In April 1999, during the crisis in Kosovo, the Israeli government launched a medical, field hospital in order to provide humanitarian aid to the Albanian refugees that fled from their homes in Kosovo. This facility was set up by the Medical Corps of the Israeli Defense Forces, in a refugee camp located in Northern Macedonia. During the 16 days during which the hospital functioned, the medical staff treated 1,560 patients and hospitalized >100. The field hospital served as a referral center for all of the other primary clinics that were hastily erected in the camp and its surroundings. This communication elaborates on the various aspects of the humanitarian medical aid that were provided by this medical facility and the conclusions that learned from such a mission.

Recent acts of terrorism have ranged from the dissemination of anthrax spores to intentional contamination of food to the release of chemical weapons to suicide attacks using explosives. The prediction of such events is difficult, if not impossible. The recent attacks that have generated massive numbers of injured and dead may signal the crossing of a new threshold from multi-casualty events to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the medical and healthcare infrastructure must be able to prevent and treat illness and injury resulting from such events. Thus, a first step in improving the preparation for and responses to such events must include a sustained commitment to training physicians, nurses, identification specialists, pathologists, and other first responders. The rapid spread of SARS gives reason to believe that the distribution of such agents has potential advantages over the use of other weapons. Investments in the public health and healthcare systems provide the best defense against terrorism.

There is a spectrum of several threat agents, ranging from nerve agents and mustard agents to natural substances, such as biotoxins and new, synthetic, bioactive molecules produced by the chemical industry, to the classical biological warfare agents. The new, emerging threat agents are biotoxins produced by animals, plants, fungi, and bacteria. Examples of such biotoxins are botulinum toxin, tetanus toxin, and ricin. Several bioactive molecules produced by the pharmaceutical industry can be even more toxic than are the classical chemical warfare agents. Such new agents, like the biotoxins and bioregulators, often are called mid-spectrum agents. The threat to humans from agents developed by modern chemical synthesis and by genetic engineering also must be considered, since such agents may be more toxic or more effective in causing death or incapacitation than classical warfare agents. By developing effective medical protection and treatment against the most likely chemical and mid-spectrum threat agents, the effects of such agents in a war scenario or following a terrorist attack can be reduced.

The purpose of this editorial is to explore the relationship between the new global emphasis on terrorism and the developing academic and practical fields of disaster management. It includes an appraisal of the place of terrorism among the various forms of disaster, a consideration of its relationship to risk assessment and its place in the practical handling of risks and incidents, and some reflections on the role of the private sector in security management. The influence on the current attitude toward managing the terrorism threat by the evolution of the disaster management field is considered and some of the problems with defining scenarios for counter-terrorism planning also are discussed.

The lack of a universally applicable definition of terrorism has confounded the understanding of terrorism since the term was first coined in 18th Century France. Although a myriad of definitions of terrorism have been advanced over the years, virtually all of these definitions have been crisis-centered, frequently reflecting the political perspectives of those who seek to define it.

In this article, we deconstruct these previously used definitions of terrorism in order to reconstruct a definition of terrorism that is consequence-centered, medically relevant, and universally harmonized. A universal medical and public health definition of terrorism will facilitate clinical and scientific research, education, and communication about terrorism-related events or disasters.

We propose the following universal medical and public definition of terrorism: The intentional use of violence — real or threatened — against one or more non-combatants and/or those services essential for or protective of their health, resulting in adverse health effects in those immediately affected and their community, ranging from a loss of well-being or security to injury, illness, or death.

The smallpox virus is a high-priority, Category-A agent that poses a global, terrorism security risk because it: (1) easily can be disseminated and transmitted from person to person; (2) results in high mortality rates and has the potential for a major public health impact; (3) might cause public panic and social disruption; and (4) requires special action for public health preparedness. In recognition of this risk, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (LAC-DHS) developed the Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan for LAC to prepare for the possibility of an outbreak of smallpox.

