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Converting Threats into Opportunities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2006

Elinor Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Extract

James Madison contributed much to political science and to the art and science of governing democratic regimes. A major contribution was his recognition of the multiple threats facing the newly established Confederation (see, e.g., Dougherty 2001). Madison was willing to invest heavily in converting these threats into new opportunities. In his “Preface to Debates in the Convention” ([1984] 1840, 19), Madison reflected on the causes for alarm.James Madison Award lecture presented at the American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., September 1, 2005. The author is appreciative of support from the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the National Science Foundation and useful comments by Bill Blomquist, Eric Coleman, Sue Crawford, Joshua P. Hill, Marco Janssen, Robert Keohane, Mike McGinnis, Lesa B. Morrison, Amy Poteete, Mike Schoon, David Schwab, and Kenneth Shepsle on an initial draft of this paper. As always, I deeply appreciate Patty Lezotte's careful editing.

Type
THE 2005 JAMES MADISON AWARD LECTURE
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , January 2006 , pp. 3 - 12
Copyright
© 2006 The American Political Science Association

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