Much as I admire E. H. Carr's work in the international field, I intend to question the main assumption upon which it is based: namely, that it is power which always has decided and always will decide major political issues. In this respect my argument points in the same direction as two earlier lectures in this series, although my method of approach is different from theirs. My aim is to show with some precision why power, as used in political theorizing, is not only an inadequate but a confusing and even a deceiving notion. And I will begin by indicating the three main areas in which the confusions and deceptions arise.

Alan James makes a noble effort to rescue me from my puzzlement concerning Martin Wight, but I confess myself still confused. As he implies, probably the root of the matter lies in differences of temperament and experience. This being the case, it then becomes the task of the academic to pursue the argument back to the basic point at which one party asserts one set of premisses and the other another, but neither side can offer further justification of these premisses, or at least not in terms which would be acceptable to the other. This I shall endeavour to do at the end of this note. Where Alan James's article is particularly helpful is that it makes it a little clearer that Wight was a part of an intellectual tradition and that this sort of ‘private pacifism’ may be less uncommon than I had supposed, partly, presumably, becauseit is private. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it rests on, at best, a curious set of premisses; but about this later. There are some initial points to make.

Thirteen years – almost to the day – after formulating its Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour, at a ‘Summit’ of Communist Party First Secretaries (in Moscow in June 1962), Comecon established its Agreed Plan for Multilateral Integration Measures, at a meeting of Heads of Government in Budapest in June 1975. The causes of delay to economic integration within Eastern Europe's trading bloc have been political, but the foundation of the body in 1949 was as political in origin as was the renewed impetus given to economic collaboration by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Indeed, as a brief retrospective readily shows, international politics have been instrumental in every turning-point in Comecon's life of 27 years (one fewer than its nearest Western counterpart the O.E.E.C, since 1961 the O.E.C.D.).

By showing how a number of temporal assumptions shape three mutually exclusive narratives, the article argues for a mediated and reflexive understanding of events, one that is more open and less likely to fall into the pitfalls of a confrontation between different versions of retrospective responsibility. The article begins by looking beyond the agency and structure debate and into the temporal dimension of narrative, mainly for the sake of understanding the relationship between continuity and change. The article covers three potential narratives, focusing on their influence on the study of events, policy, and retrospective responsibility. It then illustrates their impact on mainstream understandings of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Upon describing the problems of positing strict continuity and change, both of which impact accounts of retrospective responsibility, the outline of a more reflexive, mediated approach to events and temporality is introduced, based on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In doing so, the article demonstrates the disadvantages of Erlebnis, an approach that unreflexively applies a limited set of temporal assumptions, highlighting instead the advantages of Erfahrung, an approach that strives for a mediated understanding of events.

Walzer has recently updated his just war theory to take account of terrorism, humanitarian military intervention and new interpretations of the doctrine of self-defence, pre-emptive and preventative warfare The ethical considerations that underwrite Walzer's most recent work invite us beyond the routine citation of his work to a proper consideration of the moral parameters of international politics. Beyond Just and Unjust Wars Walzer has a wealth of insight into the key questions of international theory. His work on toleration, the nature of universality or on the role of social criticism has always been the basis of his insight in to the hard questions of international ethics. Despite being heavily criticised for being communitarian or conservative (both charges that need serious re-evaluation) Walzer's ideas offer a real alternative to the dominant neo-Kantian cosmopolitan tradition and a workable ethical framework for thinking about the challenges of contemporary international politics and international law. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the final essay of Arguing About War. The essay, entitled ‘Governing the Globe’ offers a radical vision of a reformed international society inspired by the principles that underpin Walzer's development of his just war theory and it is vital that we take notice.

The political scientist who relies upon historiographic sources to propose and test hypotheses runs the risk of riling up not only her peers in the discipline, but also the historians upon whose work she must rely to provide the materials for these hypotheses. It was intellectually satisfying and stimulating to learn that my work has been read not only by scholars in ‘my’ discipline, but also by those in the discipline which made my own analysis possible, and I am grateful for Professor Hopkins' extensive comments. As Hopkins notes, there are differences in the orientation of the two disciplines: political science has as one of its central concerns ‘the state’, while historians are more interested ‘in charting changing relativities in international relations’. As a political scientist, I am indeed interested in identifying the factors which lead to such changes.

