This article argues that high levels of government regulation of religion help to explain the “democracy gap” in majority Muslim countries. Controlling for previously hypothesized determinants of democracy, it finds that as levels of regulation increase, levels of democracy decline. Examination of specific types of religious regulation in Muslim-majority countries uncovers a pattern of repression of religious expression that may be used to mobilize citizens politically. These regulations are targeted more often at Muslims who seek independence from state-controlled religion or who wish to challenge authoritarian governments, rather than at non-Muslim minorities or at religious worship more generally. Thus, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in Muslim-majority states successfully use policies toward religion to restrict political competition and inhibit democratic transition.

Religious movements have long been challenging the modernist and secularist ideas around the world. Within the last decade or so, pro-religious parties made significant electoral advances in various countries, including India, Sudan, Algeria, and the Palestinian territories. In this article, we focus on the rise of the pro-religious Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP) to power in the 2002 elections in Turkey. Using the Turkish experience with political Islam, we evaluate the explanatory value of Mark Juergensmeyer's rise of religious nationalism theory, with a special emphasis on the “failed secularism” argument. Our analysis indicates that the theoretical approach formulated by Juergensmeyer has a great deal of explanatory power; however, it does not provide a complete explanation for the success of the AKP. The rise of religion in Turkish politics is the result of a complex process over long years of encounter and confrontation between two frameworks of order, starting with the sudden imposition of secularism from above, when the republic was established. Hence, to understand the rise of religion in contemporary Turkish politics, an in-depth understanding of history, politics, and the sources of tension between secularists and Islamists is essential. The findings of this article have important implications for other countries, especially those that are experiencing a resurgence of religion in politics, and are struggling to integrate religious parties into a democratic system.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a trilogy of cases involving Muslim claimants, has granted state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights a wide margin of appreciation with respect to the regulation of public manifestations of Islam. The ECHR has justified its decisions in these cases on the grounds that Islamic symbols, such as the ḥijāb, or Muslim commitments to the shari‘a — Islamic law — are inconsistent with the democratic order of Europe. This article raises the question of what kinds of commitments to gender equality and democratic decision-making are sufficient for a democratic order, and whether modernist Islamic teachings manifest a satisfactory normative commitment in this regard. It uses the arguments of two modern Muslim reformist scholars — Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa — as evidence to argue that if the relevant degree of commitment to gender equality is understood from the perspective of political rather than comprehensive liberalism, doctrines such as those elaborated by these two religious scholars evidence sufficient commitment to the value of political equality between men and women. This makes less plausible the ECHR's arguments justifying a different treatment of Muslims on account of alleged Islamic commitments to gender hierarchy. It also argues that in light of Muslim modernist conceptions of the shari‘a, there is no normative justification to conclude that faithfulness to the shari‘a entails a categorical rejection of democracy as the ECHR suggested.

While it is well-known that religiosity measures inform modern political alignments and voting behavior, less is known about how people of various religious orthodoxies think about the role of religion in society. To learn more about this veritable “black box” with respect to whether and why people connect their spiritual life to the political world, we conducted several focus groups in randomly selected Christian congregations in a mid-sized Midwestern city. Our analysis offers confirmatory, amplifying, and challenging evidence with respect to the “Three Bs” (believing, behaving, and belonging) perspective on how religion affects politics. Specifically, we show that while contemporary measures of religious traditionalism accurately reflect individuals’ partisan, ideological, and issue preferences, attitudes regarding the broad intersection of faith and politics are perhaps best understood via the presence (or absence) of denominational guidance on questions of the role of religion in society. We conclude by offering suggestions for future survey research seeking to explain the relationship between religion and politics.

The post-Stalinist decade resulted in a temporary liberalization in Soviet religious policy in 1956–1957, followed by an intensification of administrative suppression of religious life during the years 1958–1964. A close evaluation of archival sources reveals the quiet two-faced tendencies of Soviet religious policies vis-a-vis the Orthodox Church of occupied Estonia: on one hand, the dozens of orthodox congregations at the local level were forcibly liquidated and the number of clerics decreased rapidly; on the other hand, the patriotic and ecumenical activities of the administration of the Estonian Eparchy increased dramatically and achieved its “golden era” during the tenure of its new bishop of Tallinn, Aleksii Ridiger (the future patriarch Aleksii II of Moscow). This study describes in detail the gradual increase in the interference of Soviet propaganda with the ecumenical and patriotic activity of the Estonian Eparchy from 1959. In the course of subsequent restrictions and the persecution of religion under Khrushchev, the Estonian Diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate was integrated into the larger scheme of Soviet peace propaganda and ecumenical cooperation. This took the form mainly of the joint reception of foreign church delegations which coincided with the tenure of Bishop Aleksii, who played a big role in the Moscow hierarchy as well as in the external affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. Visits of Church delegations in Tallinn and Kuremäe monastery became a kind of “show piece” of religious freedom and played their part in Soviet peace propaganda. In conclusion, the rise and ebb of the patriotic and ecumenical activity of the Orthodox diocese in occupied Estonia were influenced by the changes, which took place among the USSR's highest authorities in the religious policies level and by the transition from Stalinist totalitarian dictatorship toward Nikita Khrushchev's more oligarchical system.

