There is evidence to suggest that patients delayed seeking urgent medical care during the first wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. A delay in health-seeking behavior could increase the disease severity of patients in the prehospital setting. The combination of COVID-19-related missions and augmented disease severity in the prehospital environment could result in an increase in the number and severity of physician-staffed prehospital interventions, potentially putting a strain on this highly specialized service.

The aim was to investigate if the COVID-19 pandemic influences the frequency of physician-staffed prehospital interventions, prehospital mortality, illness severity during prehospital interventions, and the distribution in the prehospital diagnoses.

A retrospective, multicenter cohort study was conducted on prehospital charts from March 14, 2020 through April 30, 2020, compared to the same period in 2019, in an urban area. Recorded data included demographics, prehospital diagnosis, physiological parameters, mortality, and COVID-status. A modified National Health Service (NHS) National Early Warning Score (NEWS) was calculated for each intervention to assess for disease severity. Data were analyzed with univariate and descriptive statistics.

There was a 31% decrease in physician-staffed prehospital interventions during the period under investigation in 2020 as compared to 2019 (2019: 644 missions and 2020: 446 missions), with an increase in prehospital mortality (OR = 0.646; 95% CI, 0.435 – 0.959). During the study period, there was a marked decrease in the low and medium NEWS groups, respectively, with an OR of 1.366 (95% CI, 1.036 – 1.802) and 1.376 (0.987 – 1.920). A small increase was seen in the high NEWS group, with an OR of 0.804 (95% CI, 0.566 – 1.140); 2019: 80 (13.67%) and 2020: 69 (16.46%). With an overall decrease in cases in all diagnostic categories, a significant increase was observed for respiratory illness (31%; P = .004) and cardiac arrest (54%; P < .001), combined with a significant decrease for intoxications (-58%; P = .007). Due to the national test strategy at that time, a COVID-19 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) result was available in only 125 (30%) patients, of which 20 (16%) were positive.

The frequency of physician-staffed prehospital interventions decreased significantly. There was a marked reduction in interventions for lower illness severity and an increase in higher illness severity and mortality. Further investigation is needed to fully understand the reasons for these changes.

Disaster Medical Response is a challenging field where opportunities for advancement are welcomed. Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (sUAV) technology (i.e., drones) has made enormous strides in the past few years and is poised for utilization in the early disaster response phase.

To discuss current uses of UAVs, proposed utilization and logistical details, technological advancements, current deficits, and training.

Our Foundation, Luman Medical, is working in the field of UAV integration for small to large scale disaster response. The concept is to equip first responders with small, relatively inexpensive, programmable drones that come equipped with hardware and software that are easy to use for inexperienced as well as skilled sUAV pilots.

These UAVs could increase ease and speed of deployment for early assessments of disaster area mapping, thermal imaging, ingress and egress routes, the discovery of survivors, communications, and delivery of supplies. Drone technology offers a new and growing type of tool in the disaster response arena. It is our hope to explore an integration that is easy, safe, and affordable to augment and enhance existing disaster response planning.

The Stop the Bleed campaign provided civilians with tourniquet application training and increased the demand for tourniquets among the general population, which led to the development of new commercially available devices. However, most widely available tourniquets have not undergone testing by regulatory bodies and their efficacy remains unknown.

This study aimed to compare the efficacy and performance of Combat Application Tourniquets (CAT) versus uncertified tourniquets.

This study compared 25 CAT with 50 commercially available “look-alike” tourniquets (LA-TQ) resembling the CAT. The CAT and the LA-TQ were compared for cost, size, and tested during one-hour and six-hour applications on a manikin’s leg. The outcomes were force applied, force variation during the application, and tourniquet rupture rate.

The LA-TQ were cheaper (US$6.07 versus US$27.19), shorter, and had higher inter-device variability than the CAT (90.1 [SE = 0.5] cm versus 94.5 [SE = 0.1] cm; P <.001). The CAT applied a significantly greater force during the initial application when compared to the LA-TQ (65 [SE = 3] N versus 14 [SE = 1] N; P <.001). While the initial application force was maintained for up to six hours in both groups, the CAT group applied an increased force during one-hour applications (group effect: F [1,73] = 105.65; P <.001) and during six-hour applications (group effect: F [1,12] = 9.79; P = .009). The rupture rate differed between the CAT and the LA-TQ (0% versus 4%).

The LA-TQ applied a significantly lower force and had a higher rupture rate compared to the CAT, potentially affecting tourniquet performance in the context of public bleeding control. These findings warrant increased layperson education within the framework of the Stop the Bleed campaign and further investigations on the effectiveness of uncertified devices in real-world applications.

A mass hospital evacuation occurred in Taiwan in 2021 due to the clustered COVID-19 infection in Hospitals. To maintain essential services with limited manpower, 74 patients are triaged and evacuated to 12 hospitals in 6 cities in 16 hrs for further treatment.

All patients were evaluated by physicians for discharge. The patients who still needed hospitalization were classified into three groups according to the risk of infection1. The high-risk group of patients were cared for by infected staff directly; the moderate-risk group were patients admitted to the same ward but didn’t receive care from infected staff. The low-risk group were patients avoiding infection outbreak. Only the low-risk group patients were transferred, excluding patients with unstable vital signs, hospice, and prison. Command Center of HICS of TGH set up a transfer execution team to handle this task.

There were 74 patients transferred, including 56 from internal medicine and 18 from the surgery ward. Most of the transfers are concentrated within 16 hours. These patients were transferred to 12 emergency hospitals in 6 cities. The average transport time was 1.5 hours and the longest was about 3 hours due to the distance and traffic.The 17 private ambulances and 11 Fire Department ambulances were dispatched and transferred 60 patients. In addition, there were 14 patients evacuated by small buses. No mortality or COVID-19 infection had been reported within 3 days after this mass evacuation, only one patient had been intubated after one hour of arrival to hospital due to condition deterioration.

A hospital evacuation is a complicated process, especially during a pandemic. All infection control measures create difficulties in the patient transfer process. Well-prepared evacuation plans, regular drills, well-trained personnel, an organized command system, and regional cooperation are the keys to mass evacuation in a disaster.