Certain societal groups are significantly overrepresented within politics, including men, ethnic majority groups, and socioeconomic elites. This has fueled debates regarding meritocracy within political recruitment. While meritocracy is desirable, its definition and measurement are contested. The criteria used in theoretical and empirical academic studies differ from those of political parties and voters, as discussed below. Furthermore, there is bias in favor of the male status quo, with all groups preferring the qualities of existing elites. The definition of a “good” politician is therefore highly subjective. Nonetheless, political traditionalists claim that the “best” candidate should be selected even if this leads to significant gender imbalance in parliaments. Yet, if political recruitment is biased in favor of social elites, the overrecruitment of men may not derive solely from merit (Murray 2014). Without definitive criteria for evaluating prospective candidates and judging those already elected, we cannot determine whether political recruitment is meritocratic.

During the novel coronavirus pandemic, early data suggested that men were slightly more likely to contract COVID-19 than women, less likely to seek medical attention for the disease, and far more likely to die as a result of COVID-19. While several studies have explored this gender gap, none has attempted to isolate the psychological processes underpinning this phenomenon. In this research note, I suggest that sexism partly explains these differences. Using data from a large (N = 100,689) survey of American adults conducted between March and June 2020 by the Democracy Fund and the University of California, Los Angeles (Nationscape), I find that sexist beliefs, a component of masculine norms, are consistently the strongest predictor of coronavirus-related emotions, behaviors, policy attitudes, and ultimately contracting COVID-19. This study highlights how gender ideology can impact health and impede government public health efforts.

The notion of a “resource curse” has been most commonly applied in explaining why many countries apparently blessed with abundant reserves of nonrenewable mineral resources, such as Nigerian oil, Democratic Republic of Congo gold, or Sierra Leone diamonds, in fact, are commonly blighted with less transparency and probity, economic stability, economic diversification, social equality, and investment in human capital. In these conditions, the heightened danger of state capture and rent seeking by ruling elites generate poorer prospects for the transition from autocracy and the consolidation of stable democracies (Auty 1993; Boix 2003; Dunning 2008; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001). Lootable mineral resources, in particular, are thought to make a country particularly vulnerable to civil war, insurgency, and rebellion (Collier and Sambanis 2005; Humphreys 2005; Ross 2004, 2006; Snyder 2006).

Ministerial office represents the pinnacle of political power. Quite rightly, politics and gender and comparative scholarship is paying increasing attention to women's access to political executives (Claveria 2014; Davis 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000; Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007). These studies develop and test a range of hypotheses relating to the demographic, socioeconomic, political cultural, or political institutional factors at state or system level deemed to shape women's access to political executive office. The conclusions primarily emphasize relatively general correlations between women's ministerial representation and a nation's familiarity with women in positions of power (Reynolds 1999), the prevalence of “egalitarian societies” and “leftist values” (Siaroff 2000), or international pressure and regional contagion (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). Studies that address the importance of political institutional factors affecting the supply and demand of female government ministers highlight the different procedures for appointing ministers in presidential versus parliamentary democracies (Reynolds 1999; Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007) or the generalist versus specialist recruitment traditions of ministerial recruitment in parliamentary democracies (Claveria 2014; Davis 1997; Siaroff 2000). All studies flag the significance of the numerical presence of women in parliament, and some, the way the electoral system or gender quotas influence women's access to parliament (Claveria 2014; Krook and O'Brien 2012).