A unique feature of the LAC-DHS plan is its explicit use of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) framework for detailing the functions needed to respond to a smallpox emergency. The SEMS includes the Incident Command System (ICS) structure (management, operations, planning/intelligence, logistics, and finance/administration), the mutual-aid system, and the multi/interagency coordination required during a smallpox emergency. Management for incident command includes setting objectives and priorities, information (risk communications), safety, and liaison. Operations includes control and containment of a smallpox outbreak including ring vaccination, mass vaccination, adverse events monitoring and assessment, management of confirmed and suspected smallpox cases, contact tracing, active surveillance teams and enhanced hospital-based surveillance, and decontamination. Planning/intelligence functions include developing the incident action plan, epidemiological investigation and analysis of smallpox cases, and epidemiological assessment of the vaccination coverage status of populations at risk. Logistics functions include receiving, handling, inventorying, and distributing smallpox vaccine and vaccination clinic supplies; personnel; transportation; communications; and health care of personnel. Finally, finance/administration functions include monitoring costs related to the smallpox emergency, procurement, and administrative aspects that are not handled by other functional divisions of incident command systems.

The plan was developed and is under frequent review by the LAC-DHS Smallpox Planning Working Group, and is reviewed periodically by the LAC Bioterrorism Advisory Committee, and draws upon the Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan, with its SEMS framework and ICS structure, now is serving as a model for the development of LAC-DHS plans for responses to other terrorist or natural-outbreak responses.

Throughout the globe, healthcare providers are increasingly challenged with the specter of terrorism and the fallout from weapons of mass destruction. Preparing for and responding to such manmade emergencies, however, threatens the ethical underpinnings of routine, individualized, patient-centered, emergency healthcare. The exigency of a critical incident can instantly transform resource rich environs, to those of austerity. Healthcare workers, who only moments earlier may have been seeing two to three patients per hour, are instantly thrust into a sea of casualties and more basic lifeboat issues of quarantine, system overload and the thornier determinations of who will be given every chance to live and who will be allowed to die. Beyond the tribulations of triage, surge capacity, and the allocation of scarce resources, terrorism creates a parallel need for a host of virtues not commonly required in daily medical practice, including prudence, courage, justice, stewardship, vigilance, resilience, and charity. As a polyvalent counterpoint to the vices of apathy, cowardice, profligacy, recklessness, inflexibility, and narcissism, the virtues empower providers at all levels to vertically integrate principles of safety, public health, utility, and medical ethics at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Over time, virtuous behavior can be modeled, mentored, practiced, and institutionalized to become one of our more useful vaccines against the threat of terrorism in the new millennium.

Major terrorist attacks in Argentina since 1990 have been limited to two bombings in Buenos Aires, which together caused 115 deaths and left at least 555 injured. Following these attacks, national, regional, and local institutions responsible for emergency response in Argentina sought to improve their planning and preparedness for terrorism-related events. In 1996, the national government enacted legislation, which launched the Sistema Federal de Emergencias (SIFEM) or Federal Emergency System under the direction of the president. Since 1997, several of Argentina's major cities have developed emergency plans for terrorism-related events, including intentional biological and chemical releases. Institutional participants in emergency preparedness for terrorism-related events include Emergency Medical Services, hospitals, and the public health system. Remaining challenges include: (1) Improving intra-agency coordination; (2) Improving intra-agency communication; and (3) Improving and expanding emergency response training programs for responders and the general population.

The events of 11 September 2001 have had a profound effect on disaster planning efforts in the United States. This is true especially in the area of bioter-rorism. One of the major tenets of bioterrorism response is the vaccination of at-riskpopulations. This paper investigates the efficacy of training emergency medical services paramedics to administer vaccines in public health settings as preparation for and response to bioterrorism events and other disaster events.

The concept of vaccination administration by specially trained paramedics is not new. Various programs to provide immunizations for emergency services personnel and at-risk civilian populations have been reported.

Vaccination programs by paramedics should follow the guidelines of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Thispaper compares the seven standards of the CDC guidelines to routine paramedic practice and education. It is concluded that paramedics are adequately trained to administer vaccines. However, specific training and protocols are needed in the areas of administrative paperwork and patient education. A proposed outline for a paramedic-training program is presented.

