Over the last few decades, the steady progress achieved in reducing planned exposures ofboth workers and the public has been admirable in the nuclear sector. However, thedisproportionate focus on tiny public exposures and radioactive discharges associated withnormal operations came at a high price, and the quasi-denial of a risk of major accidentand related weaknesses in emergency preparedness and response came at even higher price.Fukushima has unfortunately taught us that radiological protection (RP) for emergency andpost-emergency can be much more than a simple evacuation that lasts 24 to 48 hours withpeople safely returning to their homes shortly afterward. On optimization of emergency andpost-emergency exposures, the only “show in town” in terms of international RP policiesimprovements has been the issuance of the ICRP’s new general recommendations. However, nomatter how genuine these improvements were, they have not been “road tested” to thepractical reality of severe accidents. Post-Fukushima, there is a compelling case toreview the practical adequacy of key RP notions such as optimization, evacuation,sheltering, reference levels for workers and the public, and to amend these notions with aview to make the international RP system more useful in the event of a severe accident. Inpursuing further improvements to the international RP system, it should be clearly bornein mind that the system is generally based on protection against the risk of cancer andhereditary diseases. The system also protects against deterministic non-cancer effects ontissues and organs. In seeking refinements of such protection notions, we invite ICRP topay increased attention to the fact that a continued balance must be struck betweenbeneficial activities which cause exposures, and protection. The global nuclear industryis committed to help overcoming the above key RP issues as part of the RP community’supcoming international deliberations towards a more efficient international RP system.