Challenging and transforming political institutions has long been recognized as central to feminist projects of change. Existing institutions can be reformed and/or new institutions created. Over several decades, feminist political scientists, activists, and equality-seeking states have addressed questions of how the existing institutions of governance—global, regional, and local—work in gendered ways and how they can be reformed or redesigned to incorporate gender justice and promote gender equality and women's human rights. We now have a wealth of case studies about efforts to insert new actors, new rules, and new ideas into old institutions. Work has focused on three trends in institutional reform: the adoption of gender quotas, which aim to transform the institutions of political recruitment (see, for example, Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012; Krook 2009); the creation of women's policy machinery; and the introduction of gender mainstreaming, the last two of which aim to counteract the traditional mobilization of masculinist bias in the institutions of legislation and policy making (see, for example, McBride and Mazur 2010, Squires 2007, True 2003). However, this rich field of research presents us with a puzzle: On the one hand, there's been a rapid proliferation and remarkable diffusion over the past 30 years—for example, quotas (of one form or another) have been adopted in more than 100 countries. On the other hand, however, there have been variable and sometimes unpredictable outcomes in practice, highlighting the difficulty of inserting new claims into old institutions.

Women now receive political science degrees in record numbers, but female representation among political science faculty still lags behind that of many other disciplines. Only 26% of the 13,000 political science professors in the United States today are women (Sedowski and Brintall 2007). According to our recent survey of international relations faculty in the United States—the 2006 Teaching, Research, and International Politics (TRIP) Survey—women comprise an even smaller proportion of IR scholars: 77% of the IR faculty respondents are men, while only 23% are women. Even more than their counterparts in the wider field of political science, women in IR tend to be more junior and less likely to hold tenure than their male colleagues. Women comprise a minority at every level of the profession, but they are most scarce at the full professor level: Only 17% of political science professors and 14% of IR professors are women (Maliniak et al. 2007c; Sedowski and Brintall 2007).

When are “the people”—with all its different groups—represented? It is commonly accepted that democratic representation implies that no significant parts of the population are excluded from the right to vote or to stand for election and, similarly, that parliaments and even governments should, to a certain extent, mirror the represented and governed population. If authorization and accountability indicate the democratic quality of the formal dimension of representation (i.e., it is democratic when it is accountable), then representativeness allows for evaluating descriptive representation (i.e., it is democratic when it is representative of society) (see also Celis 2009). But what are our standards for judging the democratic quality of substantive representation? According to Hanna F. Pitkin, that normative standard is the representative's responsiveness: substantive representation is “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.” Responsiveness turns what representatives do into substantive representation of the demos. It is a metacriterion for democratic representation in the sense that accountability and descriptive representativeness need also to ensure responsiveness. But, again, questions arise: How should we understand responsiveness? How do representatives establish it? Where and when does responsiveness need to be established?

This article offers a new approach to studying sex differences in responses to negative news, using real-time physiological responses as opposed to self-reports. Measurements of skin conductance and heart rate are used to examine whether there are differences in the extent to which women and men are aroused by and attentive to negative news stories. Like experiments that have relied on postexposure self-reports, we detect no sex differences in arousal in response to negative news stories. However, in contrast to those experiments, we find indications that women are more attentive than men to negative news content. We consider possible reasons for this difference in findings. We also discuss neuropsychological studies that are consistent with our finding of greater attentiveness on the part of women to negative stimuli. Finally, we consider the relationship between our work and evidence in the literature that women consume less news than men.

The most conservative party in Chile, the Unión Demócrata Independiente, has nominated and elected more women to local-level office than any of the other major parties in the country. In this article, I argue that the candidate selection processes used by this party explain how it has proposed more women candidates for municipal office than parties with defined ideological commitments to increasing women's representation. The party's use of candidate selection procedures that are both exclusive and centralized allow women to avoid important obstacles on the path to obtaining candidacies. The case of the Unión Demócrata Independiente is important, first, because it allows us to understand how a party without a commitment to increasing women's participation can nonetheless do so, and second, because it lays bare the causal mechanisms of candidate selection procedures and increases our understanding of the effects that these processes have on female representation.

During the last four decades, Latin America has witnessed the political strengthening of collective actors with conflicting agendas: feminist and LGBTQ+ movements on one side, and Catholic and Pentecostal Evangelical sectors on the other. While the first two movements focus on gender equality and the extension of sexual and reproductive rights, the Pentecostal and Catholic sectors have also adopted a political identity, but with an agenda prioritizing the defense of religious freedom and Christian sexual morality. Far from being a holdover from the past, the political strategies employed by these religious sectors continue to affect public debate across much of Latin America today.