Recent world events have forced Australia to re-examine its role on the world stage and its susceptibility to terrorist attacks. The authors examine the brief historical exposure of Australia to the phenomenon of terrorism, and review the geopolitical climate and features that may render it more susceptible to attack in the future. Australia's emergency management structure is outlined, and its current state of medical preparedness for a terrorist incident is critically reviewed.

It has been stated that the Franco-German Emergency Medical Services System (FGS) has considerable drawbacks compared to the Anglo-American Emergency Medical Services System (AAS):

1. The key differences between the AAS and the FGS are that in the AAS, the patients is brought to the doctor, while in the FGS, the doctor is brought to the patient.

2. In the FGS, patients with urgent conditions usually are evaluated and treated by general practitioners in their offices or at the patient`s home; initially, very few approach an emergency department.

3. Emergency patients with life-threatening trauma or disease are treated by emergency physicians at the scene and during transport. Paramedics often are first to arrive at the scene, and until the emergency physician arrives at the scene, are allowed to defibrillate, to intubate endotracheal-ly, and to administer life-saving drugs (epinephrine endotracheally, glucose intravenously, etc.).

4. Prehospital emergency physicians treat patients at the scene and during transport.

5. Emergency patients are guaranteed to be reached by an appropriate emergency vehicle and a respective crew within 10 minutes in 80% of the responses and within 15 minutes in 95% of cases.

6. The FGS deploys qualified emergency physicians assisted by qualified paramedics as prehospital intensive care providers; extended immediate care is standard. Total Prehospital Times (TPT) and scene times only are minimally longer than in the AAS.

7. Emergency Medicine is recognized as a supra-specialty to the base specialties. Specific training programs exist for emergency physicians, medical directors of emergency medical services systems (EMSS), and chief emergency physicians (CEP).

8. Resuscitation attempts are carried out not only by anesthesiologists, but also by internists, surgeons, pediatricians, etc. Emergency medicine encompasses cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and shock cases, and patients with an acute myocardial infarction, stroke, poly-trauma, status asthmaticus, etc. Emergency patients are admitted directly to emergency departments of the hospitals, which, depending upon the size of the hospital.

9. The incidence of life-threatening trauma victims has decreased to <10% in the FGS. Of a total of 830,000 deaths/year, fatal trauma cases ranked the lowest at 4%.

10. Survival figures on cardiac arrest (asystole, ventricular fibrillation/ventricular tachycardia (VF/VT), pulseless electrical activity (PEA), etc.) reported in the German EMSS correspond to those in Europe and the United States.

11. Paramedic training is characterized by a two-year program followed by a theoretical and a practical examination.

12. Paramedics and emergency physicians-in-training are supervised at the scene and during transport. Quality assurance (Q/A) constitutes an integral and legally compulsory part of the EMSS.

13. In the majority of cases, the emergency patients are evaluated and treated by the respective specialties without delays caused by patient transfer to other hospitals.

14. The FGS does not require a greater number of ambulances and/or personnel than does the AAS.

15. The German healthcare system creates less expenses/ capita than the does the U.S. system at a similar level of quality of care.

16. Emergency procedures are carried out by anesthesiologists, emergency physicians, surgeons, internists, and other specialists.

Before the sarin incidents in Tokyo and Matsumoto, the Aum Shinrikyo (now Aleph) had tried to conduct bioterrorism with botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis. Followers of the Aum could not overcome technical difficulties inherent in developing biological weapons, and the perpetrators had not been prosecuted for their failed attempts of bioterrorism. But the Aum's biological attack revealed several shortcomings in the Japanese law that regulated biological weapons. Since the missile experiment of North Korea conducted in 1998, the Japanese government has come to consider the threat posed by biological weapons more seriously. In 2001, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the series of anthrax letter scares in the United States of America, the Japanese government established its Five Basic Principles for Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism and several measures were taken at the central and local levels. Activities of the Aum have been monitored by the Public Security Investigation Agency and the National Police Agency under the Anti-Aum Law since 2000.