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Divine intentions and the problem of evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2018

JUSTIN MOONEY
JUSTIN MOONEY*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst MA, 01003, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

I develop a model of providence on which God brings about good states of affairs by means of evil states of affairs, but without intending the latter. The model's key ingredient is a backward-looking counterpart of the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences of an action: namely, a distinction between intended and merely foreseen means to an end. The model enables greater-good theodicies to avoid worries about whether a perfect being could intend evil.

Type
Articles from the 2018 Postgraduate Essay Prize
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 215 - 234
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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