Feminist Security Studies (FSS) is quickly becoming a recognized area of research. Recent articles in Security Studies (Sjoberg 2009) and International Security (Hudson et al. 2008/9) specifically address the contributions of FSS to the field of security studies, a network of scholars working in FSS is regularly represented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, and the terminology has been used in many recent publications (e.g. Hansen 2009; Shepherd 2010; Sjoberg and Martin 2010; Wibben 2009, 2011). Given the proliferation of feminist security scholarship, which is based on a variety of feminisms, feminist scholars should begin to debate the content and scope of their research. Not only is there now enough material to do so, but there also are some real differences in feminist scholarship—and these differences matter.

Studies expressing concern over the continued underparticipation of women in politics rest on the assumption that increasing the number of female representatives in democracies leads to greater substantive representation of women's policy interests. This article advances the discussion by conducting a comparative analysis of men's and women's attitudes across 27 countries in the European Union. Using the European Election and Candidate Studies 2009, I find that differences between the policy preferences of men and women in the EU do exist and that these differences are replicated between male and female candidates in European elections. The findings provide empirical support for the argument in favor of a greater gender balance in European policy-making institutions.

On September 11, 2016, less than two months before Election Day, Hillary Clinton attended the 9/11 memorial service in New York City. Reportedly, Clinton left the event early, and as she was getting into her SUV, she fainted. A bystander caught on camera a wobbly Clinton needing assistance getting into her vehicle, which he posted to Twitter, where it immediately circulated (Kafka 2016). News media outlets soon picked it up and were quick to air the footage. Initially, the Clinton campaign explained that Clinton had been “overheated.” Later that afternoon, however, the campaign announced that two days prior, Clinton had been diagnosed with walking pneumonia, and despite being advised to rest, she had attended the memorial event.

Progress toward gender equality in politics is striking. With the help of electoral gender quotas in more than 130 countries, women's national legislative representation more than doubled in the last 20 years. Other historically marginalized groups—racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, immigrants, and indigenous peoples—are also increasingly making their way into our parliaments. Political institutions are, then, more inclusive today than they have ever been. Yet equal representation has not been fully realized: some marginalized groups have seen a decline, and men from dominant social and economic groups—hereafter “elite men”—remain numerically dominant. Globally, there are no known cases in which elite men do not hold a disproportionately high share of positions in national elective office (Hughes 2015).

Women are making important strides as presidents in Latin America as of late. This trend became evident in 2006 when Michelle Bachelet gained the Chilean presidency. Cristina Fernández followed shortly thereafter in Argentina. In 2010, Dilma Rousseff (popularly referred to as “Dilma”) joined this small yet growing group of women when she was elected the first female president of Brazil. Dilma's victory was no surprise since she had the support of the very popular outgoing president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva. Nevertheless, the fact that Dilma is a woman is noteworthy given that Brazil's political system is overwhelmingly male dominated at all levels of government (Araújo 2010; Bohns 2007; Miguel 2008). Dilma's significance also stems from the fact that, unlike most women national leaders around the world, she occupies a relatively strong presidency, gained office through popular election, and lacked family ties to power (Jalalzai 2013).

Although it is well known that “when women run, they win as often as men,” the literature on women and campaigns suggests that we should see significant differences in races involving male and female incumbents. Do female incumbents face the same competitive environment as their male counterparts in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives? Using the existing literature on the role of stereotypes and gender traits in campaigns, we formulate two hypotheses to explain the relationship between gender and incumbency. The Competition Hypothesis asserts that compared to male incumbents, women running for reelection will face more competition in retaining their seats. The Gender Effect Hypothesis predicts that female incumbents will induce other women to enter the race. On the basis of an analysis of House elections from 1956 to 2002, we find considerable support for both hypotheses. In House elections, female incumbents have a “hidden influence”: Not only do they face more competition but they also increase the participation of female candidates in their own party as well as the opposition party. Although female incumbents win at the same rates as male incumbents, they face a much more competitive environment.

