In response to the 2011 Tunisian elections and the uncertainty surrounding Tunisia's future, we offer an empirical explanation of the election's results using socioeconomic and demographic variables. We aggregate many political analyses to describe the main parties and give insights into their strengths and weaknesses. We also examine common misconceptions advanced during the elections. Finally, we include a proposed electoral map that could be used by politicians to plan their future political strategies.

A dozen years before this PS symposium, several political scientists came together in a similar manner to honor Louis Fisher's scholarship and highlight his contributions to the discipline (Spitzer 2000). Many wonderful insights and observations were made to shed light on Fisher's versatility and impact. However, that effort missed an opportunity to highlight a key contribution of Fisher's work: a revival of pre-behavioral era functions and concerns within political science. In many ways Fisher is a throwback to a traditional political science approach where scholars did not select subfields or specialties but sought to engage in broad public debates about governing and, most importantly, believed that normative and empirical studies could and should go hand in hand. With the latter approach Fisher has made his most important contribution to political science.

The phenomenal success achieved by Islamic political parties in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011 is one of the most significant and frequently noted developments to follow from those momentous events. Within a few months of the demise of long-standing authoritarian regimes, Islamist groups that had been banned and oppressed for decades found themselves flourishing. Soon El-Nahda in Tunisia and then Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood tasted victory in constituent assembly, legislative, and eventually presidential elections. A new area of political Islam in power had seemingly arrived.

Geoengineering has been roughly defined as “the intentional manipulation of planetary systems at a global scale” (Keith 2000; Schelling 1996). This definition is neither as precise nor as informative as some would like. Nevertheless, we can fix ideas by focusing on the most prominent current proposal, which is to inject sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere to deflect incoming radiation and so cool the Earth's surface. This is a paradigm case: if anything counts as geoengineering, stratospheric sulfate injection (hereafter SSI) does.

After Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, flooding the city of New Orleans for several weeks after levees collapsed, the city struggled to recover and rebuild. Scholars and activists participating in the roundtable, “Katrina Seven Years On: The Politics of Race and Recovery,” at the 2012 APSA Annual Meeting in New Orleans, were to discuss recovery and racial justice in post-Katrina urban planning and rebuilding efforts, grassroots movements, job recovery, fair housing, and cultural revival. Although the 2012 meeting was canceled as Hurricane Isaac threatened New Orleans anew, panelists offered their observations and ideas to be summarized for PS readers.

In this article I address the perennial lenses through which the region is studied and produced as a reality unto itself, particularly in the dominant discourse in the United States. I conclude with some contingent good news.

Political science and law intersect not only in the political world, but as disciplines. This is as it should be, and for two important reasons: disciplinary history and content. As Fisher (2009, 798) notes, the first political science graduate program, founded in 1880, studied “history, law, and philosophy.” The American Political Science Association, founded in 1903, defined itself in terms of six distinct areas of study, five of which—comparative legislation, international law, constitutional law, administrative law, and jurisprudence—were in some manner about law (798). In addition, law is the expression of authority by the state. Its formation, content, and consequences form the purest expression of governmental power through what we more comprehensively define today as public policy. Early in the history of our discipline, political scientists approached the law in a manner that was “legalistic, formalistic, conceptually barren and largely devoid of what would today be called empirical data” (Somit and Tannenhaus 1967, 69). That is, they approached it as did lawyers of the time. Yet as political science matured, those who studied public law ceased being merely “little lawyers,” vesting their work with no less respect for the content of law, but tempered also with the tools and perspectives of what was by now a distinct discipline. No early political scientist better exemplified this maturation than Edward Corwin, especially (although not exclusively) as reflected in his timeless study, The President: Office and Powers (1957).

Climate change is confirmed by a global scientific consensus. Although no serious disagreement about whether climate change exists, deep controversy remains about what should be done about its many harmful effects. These effects are wide-ranging and include, for example, the increasing threat to coastal wetlands from rising sea levels, the greater likelihood of droughts harming agricultural production, and the spread of tropical diseases (Pachauri and Reisinger 2008). One further effect is the increasing risk of triggering an environmental catastrophe, such as an ice age, that might result in major loss of human lives.

In 2010, a debate erupted about plans to construct a mosque (as part of a larger multicultural center) approximately two blocks from Ground Zero in New York City. The main justification given by those who opposed the mosque was that building it so close to Ground Zero would appear to be insensitive. Public opinion appeared to support this notion, as large majorities of Americans registered their opposition to the mosque in surveys conducted at the time. In this article, I examine whether distance was, in fact, an important factor influencing citizens' opposition to the mosque. Using a survey experiment, I asked for opinions on the building of a mosque while randomizing how far the mosque was located from Ground Zero. Results from the experiment indicate that opposition to the mosque was unaffected by how far the mosque would be located from Ground Zero, but strongly influenced by factors such as partisanship, ideology, and tolerance for out groups.

The recent protests and revolutionary movements in the Middle East, which commenced in late 2010, constitute a cataclysm not only in the way we understand the relation between states and publics in each respective country, but also in the manner the region is taught. Significantly, Arab media studies has emerged as a vital and extremely functional subject of immediate relevance to the studies of Middle East politics. The explosion of media worldwide and in the region has created new connections, increased information flows, and forged new opportunities for solidarities and transnational dissident identities to emerge.