While direct democracy is a practical form of self-determination in the political process, the value system stemming from a given country's social and cultural factors has been argued to be critical in shaping citizens' preferences for a political institution. This article investigates the relationship between religion and the attitude toward direct democracy for the case of Taiwan, an East Asian country where most people are affiliated with Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions. Unlike Western countries dominated by Judeo-Christianity, some arguments indicate that value systems emphasizing collectivities, social cohesion, and obedience to authorities in East Asian countries are inconsistent with the fundamental value of democratic norms based on individual rights and self-determination. If this is the case, then social and cultural factors are incompatible to democratic development in East Asian societies. Nevertheless, this argument has not been adequately supported by empirical studies. By using data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey 2004, the findings from this study suggest that affiliations with Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions are positively associated with the agreement of using a referendum in political decision making. The ideological orientation stemming from these Eastern religions plays an important role in enhancing democratic values and the positive attitudes toward referendum.

The workplace has been hailed as a fruitful context for encountering difference, but other institutions of adult life — notably the church — have been downplayed, as it has been argued that self-selection produces political homogeneity within these environments. At the same time, much of what scholars know about social influence has been based on relatively blunt measures of disagreement, typically included in surveys conducted over multiple-week spans either before or after the actual voting has taken place. Inspired by work on the survival, loci, and democratic consequences of political disagreement, we survey voters at the moment when the literature would suggest they should be most likely to report agreement: Election Day. Wedding exit poll methodology with items that capture the major dimensions of networks and the content of discussion, we re-examine the contexts in which discussions take place and untangle issue-specific patterns of disagreement. We find evidence that church-based networks fulfill important democratic roles relative to other contexts, exposing individuals to cross-cutting discourse while serving as unique sources of information in the midst of broader electoral environments.

A growing body of literature criticizes the notion that Islamism is sui generis and argues that it could be explained by existing conceptions about human behavior. This approach relies on rational choice theory and its derivatives, characterizing Islamists as rational political actors that engage in cost-benefit analysis and strategic calculation. This article evaluates the explanatory power of this characterization through three case studies, namely the Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun). It argues that although the approach offers explanations for Islamist pragmatism, this characterization has three major limitations: lack of room for ideological change, extreme voluntarism between violence and non-violence, and lack of insight for intra-group gender relations.

This article presents a cross-country empirical analysis of the relationship between religion and political attitudes among the Catholic and Muslim publics, using the most recent data from the World Values Survey. We find that public support for democracy is stronger among the better educated in both the Catholic and Muslim countries. Contrary to the conventional belief that pious believers are less receptive to democracy, individual religiosity, measured by belief in God, is found to have a significant positive impact on desire for democracy in both types of society. Our findings further indicate that at the societal level, overt support for democracy is consistently positively correlated to the attachment of a set of more implicit tolerant civil values in Catholic-majority countries, while exactly the opposite is observed in Muslim-majority countries.

This article examines the effect of religious affiliation and depth of religious commitment on the political behavior of Catholic Latinos, evangelical Latinos, and secular/unaffiliated Latinos. The culture war theory connects theological conservatism with political conservatism, but because prior research shows that minority groups often have alternate experiences with churches that place religious doctrine and teachings in varying political contexts, it is not clear that Latinos fit the culture war profile. We find that religious tradition and church attendance have an additive but differing impact on ideological and partisan identification as well as various policy preferences on social issues where culture war religious divisions are usually found (abortion, gay marriage, death penalty, and support for Israel) and other non-social issues (universal healthcare and taxing and spending). We find that religiosity has the greatest effect on the political behavior of evangelical Latinos, followed by secular/unaffiliated Latinos and committed Latino Catholics, and that religious tradition is largely consistent in moving evangelical Latinos to the political right and secular/unaffiliated Latinos to the political left.

This article proposes a revised conceptual definition of consensus social movement. By using the example of the Catholic Worker, I construct a workable concept of a consensus social movement based on Quaker consensus and indigenous decision-making. The new definition of consensus social movement brings theoretical strength as demonstrated in the illustration of the Catholic Worker. The concept of a consensus social movement offers a revised theoretical tool for the social movement literature toolkit.

