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Fundamentality and the prior probability of theism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2018

LUKE WILSON
LUKE WILSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West LafayetteIN, 47907, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Paul Draper has recently developed an account of intrinsic probability according to which a theory's intrinsic probability is determined by its modesty and coherence. He employs this account in an argument that Source Physicalism (SP) and Source Idealism (SI) are equally intrinsically probable. Since SP and SI are not exhaustive, and Theism is one very specific version of SI, it follows that the intrinsic probability of Theism is very low. I argue here that considerations of fundamentality show that more work needs to be done to defend the claim that P(SP) = P(SI).

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 169 - 180
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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