The Sea Ice Group of the Scort Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, took part in the international Marginal Ice Zone Experiment 1984 (MIZEX 84) from 12 June to 26 July, operating from icebreaker FS Polarstern and chartered sealing vessel Kvitbjørn in the Greenland Sea. Observations included measurement of ice edge kinetics, wave-ice interactions and upper ocean structure and processes; ocean surface measurements and pressure ridge profile studies were also made in the same area during a post-MIZEX cruise in MS Lance.

On 10 May 1971, a federal jury in Alexandria, Virginia, found Mario Escamilla not guilty of second-degree murder on the high seas in the death of another American, Bennie Lightsy. The same jury convicted Escamilla of a lesser offence, involuntary manslaughter on the high seas, and he was sentenced to three years in the custody of the United States Attorney-General, a provision that permits probation after as little as 60 days. In fact, Escamilla has been free on bail pending the hearing of an appeal, brief for which will have been filed by 17 October 1971 to be argued before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in late 1971 or early 1972.

Native languages in northern Canada are under great pressure. Even in the remote settlements of the central and eastern Arctic schooling is primarily in English; Eskimo or Indian languages tend to be regarded as special items of culture that warrant a half-day per week in a ‘cultural inclusion’ programme, along with story-telling and traditional crafts. Even this ‘inclusion’ is a result of recent reforms in curriculum development: in the 1950's and '60's there were schools where the use of native language was simply forbidden. This pressure from within the educational system is compounded by demands from employers in the industrial sector: functional English has sometimes been a condition of being hired, and native languages are generally given minimum usefulness or status at the work-place.

I am writing in response to Professor Chris Turney's recent research article Why didn't they ask Evans?, published in Polar Record on 28 September 2017. The article took as its focus Scott's second-in-command, Lieutenant E.R.G.R ‘Teddy’ Evans, and alleged that Evans failed to deliver Captain Scott's ‘updated orders’ to base in February 1912. This is an error that needs to be corrected.

Edwin Jesse De Haven (1816–1865) led the first Grinnell expedition in search of the lost British explorer Sir John Franklin in 1850–1851. Since it was the ship's charismatic surgeon, Elisha Kent Kane, who wrote the popular account of the voyage, De Haven's achievements have generally been overlooked. De Haven joined the United States Navy when he was 13 and was master on the ill-fated Peacock during the United States Exploring Expedition (1838–1842) to the Antarctic under Charles Wilkes. He saw action in the Mexican War in 1848, and was serving under Matthew Fontaine Maury at the Naval Observatory when he was chosen to take command of the first United States Franklin search expedition. He retired from the navy at the age of 46 and died three years later.

Surrounded by potted palm trees, the 12 delegations including the Soviet Union invited to participate by the United States government decided, over the course of six intense weeks, the legal, political and scientific future of the Antarctic continent and surrounding seas. Thanks in part to the neatly typed entries of Brian Roberts, the Foreign Office's polar advisor for many years; we have at least one source that vividly conveys (from the perspective of a British delegate of course) the febrile atmosphere surrounding the conference (see King and Savours 1995; Dodds 2008). Notwithstanding the achievements of the recently completed 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year and its extension the International Geophysical Co-operation (1959), there was no reason to presume that an Antarctic Treaty would be recognised as legitimate and sufficiently robust to accommodate all the parties concerned. Indeed, it is not uncommon to read in the reports prepared by the delegates for their domestic political leaders, a whole series of counter-factual possibilities if the negotiations failed to secure a modus vivendi for the polar region. We may not assume, therefore, that it was in any way inevitable that a treaty (lasting now for over fifty years) would have emerged when the delegates sat down to discuss the future of Antarctica in October 1959. The treaty was nearly not ratified in Argentina for example because of the anger felt by some political leaders about Article IV and what they considered the ‘giving away’ of Argentine sovereign rights.

It is sometimes argued that the Arctic is so fragile that oil and gas development is never acceptable. Occasionally the argument rests on a fundamental objection to any development of fossil fuel resources. This paper will argue that under some conditions development can be carried out in a way that safeguards the natural environment, and that when the resources are exhausted all traces can be removed. This conclusion applies both offshore and onshore. It will require great sensitivity and care, and the application of the best technology developed by the petroleum industry for developments elsewhere. Some locations will have to be left inviolate until better technology is discovered, and perhaps for ever. The argument will be illustrated by case studies, some of them taken from completed projects.

The southwestern part of Foxe Basin is a little known region of the Canadian Arctic, being difficult to access during the summer because of heavy and unpredictable ice conditions. Surveys of birds and marine mammals in the area were carried out by lightweight expeditions in the summers of 1994 and 1995, using sea-kayaks, as well as a Peterhead boat from the nearest community, at Repulse Bay. The area supports important populations of narwhal, bowhead whales and walrus, as well as significant concentrations of shorebirds, common eiders, black guillemots, and perhaps one third of the world's Thayer's gulls. New information was obtained on the status and abundance of these species and novel observations were made on the feeding ecology and breeding phenology of the gulls.

