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On the Importance of Getting Things Done

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2012

Jane Mansbridge
Jane Mansbridge
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

Trend plus inaction equals drift. When a trend has external causes and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the United States produces the domination of American democracy by business interests. Drift in international decisions produces global warming. Specific institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than using, coercion.

Type
The 2011 James Madison Lecture
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 1 - 8
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2012

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