Arnold Toynbee was Director of Studies at Chatham House from 1924 until his retirement in 1954. His fame rests on two monumental projects to establish a global perspective. The Annual Survey each year reviewed the world as a geographical whole, selecting four or five themes for special treatment. It was not an edited volume. The Study of History put Western civilization in the context of a historical survey of all previous civilizations. Quite apart from his considerable journalistic output, the thirty-four volumes of the Survey and the ten volumes of the Study show how seriously Toynbee had taken a schoolmaster's injunction ‘first to see your subject or your problem as a whole’. Toynbee believed that a global perspective in terms of both time and space was of practical use.

In this article I explore the nature of the relationship between art and terror/ism and ask why identifications between the two are so routinely and often insistently made. In so doing, my aim is twofold. Firstly, I explore the possibility of there being a deep-seated structural link that exists between art, terror/ism and creativity. In other words, I ask if terror is a necessary corollary of the ‘creative event’. Secondly, I explore explicit examples in which artists have sought to create or to emphasise this relationship, from the perspective of Contemporary Art practices. In the spirit of experiment rather than of judgment then, this article sets up a series of trials in which art and terror/ism are philosophically, aesthetically and politically blended. It asks where else should such tests be conducted, if not in relation to the artwork and in particular, in relation to those artworks which toy with terror/ism and those artists who claim on some level, to be ‘terrorists’? How is the ‘artist-as-terrorist’ to be interpreted and understood alongside existing definitions of both terrorism and of Art? And finally, what role does imagination play in the construction of experience?

The problem of reconciling historical data and scholarship with the concepts and assumptions of political science is a familiar and much-debated one. Whatever the abstract arguments about the exercise, it is a desirable one in the evolution of rigorous and comparative analyses, and one which demands attention in many areas of international studies. It is the aim of this review article to look at the problems entailed in the reconciliation of history and theory, through the particular example of the League of Nations and its experience.

This article examines ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a significant factor in the future of global politics. Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent to which different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies in the form of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing on rising powers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states such as China, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, with diasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states’ geopolitical agendas and great power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies. States can treat ‘their’ diasporas as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of ‘civilisational’ politics; and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussing the implications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years.

The war in Syria has been communicated to global audiences through images of dead and injured children, decapitated and tortured bodies, and ruined cities. The article shows how news media coverage of the war's impact on the city of Aleppo invoked a Gothic tradition. Drawing on Kristeva and Freud's concepts of the abject and the uncanny, the article argues that the Gothic tradition can further International Relations research on the constitution of Selves and Others. The Gothic Other is constituted through the (Gothic) Self's repulsion, fascination, and desire, and the Gothic tradition revolves around an understanding of the invisible as an in-between space of fear and anticipation. The ability to recognise Gothic themes in an image depends on one's familiarity with the Gothic tradition, hence images are theorised as having a Gothic potentiality. The article focuses on how the Anglo-Saxon Gothic tradition enabled Western readers to identify Gothic themes in news coverage of the war in Aleppo. The article adopts a multimethod strategy including a content analysis of 457 images published by Western news media; a discourse analysis of news stories; an analysis of three Gothic, uncanny iconic motifs; and an author-created comic drawing on Gothic elements from the published photographs.

This article explores the question of human agency in military targeting. Targeting is one of the key drivers of war. When studied by academic disciplines, much interest has been devoted to the ethics and effects of military targeting. Less debated, but focused here, is the question of the conditions of human agency within military targeting. In the literature that does exist on this topic, there is a questioning of the traditional conception of human agency but at the same time a lack of closer conceptualisation of different kinds of articulations of human agency in the targeting process. In this article, we propose a recentring of human agency in critical scholarship on military targeting. With inspiration from Theodore Schatzki's work on ‘practice’, by analytically approaching targeting as a practice, and through various examples from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the article develops and illustrates a framework for the conceptualisation of human agencies in targeting. This framework distinguishes articulations of agency based on whether they furthered the (temporary) ordering of the targeting practice or challenged its internal organising elements. The study of military targeting is significant not least since the phenomenon is one of the key ‘engines’ and drivers of war's constant becoming.

