This article introduces the symposium on the relationship between Islamist and Salafi parties and neo-liberal economics. Through a mix of analyses of the party manifestos and ethnographic work, this symposium unveils how Islamist and Salafi parties across the Arab world and abroad have thought about the economy, how they attempted to incorporate the Islamic economy into their discourses and practices and how they have ultimately dealt with the current economic doctrine of neo-liberalism whether in power or opposition.

The article examines the economic vision of the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda focusing on its supposed transformation from a party with socialist rhetoric to one embracing fully the tenets of neo-liberalism. The article argues that such a transformation has been quite easy to achieve because the party and its leaders were always more pragmatic than ideological when it comes to economic policy-making. In fact, the party is more at ease with neo-liberal economics because of the electoral constituency it serves and because of its internal structure and ways of operating, which reward those members who display the virtues that the neo-liberal economy also values.

Hezbollah, like other Islamic fundamentalist movements in the region, professes an “Islamic way of life” as an objective to achieve and implement in society, but its actual practices can best be understood as harmonious with—and reflective of—the nature of the capitalist environment in which it operates, despite discourses appealing to the popular classes of society. Religious fundamentalist movements should indeed not been considered as fossilized elements from the past. While they may employ symbols and narratives from earlier periods, fundamentalisms are alive, dynamic, and representative of major contemporary trends. Their emergence must thus be fully situated in the political, economic, and social context of the contemporary period. In this perspective, the article analyzes the political economy of Hezbollah and its support for neoliberal policies.

How can we explain the neoliberal orientation of Islamist movements in the Middle East? This paper attempts to answer this question by exploring the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It analyzes in depth the Brotherhood's socio-economic vision and policies when it was in power between 2012 and 2013. It argues that the Brotherhood adopted a market-oriented vision, which encouraged the private sector, liberalized the economy, and appealed to foreign investments. As a socio-political movement, the Brotherhood attempted to strike a balance between its constituency, which is rooted in the lower, middle, and upper-middle classes, and its commitment to neoliberal policies. However, this paradoxical balance burdened the movement and affected its popularity. The article also contends that the Brotherhood's neoliberal leanings can be explained by three key factors: the movement's pragmatism, its “devout” bourgeoisie, and the appeal for international acceptance and recognition.

There is a paradox: why are there so many political and economic Islamic actors in the Middle East but not a large willingness on their part to adopt and promote Islamic banking and finance methodologies? This paper argues that the more vague and ambivalent these actors are on economic policy, the wider their appeal; and, by extension, the more compatible Islamic ideas and ideologies are with neoliberalism. The case of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan is given as it has adopted an emphasis on Islamic middle-class values and ethical concerns of neoliberalism in order to gain political support. The case of the IAF demonstrates that there are points of compatibility between the neoliberal economy and Islamist politics. In the calibrations of the relationship between the state and Islamist party politics in line with Islamic neoliberal tenets, this approach ensures enhanced appeal for neoliberal Islamism into the future.

Breaking with a long tradition of political quietism, many Salafis in Tunisia and Egypt decided to found political parties and participate in competitive elections after the collapse of the regime. In doing so, they had to present a political program to voters, including policy proposals on economic issues. The article examines how Salafi parties dealt with economic policy-making and finds that they reluctantly engaged with it, offering contradictory and naïve policies meant to pander to the electorate. Policy-making preferences and positions on economic issues are employed to look at the degree of party institutionalization Salafi parties have.