world which seem, at first glance, to have little consequence for the functioning of international order.

American grand strategy has undergone repeated changes in recent years. This essay clarifies the nature of those changes and offers an explanation for them. US foreign policymakers have had four basic strategic alternatives: a strategy of disengagement; a strategy of balance of power; a strategy of primacy; and a strategy of liberal internationalism. The Bush administration experimented with two of these strategies, and initiated two major strategic adjustments after coming into power: the first, early in 2001, by moving from Clinton's liberal internationalist approach towards a strategy of realism; the second, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, by moving from a realist approach towards a strategy of American primacy. International structural pressures cannot explain why either of these changes occurred. The real explanation lies in the influence of distinctive policy ideas, as promoted by leading state officials. The irony of this twofold strategic adjustment is that the realists of the Bush administration have returned to many of the Wilsonian assumptions that characterised the Clinton years.

After a decade of financial crises, international economic leaders have begun to talk about the need for reform. Yet, while they speak in dramatic terms of a ‘new financial architecture’, in practice, they seem more interested in more limited renovations to the international monetary system. Arguing that ‘A lack of reliable data . . . was critical to [recent] crises’, the International Monetary Fund has, for example, emphasised the importance of better data-gathering systems and greater surveillance. By defining the cause of the crises as informational rather than systemic, Fund leaders thus justify a limited solution: in Michel Camdessus' words, what is needed is ‘no new machinery, no new heavy public intervention’, but rather a series of limited technical fixes. This is not the first time that international financial leaders have succumbed to the seduction of technique. Four decades ago, as the Bretton Woods system struggled through an escalating series of monetary crises, state and global policymakers chose a similar path of technical expediency, opting for limited reforms. As we now know, those strategies ultimately proved to be inadequate to the task of rescuing the postwar monetary order. In this article, I revisit that regime and its collapse, examining the roots of the contemporary search for technical fixes.

D.A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 257 pp.

F. Jawara and A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations (London, Zed Books, 2003), 329 pp.

Amrita Narlikar, International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO (London, Routledge, 2003), 238 pp.

American actions since the collapse of the trade talks at Cancún have suggested that trade conflicts can no longer be solved simply by a bilateral bargain with the EU that is then imposed, with a few side payments, on the other members of the WTO. The emergence of the G-21 (with its fluctuating membership) has at least opened up the possibility that trade negotiations may move away from the US–EU duopoly that has characterised them for so long towards a set of bargaining arrangements that are more multilateral. It may be that the real beneficiaries of these changes will be the emerging countries such as Brazil, China and India, all prominent in the leadership of the G-21, rather than the least developed countries. Thus, for example, opening up trade in sugar could benefit Brazil and harm Mauritius.

The United States has in recent years come under considerable criticism for its apparently cynical attitude towards international law. While the US administration refers often to the importance of the international rule of law it appears unwilling to itself be bound by that law. While the US took the lead in the post World War II years in establishing international law and institutions it has in recent years appeared unwilling to give those same institutions its full support. This article begins by examining a range of explanations for the seemingly undesirable US attitude towards international law. Dismissing each as inadequate on its own, the article demonstrates how what often appear to be contradictory aspects of the United States' relationship with international law can in fact be reconciled through the application to United States' behaviour of the basic tenets of classic modern realism as it pertains to the conduct of foreign policy. This is surprising since international law and realpolitik are more often contrasted. The United States' ‘attitude’ towards international law is better explained not as a post-Cold War anomaly but as having been an integral aspect of the rise of the United States to sole superpower status.

Social constructivism has come of age in contemporary international relations (IR) theory. Indeed, more and more submissions to presses and journals in both Europe and America characterise themselves as constructivist or situate their arguments vis à vis those of constructivists. In substantive terms and as the three books under review attest, constructivists also now offer detailed empirical studies that amplify and enrich their earlier conceptual and meta-theoretical critiques of mainstream approaches. Yet, as with any maturing research programme, there are gaps to be filled and challenges to be met. These include a better appreciation and theorisation of domestic politics; more explicit attention to research methods; further work on the linguistic turn so central to much of constructivism; and, finally, a rethink of attempts to build bridges.

This article presents an empirical case study of a type of nonstate actor largely overlooked in the IR literature on transnationalism: the diaspora or transnational ethnic actor. Building upon findings from contentious politics or social movements scholarship, I highlight the nexus of domestic and transnational politics by demonstrating how actors form ethnic networks and utilise transnational opportunities to pursue political goals in various states. Specifically, I argue that the formation of ethnic networks in the Tamil diaspora has enabled the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or ‘Tigers’ to engage in protracted insurgency against the Sri Lankan government army. Whereas traditional contentious politics scholarship is unable to explain the longevity and intensity of that conflict, a consideration of the transnational dimension provides new insight into how ethnic conflicts may be sustained. The combination of greater political freedom, community organising and access to advanced communications and financial resources in receiving states has allowed Tamil separatists in the diaspora to maintain ‘transnational ethnic networks’ which are in turn used to mobilise funds that have prolonged the secessionist campaign in Sri Lanka.

Clifford Geertz has noted recently that ‘more than any other single thing, it has been the rising tendency to ideologize faith in so much of the Muslim world that has made it increasingly hard to arrive at summary accounts of what is happening there’. This recognition has not deterred the emergence of a veritable flood of literature, scholarly or otherwise, much of which provides sweeping holistic accounts of ‘Islam’ and the West's current engagement with it. The difficulty Geertz highlights is, ironically, also the impetus that drives the current hunger for such knowledge at the popular, academic and policy levels: the recognition of Islam, in its multifarious manifestations, not as a stagnant and ritualistic historical artefact, but as the major component of cultural renaissance and prime vehicle of dissident political mobilisation in the contemporary Muslim world.

RANDAmerica's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003)

Imaging Iraq

On the back cover of this book there is a warm endorsement of its contents by none other than Paul Bremer, effectively the US Governor General of Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004. He claims to regard the book as ‘a marvellous “how to” manual for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. I have kept a copy handy for ready consultation since my arrival in Baghdad.’ Events in Iraq during the past year would suggest either that he misplaced his copy of the book early in the occupation – or simply chucked it behind a sofa when he realised that it no longer told him what he wanted to know.

The concept of an emergent global civil society (GCS), an identifiable public sphere of voluntary association distinct from the architecture of states and markets, has become voguish in some approaches to international relations and international political economy, and in the practices of global governance. This article seeks to reveal the limitations of the prevailing commonsense framing of GCS. Challenging the idea that we can isolate an unambiguous GCS sphere, we focus instead on the particular uses of GCS – on the practices that are shaped in its name. We make a number of interventions to emphasise the conceptual and political ambiguity of GCS. First, we shift the emphasis from GCS as a bounded ‘non-governmental’; space to GCS as precisely a means of making global politics governable in particular ways. Second, we question the assumption of GCS as ‘voluntary association’, asking what it means for GCS to embody or represent the interests of social groups. Finally, we raise questions of the image of empowerment through GCS, highlighting the power relations, tensions and contradictions at the heart of a transformative politics.