1980 was not a good year for detente. The year began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing state of East-West relations was reflected at the year's end in a deadlocked C.S.C.E. Review Conference in Madrid. The second phase of the Conference began with a sombre declaration by the United States' delegate that ‘detente does not today exist’ though it remains ‘an objective to be sought’. The invasion of Afghanistan gave sustenance to those who had been arguing for some time that detente was merely, in the words of Senator Jackson, ‘appeasement in its purest form’. For many indeed, like Mr. Kampelman, Afghanistan signalled the final end of detente. Others could argue however that the fact that the Madrid Conference could take place at all in such a political atmosphere, thus maintaining the momentum of the ‘Helsinki process’, is a clear indication that detente is at least alive if not well.

This article examines and further develops the relationship between the theory of uneven and combined development (UCD), recently taken up by International Relations (IR) scholars to furnish a social theory of ‘the international’, and the Gramscian concept of ‘passive revolution’, which refers to a molecular process of top-down revolution and state formation that preserves ruling-class power by transforming its social base. To this end, the paper: (1) advances a productive distinction between ‘societal’ and ‘(geo)political’ multiplicity, increasing the transdisciplinary potential of UCD and challenging dominant state-centric approaches to IR; (2) demonstrates that UCD is central to creating the conditions for passive revolution; and, (3) argues that UCD illuminates the distinct spatial dimensions of passive revolution, for which the succession of ‘classes’ in time requires the expansion of capitalist social relations in space. To illustrate these claims, the article demonstrates how the American Civil War is best understood as an inter-societal conflict, exacerbated by the coexistence of two social formations within a single state, leading to war. It then shows how, upon victory, the North’s abolition of enslaved labour and the subsequent attempt to re-subsume the South within a single sovereign polity constituted a radical instance of passive revolution.

This article asks whether there is a discrepancy between the field of International Political Economy (IPE) as we know it from recent debates about its role, distinctiveness, and contribution compared to the experience of its practitioners on the ground? Intellectually IPE is needed more than ever to engage real world events but faces constraining institutional imperatives. We have two interrelated objectives related to this: (1) to assess the extent to which the patterns in recent interventions are replicated when you ask those who self-identify as IPE scholars in the UK (2) to appraise survey data on the reproduction of a particular community of practice within the field as it evolves intellectually and institutionally. Rather than imposing our interpretation of IPE through publications, citation practices, conference attendance, or textbook content we offer two distinct contributions. First, to report new empirical data on IPE as a ‘field of inquiry’ in UK universities; and, second, to develop a critical intervention on the indisciplined nature of IPE as a field of inquiry in the UK. We conclude that the widely acknowledged and long-standing fertile intellectual advantages of IPE's ‘open range’, unlimited intellectual borders and transgressive enquiry bring institutional disadvantages with them.

After important critiques highlighted that studies of peacebuilding and statebuilding tend to bypass people living the consequences of intervention, scholars moved to include local experiences and subjects into knowledge production. This article builds upon these efforts by identifying and then furthering their common goal of coeval engagement. Coeval engagement implies encountering interlocutors as contemporaneous subjects of international politics and centring their experiences as a base for knowledge production. While the urgency and ongoing failures of coeval engagement are widely discussed, I focus on a thus far unconsidered possibility: that coeval engagement is impossible within the conceptual confines of intervention itself. The article delineates two defining parameters of intervention thinking that limit ongoing efforts at coeval engagement: predefined fields of visibility and the local-international binary. As an alternative, it proposes seeing intervention as part of a wider politics of improvement. This conceptual shift leads to unexpected empirical sites and continues challenging intervention’s constitutive binaries. The potential of this reorientation is demonstrated by showing how a common tool of ‘soft’ statebuliding – non-formal youth education – functions within the politics of youth (un)employment in Serbia.

