Exercise Musk-ox was no isolated adventure, but the culminating test of several years of wartime work. In it, vehicles, equipment, and techniques of training and of air-supply, secretly developed during the war, were given an open test to ascertain their usefulness in northern Canada. Because the public had not been aware of this secret work by the services, Exercise Musk-ox was hailed by them as a new idea, but it would not have been possible had not the equipment and methods all been ready and proven before tbe close of the war.

So great had been these wartime improvements that none of those men best acquainted with the north country and with older methods of transportation believed that the ground party had any chance of driving 2600 miles without roads across the Arctic and sub-Arctic in less than 2½ months. Neither was it generally realised that the military purposes had already been served and that this was no tactical exercise but a demonstration of the soundness of military development and an experiment in applying it to peaceful pursuits in the Canadian Arctic.

The growing output of polar books shows that Arctic and Antarctic regions still exercise a fascination, both to the explorer, and to the reading public; and the disappearance of the two-volume book is a welcome result both of financial stringency, and of a less verbose age. The conquest of the poles has allowed exploration to be diverted into more useful directions than the mere attainment of a high latitude. At the same time there is no denying that it has robbed polar work of a popular zest, and will not make it easy to raise funds for a large-scale expedition in the future. A two years' effort in the Antarctic will have to be done on scantier means than several of the expeditions for pre-war days, for the popular appeal will be restricted. And again, more is now expected, because more is possible with modern methods and technique, and knowledge of past mistakes. Byrd's marvellous flight to the South Pole and back stirred imagination comparatively little, while Greenland can now be crossed without the public taking the slightest interest. Contrast such successful ventures with the world-wide interest in Andrée's abortive attempt to fly in 1897, or the sensation caused by Nansen's crossing of Greenland in 1888.

The processes undertaken by Arctic states and Antarctic claimant states to submit data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) demonstrates the robustness of polar governance. The robustness of a governing system reflects its capacity to deal with emerging issues. For the purposes of this article, robustness comprises the effective protection of rights in the absence of prejudice and participant confidence. In the Arctic, unilateral assertion of continental shelf entitlement can proceed due to the nature of the CLCS process and recognition of sovereignty. Combined with the voluntary nature of Arctic governance, the process does not hamper cooperation in scientific research, boundary delimitation or engagement in initiatives such as the Arctic Council. In the Antarctic, a coordinated approach to continental shelf delimitation protected claimant states’ entitlement to a continental shelf and the right of other states not to recognise sovereignty. States demonstrated commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and acted according to accepted norms. Though different in structure, each polar governing system has its own characteristics of robustness. State authority drives participant confidence and regional cooperation in the Arctic. In the Antarctic, norms of behaviour foster system legitimacy and resilience is reinforced by the consequences of abandoning the system. With continued acceptance of the individual governing-system dynamics, emerging issues can be accommodated in both polar regions.

The increasing use of electronic techniques in making measurements in all branches of science has been evident for many years in laboratories, and we must expect the same trend at scientific stations and in field operations in the polar regions. The aim of this and a later article is to provide information about polar conditions for those already familiar with electronic methods in the laboratory, and to call attention to the variation in properties and reliability of components for which allowance should be made in specification and design of electronic apparatus.

Sir Ernest Shackleton's Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition famously did not succeed in traversing the Antarctic continent from the Weddell Sea to the Ross Sea. It was, nevertheless, an enterprise that engaged the interest of New Zealanders and the rest of the British Empire even as World War I was being fought. When one of the expedition ships, Aurora, broke from her moorings soon after arrival in McMurdo Sound and drifted trapped in pack ice for months, the construction of a temporary jury rudder while still at sea enabled her crew to make their way to Port Chalmers, Dunedin for more extensive repairs in 1916. This paper discusses interactions between the Otago Museum staff and the crew of Aurora while she was in port, the offer of the replaced jury rudder to the museum, and reflects on the concerns and interests that might have contributed to the offer and its rejection.

This paper aims to show how the photography of Frederick A. Cook (1865–1940) played an important role in the making of his polar explorer-hero image. It considers portraits and Arctic and Antarctic photographs that Cook used in his own publications and illustrated lectures, and which he provided for press articles. The paper is underpinned by discourse analysis and the concept of the photograph as a representation of reality filtered through various lenses. The visual impact and discursive messages of the photographs were aimed at situating readers and audiences in responsive attitudes that would generate a public persona which he exploited to increase his fame and heroic reputation. In time, Cook's photography also played a critical part in the collapse of the hero image.

In September 1909 Captain Scott announced his intention to utilise dog transport in his dash for the Pole - this being his intention until as late as February 1911. In May 1911, Scott lectured expedition members about a new plan for their Southern Journey. His lecture notes include detailed calculations, based solely on ponies and men hauling the sledges – dogs and motor sledges were now surplus to requirements. In less than three months, Scott had supplanted his published scheme of advance. This article investigates evidence relating to Scott’s change of mind. A substantial amount of research has been undertaken and a credible explanation emerges. The First Depot Journey, with its loss of ponies, inadequate animal nutrition (both dogs and ponies) and crevasse incident wrecked Scott’s original scheme of advance. When he commenced detailed planning in April 1911, it became apparent his dogs could not reach the Pole. Scott’s leadership technique for getting his men to understand and support the new transport plan is examined and its influence on current perceptions of the expedition and its men is investigated.

Victorian and Edwardian travellers who ventured into little-known parts of the world formed essential links between the early pioneer geographical and scientific explorers, and modern tourists of today. While they were generally cultured people, interested in making useful observations in the areas they visited, they often indulged in travel for its own sake, devoting much of their lives to it almost as an addiction. Aubyn Bernard Rochfort Trevor-Battye (Figure 1) was just such a person. He was a gentleman of means who spent much time travelling, and can be considered a minor explorer. He excelled as an observer of peoples and wildlife; he was an adequate draughtsman, and his writing holds the attention of the reader though it lacks finesse. Of his verse, possibly the less said the better.

The Polar Record, Vol. 11, No. 71, 1962

Page 207, line 43. For United States Atomic Energy Commission read le Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique.

The Polar Record, Vol. 11, No. 72, 1962

Page 261, line 12. For Airways read Airlines.

Page 263, lines 1 and 10. For Köbenhavn read København.

Page 263, line 11. For Sondre Stromfjord read Søndre Strømfjord.

Page 263, line 30. For Baffin Land read Baffin Island.

Facing page 266. Transpose names of motor sledges.

Page 291, line 19. For Special read Scientific

Facing page 300. Photograph of “Old Byrd” station is printed upside down.