To many people looking for the first time at maps of the polar regions it seems astonishing how lacking in originality many of the names appear to be. Yet, before they become too trenchant in their criticism they should themselves try the experiment of finding names for the natural features which they see round them. It is not as easy as it sounds, and however firmly one lays down rules for place-names they will be broken over and over again with good reasons.

This paper explores Ealing Studios' cinematic production about Robert Falcon Scott and the Terra Nova expedition, released to British audiences in 1948. Under the title of Scott of the Antarctic, the film recreated the tragic failure of the expedition on its return from the South Pole. The race to the South Pole had ended with victory for Roald Amundsen and post-colonial Norway. Three decades later, Britain again found itself involved in an intense territorial competition with two post-colonial states, Argentina and Chile. In the midst of decolonisation, the postwar government under Prime Minister Clement Attlee was engaged in a ‘cold war’ in Antarctica. The Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) had been created in order to protect sovereignty claims to the Antarctic Peninsula. While some attention has been given to the cultural significance of Scott of the Antarctic, there has been little geopolitical commentary on this film. As an empty space devoid of indigenous populations, Antarctica was invitingly incomplete. Produced with the co-operation of the Scott Polar Research Institute and FIDS, this film depicted a failed imperial project at a time when Britain desperately needed scientific practices such as mapping to consolidate territorial sovereignty. The paper explores the actual filming process along with the verdicts of contemporary critics in order to make a critical appraisal of Britain's changing role in Antarctica. It is sobering to note that while FIDS was supporting the film Scott of the Antarctic, Argentina was attempting to indoctrinate a new generation of schoolchildren about the realities of the Argentine Antarctic sector.

Frithjof participated in several North Pole expeditions between 1898 and 1907 and was also involved in several relief expeditions. Her most frequent commander was Captain Johan Kjeldsen, who was an internationally famous ice pilot. Frithjof was built in 1884 at Stokke on Oslo fjord, Norway. After being employed in the sealing trade for some years, Frithjof was sold to an Icelandic concern. In 1891 she returned to Norwegian ownership and, in 1898, was chartered for Walter Wellman's North Pole expedition of the years 1898–1899. In 1900, she was the expedition ship for the Kolthoff expedition to Greenland, Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen. Between 1901 and 1904 she was engaged in Ziegler's North Pole expeditions both as expedition ship and as relief vessel. In 1903 the Swedish government chartered Frithjof in order to search for the Nordenskjöld expedition in the Antarctic. In 1906–7 the ship was again chartered for Wellman's North Pole airship expeditions. In late September 1907, Frithjof sailed from Tromsø on a relief expedition to search for Laura, an expedition vessel to Greenland that had not been heard of for three months. On 5 October 1907 she was lost in a storm off Iceland and only one man survived from her crew of 17.

In almost any branch of science, periods of slow and steady progress or stagnation alternate with periods of rapid development caused by new discoveries or inventions, by the introduction of new methods, or by other accelerating factors. Eskimo archaeology is no exception to this rule and, even if only thirty years have passed since archaeologists first began to search for Eskimo relics, it is already possible to distinguish four periods of development, separated by short interludes of relatively little activity. Of these four periods only the last two fall within the scope of this article, but since the understanding of recent developments in Eskimo archaeology presupposes a knowledge of previous work in that field it is necessary to summarize what was accomplished in the first two periods.

New Zealand's Antarctic research began during the 1957/1958 International Geophysical Year. This analysis explains how and why it has evolved. There have been two phases: 1957 until 1991, when the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and the universities were the key research organisations, and after 1991, when the publicly funded research sector became more diverse. International collaborations have been important throughout. Funding decision processes have progressed from a bottom-up curiosity-driven approach to a more complex system of regular contests. Since 1991, the focus has been on coherent strategies and the outcomes sought. Funding criteria are well-defined and contests are widely accepted as fair and transparent. Reviews and evaluations have been positive. Collaborative organisational interactions dominated decision-making during the early period. Bureaucratic politics is most evident in post-1991 organisational changes. The quality of the research strategies has improved in terms of defining outcomes sought and appropriate measures of progress towards them. However, New Zealand's Antarctic research funding is currently dispersed. It needs better coordination. Collaborative research should be emphasised in areas where New Zealand has established a strong reputation taking account of both national and global priorities if New Zealand's international research standing is to be maintained and enhanced.

Place names in the Hughes Bay area, Danco Coast, Antarctica well illustrate naming problems that give rise to confusion or ambiguity. This note shows the origins of conflicting place names, providing a warning to scientists and others and a key of foreign equivalents to some of the names accepted for British official use.