The article constitutes the first comprehensive review of the EU's export of crime control policies and ‘aid to internal security’ across regions over the last 15 years. Drawing on both International Relations and criminology, it develops an analytical framework to identify the political rationalities and technologies of crime control that the EU attempts to transfer across the Eastern and Southern (extended) neighbourhoods. By scrutinising 216 projects aimed at combating transnational crime beyond Europe's borders, spanning law enforcement, border security, criminal justice, and the penitentiary sector, the empirical analysis is geared towards detecting and systematising the ways of thinking and doing crime control that the EU seeks to promote and export. Moreover, it investigates the ‘action at a distance’ whereby it does so. It is argued that in shaping third countries’ ability to criminalise, police, indict, convict, and punish, the EU is simultaneously defining its own security actorness, specifically consolidating its role as a ‘global crime fighter’.

Gibraltar provides an instrumental lesson in the study of international affairs. In some areas, and on some subjects, reasoned rational compromises and solutions to disputes and differences between peoples and sovereign states are rendered impossible because of the emotional arguments which are introduced and which lead to entrenched, immutable negotiating positions. No issue is more likely to generate these situations than disputes over areas of land and differences over sovereignty. History supports this conclusion; territorial disputes concerning rights to entitlement have proved the most common cause of disagreement leading, first, to acrimonious relationships, then to the breakdown of communication and, finally, to overt physical hostilities and war.

Josip Tito first met a leading British statesman, in August 1944, when he had discussions in Naples with Winston Churchill about the future of the Yugoslav resistance movements.1 After the war however the Yugoslav communist leader did not meet another leading statesman from the West until September 1952. The visitor on that occasion was Churchill's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Between the two dates there had been remarkable changes in Anglo-Yugoslav relations. In the years 1944–1948, as the world slipped towards Cold War, the British aid given to Tito's guerillas in wartime seemed to have been wasted; Yugoslavia apparently became firmly rooted in the Soviet bloc. Many now argue that Churchill ought to have supported other Yugoslav resistance groups who were supporters of the Yugoslav monarchy and, presumably, more pro-western. British support for Tito during the war, however, had logical force: Tito was popular with his countrymen and able to unite them, a capable leader who knew how to use the geography of his country against its enemies, and a man who was ultimately able to liberate Yugoslavia without large-scale Soviet assistance.2 And, in 1948, to the surprise of many in the West he proved that he was no mere Russian puppet either. He opposed attempts from Moscow to extend its influence over Yugoslav government and politics and, in June, was expelled by Stalin from the Soviet-led ‘Cominform’ Faced by economic blockade from the East, Tito turned increasingly to the West for support. In November 1951 he took a major step by accepting American military aid. As yet there were limits to his western commitment: he was still a communist, on poor terms with some of his western neighbours (especially Italy), and determined, whilst accepting western aid, to keep his distance from both power blocs. But it seemed that he could be won over securely to the West in the long-term. Recently released British files on the Eden visit reveal much about the state of Tito's relationship with the West at this time.

In recent years there has been a marked tendency to assess French foreign policy in terms of continuity and change in the aims, organization and actions associated with General de Gaulle and his pursuit of national independence. Analysts have found that in spite of major personality differences between de Gaulle, Pompidou9 Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand, and a presidential system of government that maximizes the opportunities for personal direction,, there has been paradoxically a high degree of continuity in French foreign and defence policies. Until recently it was possible to account for this by emphasizing the influence of the GauIIist party in government and the National Assembly, but now that it is no longer the largest party nor enjoying a share in power it is necessary to seek other explanations for continuity in policy. Moreover, the return to power in 1981 of men of the Fourth Republic who continue to maintain many of their predecessors’ policies reveals the inadequacy of Gaullism as a basis for analysis and the need for terms of reference allowing for a longer view of the French role in world affairs. If that role has been so consistent in spite of changes in society, economy, political leadership and even regime is it not time to seek reasons for continuity by analysing external influences on French foreign and defence policies in the light of international relations theory? This is particularly appropriate in view of current French interest in systemic approaches to international politics. The intention here is to examine some relevant developments in the theoretical study of the international system and to consider their implications for existing interpretations and future study of French foreign policy and its claim to independent The French case is of obvious relevance to the situation of other middle-sized powers pursuing an ambitious role in world affairs, yet finding access to power and independence severely restricted.