This article develops the international aspects of the two-handed growth strategy. Both the supply and demand side measures are reviewed. The need to work on both sides simultaneously is stressed, even if the specific topic of cooperation privileges the demand side. The report argues that inflation, while always a risk, should not be currently seen as a major issue. Accordingly, it concentrates on the fiscal and external constraints. These two constraints are strongly interrelated. Openness makes fiscal policy significantly less cost-efficient: the case for cooperative action stems from the possibility of internalizing the income flow leakages which may deter governments from working on the demand side of the economy as they make progress on the supply side.

The benefits from cooperation are directly related to openness. In practice, this means that Europe can act autonomously, as it is relatively closed: the two-handed strategy does not need to be made contingent on cooperation with the US and Japan. On the contrary, cooperation within Europe is crucial. Yet cooperation is not synonymous with synchronisation and, in particular, different conditions across countries (inflation, public and external debts) warrant different policies. Flexible cooperation must rely on Germany, France and the UK taking the lead in staging a fiscal expansion to match advances on the supply side.

La problématique de l'équilibre général en présence de concurrence imparfaite est examinée à l'occasion d'une vue d'ensemble de la littérature consacrée au sujet. On tâchera de souligner à la fois les apports et les limites de la théorie sur cette question, plus particulièrement dans la perspective d'aboutir à des « fondements microéconomiques de la macroéconomie » reposant de façon explicite sur les comportements imparfaitement concurrentiels des agents économiques.

De nombreux travaux récents ont jeté un doute sur la capacité des modèles traditionnels de fournir une explication totalement satisfaisante des échanges internationaux. Le recours accru aux analyses d'Economie Industrielle, de concurrence imparfaite et de théorie des jeux fournit un cadre complémentaire particulièrement utile.

C'est dans ce contexte que le présent article propose quelques illustrations simples des nouvelles recherches. La première section met en lumière plusieurs aspects des relations stratégies internationales, y compris le rôle joué par les acteurs publics. La deuxième section illustre le rôle des stratégies collusives, tant privées que publiques dans les échanges internationaux.

The technological stagnation of large bureaucratic organizations in the seventies led to a revival of “Schumpeterian” entrepreneurship. This is explained as a consequence of the search for flexibility induced by an increase of structural uncertainty. The role of credit in promoting technological flexibility is also considered. Its basic function today is seen to consist not so much in a rapid redistribution of productive resources, as Schumpeter maintained, but rather in a proper reallocation of technological risk.