In January of 2012, the Primary Model predicted that Barack Obama would defeat Mitt Romney by a comfortable margin. He did. Obama's popular vote total topped Romney's by more than four million votes. The Primary Model's forecast was by far the earliest of those assembled in the special 2012 PS symposium (45 (4): 614–617). Even so it predicted an Obama victory with greater certainty (almost 90%) than any other one. To put this performance in perspective, note that several models got it wrong in 2012, and hardly any of the other ones picking Obama to win did so with much certainty. Many preelection polls also failed to predict an Obama victory with their final estimate, including the venerable Gallup Poll. How did the Primary Model get it right so far in advance of Election Day 2012?

You may be forgiven if you associate Lou Fisher's name primarily with his robust defense of Congress's preeminent authority in national security and budgetary matters, or with the idea that courts are only one of three co-equal players in the constitutional dialogue that occurs among all of the branches, or with the related effort to disabuse scholars, the press, and the public of the profoundly incorrect notion that courts have “the last word” in constitutional interpretation. All of these themes are, indeed, key components of Fisher's vast body of scholarly work and public testimony, and they will be forever linked to him as their progenitor. Just as solidly grounded in impeccable research and unassailable logic is Fisher's work on executive power. It fits snugly within his Madisonian emphasis on a government of limited and shared powers, enforced through effective checks and balances, where each institution exercises its respective power while overseeing the other branches to ensure respect for constitutional boundaries.

The Arab “revolutions” and the events surrounding them have posed a variety of theoretical challenges to political scientists. Popular uprisings have resulted in the ouster of long-standing autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and are seriously threatening the survival of incumbent authoritarian rulers in a region that once seemed immune to democratic change (Brumberg 2002; Fish 2002; Heydemann 2007; Posusney and Angrist 2005; Salamé 1994; Schlumberger 2007). These unforeseen developments pushed scholars of politics back to the drawing board to revisit dominant theoretical understandings of the drivers of regime change and stability (Albrecht and Bishara 2011; Bellin 2012; Blaydes and Lo 2012; Brownlee and Stacher 2011; Droz-Vincent 2011; Gause 2011; Goldstone 2011; Hoffman and Jamal 2012, Lynch 2011; Masoud 2011; Stacher 2012).

Lou Fisher's prolific writings on the war power—the constitutional repository of authority to initiate war and lesser military hostilities on behalf of the American people—have informed and, for the better part of four decades, shaped discussions and debates on the respective roles of Congress and the president, from the halls of academe to the corridors of power. Widely cited and invoked on hundreds of occasions by political scientists, historians, and legal academics, his work has opened doors for serious consideration of his views by representatives in all three branches of the federal government. It has, as well, established his place in the front-rank of constitutional scholars and, almost certainly, earned for his scholarship an enduring influence on discussions about the constitutional authority to order the use of military force.

The October 2012 issue of PS published a symposium of presidential and congressional forecasts made in the months leading up to the election. In the following articles, the forecasters assess the accuracy of their models.

Many scholars argue that retrospective voting is a powerful information shortcut that offsets widespread voter ignorance. Even deeply ignorant voters, it is claimed, can effectively punish incumbents for bad performance and reward them if things go well. But if voters' understanding of which officials are responsible for which outcomes is systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an independent source of political failure rather than a cure for it. We design and administer a new survey of the general public and political experts to test for such biases. Our analysis reveals frequent, large, robust biases in voter attributions of responsibility for a variety of political actors and outcomes with a tendency for the public to overestimate influence, although important examples of underestimation also exist.

The serial fiscal policy and budgeting woes of the United States over the last three decades have been compounded by a bipartisan evasion of institutional responsibility by elected leaders. Long before “sequestration” and “fiscal cliffs,” Louis Fisher argued that presidents and members of the House and Senate undermined constitutional power balance and the spirit of budgeting law. A variety of ill-conceived process “reforms” further damaged the separation of powers system. As a scholar, Fisher uses an institutional lens to explore budget concepts that are rare in political science, such as capacity, accountability, and duty. And as a public intellectual, Fisher's relevance has been secured by his repeatedly broaching these scholarly and political taboos.

This symposium addresses the rise of Internet data—and, more broadly, the data that is generated by a range of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Global ICT growth could have wide-ranging implications for the study of politics, but political science is currently lagging behind other disciplines in its use of ICT-derived data—particularly compared to fields such as public health and economics (Nadav et al. 2011; Carneiro and Mylonakis 2009; Choi and Varian 2009; Christakis and Fowler 2009; Ginsberg et al. 2009; Jensen 2011). The articles in this symposium, therefore, focus on the question of how political scientists can and should think about using ICT-derived data in their research.

This article empirically examines the “Big Sort hypothesis”—the notion that, in recent years, liberal and conservative Americans have become increasingly spatially isolated from one another. Using block group-, tract-, and county-level party registration data and presidential election returns, I construct two formal indices of segregation for 1992–2010 in California and evaluate those indices for evidence of growth in the segregation of Californians along ideological lines. Evidence of rising geographic segregation between Democrats and Republicans for measures generated from both party registration and presidential vote data is found. This growth is statistically significant for 10 of the 12 segregation measures analyzed. In addition, many of the increases are practically significant, with estimates of growth in segregation during the observation period ranging from 2% to 23%.

The Time for Change Model once again correctly predicted the winner of the US presidential election. In late August, before the Republican and Democratic national conventions, the model predicted that President Obama would win 50.6% of the major party vote to 49.4% for his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney. When all the votes are counted, it now appears that Obama will end up with approximately 51.8% of the vote, making the Time for Change Model one of the nation's most accurate statistical forecasting models. Despite the fact that this prediction was made more than two months before Election Day, the Time for Change forecast was more accurate than the results of many national polls conducted immediately before the election including the Gallup and Rasmussen tracking polls both of which predicted a popular vote win for Mitt Romney.