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Aristotle's Poetics and the Problem of Tragic Conflict
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 July 2014
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Despite the broad diversity in our century of views about tragedy, most critics show remarkable agreement about one point: that ‘conflict’ is a central defining characteristic of the form. Tragedy has repeatedly been discussed in terms of a struggle, which involves competing demands or forces that press in on man and shape his conduct. Although the structure of such a conflict has been variously formulated, in general it has been conceived in one of three ways: 1) as a psychological dilemma of inner decision-making, in which the hero must choose between opposing claims that he cannot mediate; 2) as a social collision between agents who hold to different but often equally valid ethical claims; 3) as a religious struggle implicating man in resistance against a force of divine necessity, such as fate, oracles, or the gods.
A wide host of influences could be marshalled to explain the development of popularity of these modern conceptions. Existentialism has had a hand in forming theories of tragedy that concentrate on crises of decision-making. Hegel's critical views of drama in the Vorlesungen ueber die Aesthetik have had an impact on the idea that tragic struggle emerges within the state and the potential competition between civic and familial obligations. And German Romantic critics, for example, Schiller and Schlegel, have made their mark on the notion that the tragic hero asserts his dignity against an external force of necessity threatening personal autonomy. But it has often been argued that these relatively modern influences are themselves derivative. According to many critics, theories of tragic conflict are ultimately indebted to Aristotle's Poetics. The Greek treatise is seen as the primary source for an idea that has by now become commonplace.
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References
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11. See especially the works of Schiller cited in n.7 above.
12. Lucas, D.W.’ edition of the Poetics (1968; rpt. Oxford 1980Google Scholar) is used for citations from the Greek. All translations are my own.
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17. NE 1098a8–10.
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24. Politics 5.5–9.
25. Politics 1302a38-b1.
26. Politics 1267b 1–3.
27. Politics 1263bl5–1264a5 and 1266b26–31.
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29. NE 1167b5.
30. NE 1167b7.
31. NE 1167b10–15.
32. NE 9.4.
33. For Aristotle’s discussion of the bad man see NE 1166b2–29. Here, once again, we find Aristotle taking over a popular set of social terms, σπoυδαῑoς/φαῡλoς, and infusing it with moral and ethical distinctions of his own.
34. See Amelie O. Rorty, ‘Akrasia and Pleasure’ in Rorty (n.15 above), 271f.
35. NE 1166bl8–23.
36. NE 1166b8–10: ‘They [= the thoroughly bad] are at variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things and rational desires for others, as is the case with the incontinent.’ This paper does not offer the scope for a treatment of the complex and ongoing scholarly disputes about Aristotle’s views of akrasia, which appear in NE 7. For purposes of the present argument, I merely want to point out that the occurrence of internal conflict in the incontinent motivates Aristotle to rank them, despite their knowledge of the good, among the worse sorts of men. On akrasia see the following recent publications: Myles Burayeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to be Good’, in Rorty (n.15 above), 82–88; Rorty, ‘Akrasia and Pleasure’, ibid. 267–284; Richard Robinson, ‘Aristotle on Akrasia’, in Bames (n.23 above), 81–86; and Kenny, Anthony, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will (New Haven 1979), 160-66.Google Scholar
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38. See Wiggins (n.37 above), 252.
39. Ibid. 256.
40. This point owes something to Aristotle’s conception of the unity of the virtues and the coherent integration of ethical claims in the life of the good man. See Wilkes (n.15 above), 341–57 and Julia Annas, ‘Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness’, in Rorty (n.15 above), 294f.
41. For a recent treatment of these matters, see Rosenmeyer, Thomas G., The Art of Aeschylus (Berkeley 1982), 336–68.Google Scholar
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43. See Poetics, Chapter 13.
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45. Poetics 1452b28–30.
46. Poetics 1453b27–1454al5. Aristotle’s choice of άνήκεστα (‘irreparable’) to describe the events that he categorises is significant, for the term does not suggest conflict.
47. Many critics now acknowledge that hamartia can have a variety of meanings, from deliberate wrong-doing to ignorant error, but that Aristotle uses the term in Chapter 13 to refer to an act committed in ignorance of particular details and without evil intent. In this narrower sense, hamartia is a characteristic only of the finest plays. See Lucas (n.12 above) 299–307, and Else, Gerald, Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 378-85.Google Scholar
48. NE 3. I see also NE 6.5, 8–13. It is important to note that although the σπoυδαîoς described in Poetics 13 is not a paragon of virtue and uprightness, he is most like the good and serious man of the Ethics in having correct knowledge of general principles and in acting badly only from ignorance of particulars, not intentionally.
49. See Lucas (n.12 above), xiv-xxii; Else (n.47 above), 21–23, 304–06, 433–35; and Thomas Gould’s review of Else’s edition and commentary in Gnomon 34 (1962), 641–49.
50. For Plato’s use of the distinction παιδíα and σπoυδή in his discussion of poetry, see Republic 602b6–10. For Aristotle’s very different manipulation of this contrast, see Poetics, Chapter 9.
51. Havelock, Eric discusses this issue at length in Preface to Plato (1963; rpt. Cambridge, Mass., 1982Google Scholar), Part One.
52. Republic 602c-608b.
53. Republic 604e.
54. This strikes me as a curious view that deserves more careful attention.
55. Republic 378c. On Plato’s views of conflict, see references in n.28 above to White’s Companion to Plato’s Republic.
56. These problems are treated with greater depth and from a larger literary historical point of view in a project on which I am currently working. Generally speaking, Hegel has not received the credit he deserves for having developed the first theory of tragedy focussed on conflict. Many modern critics of drama are indebted to him. See Bradley (n.6 above), 69–95, for the essay that first introduced Hegel’s dramatic criticism to English-speaking audiences.