Sociologist Peter Berger once said that if India is the most religious country and Sweden the least, then the United States is a nation of Indians ruled by Swedes. In terms of use of religious rhetoric by politicians, however, the United States actually comes closer to being a nation of Indians ruled by Indians, while Australia a nation of Swedes ruled by “Swindians,” and Canada a nation of “Swindians” ruled by Swedes. This article provides evidence for these claims and assesses theories as to what causes greater use of religious rhetoric by politicians. Size of the religious population and the rights revolution are not decisive in determining whether politicians heavily use religious rhetoric. The article argues that the politicization of religion is related to coalition-building incentives with Catholics.

This article examines the relationship between religiosity and support for democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Using data from the last World Values Survey, we examine levels of religiosity among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, and their support for democracy. The influence of religiosity on support for democracy is also explored. The results indicate that religiosity has a negative influence on support for democracy, and it is particularly true for individuals who do not support the separation of the religious from the political sphere and who exhibit lower support for democracy. The article also examines different levels of religiosity among the three groups, controlling for a wide range of variables. We conclude that there is basically no difference in support for democracy between Croats and Bosniaks, while Serbs exhibit somewhat lesser support for democracy than members of the other two ethnic groups. Serbs also seem to be somewhat less religious than Bosniaks and Croats. Opposition to separation of the religious from the political sphere is a major source of lack of support for democracy among Croats and Bosniaks, but not among Serbs.

Local governments in Europe are facing difficulties in meeting citizens' demands for welfare provision. This opens new opportunities for profit as well as non-profit providers of social welfare. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are one type of non-governmental organizations addressed by governments to complement or replace parts of public welfare provision. This article gives some examples of FBOs in action as providers of welfare in a European context, with a particular focus on Sweden. Following the introduction, the second part locates the phenomenon of FBOs within the scholarly debate about secularism/post-secularism as related to multi-level governance. The third part gives an overview of potential roles of FBOs in welfare provision combating poverty and social exclusion, illustrated by a few examples from European contexts. Focus in the fourth part is upon the role of FBO engagement in Sweden as developing after World War II. It is concluded that no system is all encompassing in catering to those who suffer from poverty and social exclusion. There will always be a need for the competence and avant-garde role potentially provided by FBOs. However, due to historical circumstances FBOs in Sweden have been, and still are, complementary rather than an outright alternative to public welfare provision.

Political mobilization by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints against ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was more widespread and important than most studies of the episode have acknowledged. Several decades later, the Church is again organized and active in opposing legal recognition of same-sex marriage. In this article, we explore why and how the Latter-Day Saints mobilized on these two issues. We argue that their mobilization can be understood through classic social movement theory, even though the Church is not an economic-based interest group. Furthermore, the Mormons' approach in fighting the ERA — drawing on centralized authority, tapping into established volunteer and communications networks, effectively channeling money and personnel to where they are most needed, and engaging in stealth politics (obscuring the centralized nature of apparently spontaneous action) — is echoed in the fight against same-sex marriage, even though the times and technology have somewhat changed the mobilization dynamic.

Social group conflict along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages is deeply embedded in the Canadian historical experience. Contemporary analyses, however, have deprecated the role of religion and religiosity in shaping Canadians' political attitudes. This analysis demonstrates that religion and religiosity are significant correlates of Canadian attitudes on moral issues, paralleling the pattern observed in the United States. It demonstrates that the religious cleavage has been a salient feature of Canadian politics for some time and considers whether the contemporary moral divide could serve as a portent of cultural-religious conflict in Canada if a “political entrepreneur” articulated an issue agenda linked to these religion-based differences.

This article examines religious identity and its effect on political participation in the context of the Mennonite Church USA. Traditionally, Mennonite doctrine discouraged political activity because of its “worldly” nature. But it is uncertain if traditional doctrine influences the political behavior of contemporary church members. This article seeks to determine (1) to what extent there is a religious identity among contemporary Mennonites, (2) does this identity discourage support for political participation, and (3) if Mennonite identity discourages political participation, what is the substantive difference in support for political participation between low and high identity Mennonites? The analysis reveals that Mennonite religious identity is widespread in the Mennonite Church USA and high levels of identity decreases support for political activity. Despite this, Mennonites as a whole are fairly supportive of political participation, regardless of their level of identity.

Most of the research on the effects of direct democracy on minority rights is empirically limited to the direct effects of direct democracy. This article takes the issue a step further and examines both direct and indirect effects by investigating the rights of religious minorities in Switzerland. The analysis provides two main insights: all direct effects are negative and can be observed when the rights of out-groups like Islamic minorities are at stake. Second, indirect effects on the parliamentary process can be observed, too: parliaments make laws more restrictive toward Islamic minorities if they fear a popular vote. However, they develop strategies to enforce their liberal interests, as shown by the fact that extensions of the rights of religious minorities are passed in total revisions.