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A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Laszlo Goerke
Laszlo Goerke*
Affiliation:
Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
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Summary

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans un modèle de « screening » à deux périodes décrivant les processus de grève, il est montré que des négociations centralisées plutôt qu'individuelles (par firmes) font baisser les salaires et conduisent à plus de grèves. Ces résultats tiennent quelque soit l'acteur détenant l'information. La sensibilité des modèles de grève aux hypothèses quant aux procédures semble ainsi moins problématique que ce qu'on pourrait croire.

Keywords

C78D82J52C78D82J52
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , 1998 , pp. 225 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1998 

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Footnotes

*

The note was written while I was Research Fellow at the University of Southampton and is based on chapter 8 of my PhD thesis at the University of Hamburg. Helpful comments by seminar participants in Hamburg, John Drif-fill, my supervisor Manfred J. Holler, Jakob B. Madsen, colleagues in Southampton and Konstanz, and anonymous referees, as well as financial support by the EU are gratefully acknowledged. I obviously retain the responsibility for all deficiencies.

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