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The Role of Information in a Duopoly Setting : Some Experimental Results

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Reinhilde Veugelers
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Abstract

Experiments have been conducted to analyze the influence of information on cooperative behavior in a duopoly setting. The results only qualitatively support the hypothesis that increasing information tends to facilitate cooperation. Individual signalling behavior shows the difficulties to reach a cooperative solution. These results however should be handled with caution in view of the limitations of the experimental setting.

Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 53 , Issue 4 , December 1987 , pp. 357 - 377
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1987 

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References

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