The effect of negative campaigning on voter turnout has been a major focus of research in recent years. The general finding from this large literature is that negative campaigning does not depress voter turnout overall; however, it may still be that certain portions of the electorate are differentially mobilized or demobilized by negativity. In particular, scholars have neglected to examine whether men and women react differently to campaign attacks. This article begins by showing that evidence drawn from a variety of relevant fields outside of political science point toward the general expectation that men will be mobilized by negativity to a greater degree than women. Associated hypotheses are then tested using data from both real campaigns and experiments. In each analysis, the evidence supports the hypothesis that a “negativity gap” exists. Specifically, men are disproportionately mobilized by the most negative campaign messages as compared to women. Partisanship is also found to interact significantly with gender and message tone to affect the likelihood of voting. These results highlight the importance of studying subgroup differences when establishing the effects of campaign tone on the public.

A nascent body of literature has highlighted the violence (broadly defined) that women sometimes face as they enter politics. Some interpretations depict this violence as primarily gender motivated: women politicians are targeted because they are women. Another interpretation is that violence in some contexts is an everyday political practice targeting men and women alike. However, because we lack large-scale, systematic comparisons of men's and women's exposure to election violence, we know little about the extent to which—and how—candidate sex shapes this form of violence. We address this research gap by using original survey data on 197 men and women political candidates in the 2018 Sri Lankan local elections. Sri Lanka is a suitable case for analysis because it is a postconflict country in which political violence has been endemic and the number of women candidates has increased rapidly due to gender quota adoption. Overall, we find large similarities in men's and women's exposure to violence, suggesting that violence sometimes is part of a larger political practice. However, we find that women are exposed to forms of intimidation of a sexual nature more often than men. This finding demonstrates the need for gender-sensitive analyses of election violence.

In October 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2242 calling on member states to work toward the greater integration of the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda with efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism. While the rapprochement between counterterrorism and WPS may appear to be a step forward, particularly for those seeking to increase women's participation in areas traditionally dominated by men, it is also potentially dangerous. This article makes a significant contribution to the larger debate on the WPS agenda by studying the impact and unintended consequences of linking WPS with countering violent extremism on the ground in Kenya. Based on original research in the field, including key informant interviews, I argue that in the Kenyan context, connecting WPS with violent extremism has had several damaging consequences for women and their communities. Far from advancing the WPS agenda, this new policy shift has caused tension between local and international priorities, precipitated the redirection of donor funding away from important gender initiatives and toward countering violent extremism, and resulted in women's additional stigmatization, insecurity, and exclusion.

The now well-developed literature on gender quotas focuses mainly on two areas: the causal mechanisms that can be advanced to explain the adoption, diffusion, and effectiveness of political gender quotas worldwide (Baldez 2004; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2006; 2009; Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009; Krook and O'Brien 2010; Lovenduski 2005; Meier 2012); and the benefits, as well as the dangers, that this “fast track” to gender equality can have for women's substantive representation and for politics in general (Celis and Childs 2012; Celis et al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2009; Dahlerup 1988; Franseschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012; Franseschet and Piscopo 2008; Kittilson 2005; Phillips 1995; Squires 2001). Most studies on gender quotas approach “women” as a group defined by a single axis of oppression and the quotas' consequences for gender equality broadly. The growing literature on intersectionality, however, calls attention to the internal heterogeneity of the category “women” and the fact that gender relations are embedded in race or class relations, forming a “matrix of domination” rather than a single axis of oppression (Collins 1990). But the question of how gender quotas relate to intersectionality has remained, until now, much less investigated.