Real-time systems need to be built out of tasks for which the worst-case execution time is known. To enable accurate estimates of worst-case execution time, some researchers propose to build processors that simplify that analysis. These architectures are called precision-timed machines or time-predictable architectures. However, what does this term mean? This paper explores the meaning of time predictability and how it can be quantified. We show that time predictability is hard to quantify. Rather, the worst-case performance as the combination of a processor, a compiler, and a worst-case execution time analysis tool is an important property in the context of real-time systems. Note that the actual software has implications as well on the worst-case performance. We propose to define a standard set of benchmark programs that can be used to evaluate a time-predictable processor, a compiler, and a worst-case execution time analysis tool. We define worst-case performance as the geometric mean of worst-case execution time bounds on a standard set of benchmark programs.

To address the question of how to deliver time-sensitive software for cyber-physical systems (CPS) requires a range of modelling and analysis techniques to be developed and integrated. A number of these required techniques are unique to time-sensitive software where timeliness is a correctness property rather than a performance attribute. This paper focuses on how to obtain worst-case estimates of the software’s execution time; in particular, it considers how workload models are derived from assumptions about the system’s run-time behaviour. The specific contribution of this paper is the exploration of the notion that a system can be subject to more than one workload model. Examples illustrate how such multi-models can lead to improved schedulability and hence more efficient CPS. An important property of the approach is that the derived analysis exhibits model-bounded behaviour. This ensures that the maximum load on the system is never higher than that implied by the individual models.

Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations: slight changes to inputs that can result in unexpected outputs. In neural network control systems, these inputs are often noisy sensor readings. In such settings, natural sensor noise – or an adversary who can manipulate them – may cause the system to fail. In this paper, we introduce the first technique to provably compute the minimum magnitude of sensor noise that can cause a neural network control system to violate a safety property from a given initial state. Our algorithm constructs a tree of possible successors with increasing noise until a specification is violated. We build on open-loop neural network verification methods to determine the least amount of noise that could change actions at each step of a closed-loop execution. We prove that this method identifies the unsafe trajectory with the least noise that leads to a safety violation. We evaluate our method on four systems: the Cart Pole and LunarLander environments from OpenAI gym, an aircraft collision avoidance system based on a neural network compression of ACAS Xu, and the SafeRL Aircraft Rejoin scenario. Our analysis produces unsafe trajectories where deviations under $1{\rm{\% }}$ of the sensor noise range make the systems behave erroneously.