^{Note 1 in page 26} Eds. Mabel Day and Robert Steele, E.E.T.S., orig. ser., 199 (London: Oxford University Press, 1936).

^{Note 2 in page 26} “Alle manière estate,” p. 50, 1. 793.

^{Note 3 in page 26} Twice by Thomas Wright and later, in 1873, by W. W. Skeat. It was Skeat's theory that the poem was unquestionably written by the author of Piers Plowman, Langland, but Thomas Wright said it was not by Langland.

^{Note 4 in page 26} See editors' intro., pp. xviii-xix.

^{Note 5 in page 28} Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, transl, with intro. by Frederic W. Maitland (Cambridge [Eng.] : University Press, 1900), pp. 20–21, Cf. also R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West (Edinburgh and London: Wm. Blackwood & Sons, 1903–36), m, 170–180, and v, 141–149; also William A. Dunning, A History of Political Theories Ancient and Medieval (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 230 ff.

^{Note 6 in page 28} De Monarchia, ed. Dr. E. Moore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), p. 344: “Et sic omnes partes praenotatae infra regna et ipsa regna ordinari debent ad unum Principem, sive Principatum, hoc est, ad Monarcham, sive Monarchiam.“

^{Note 7 in page 28} Polycralicus, ed. Clemens C. I. Webb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), i, 235: “Est ergo, ut eum plerique diffiniunt, princeps potestas publica et in terris quaedam divinae maiestatis imago.” Cf. James Brown Scott, Law, the State, and the International Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), i, 206–212.

^{Note 8 in page 28} De Regimine Principum, transi. Gerald B. Phelan (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 39: “It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that a king is one who rules the people of one city or province and rules them for the public good.“

^{Note 9 in page 28} Otto von Gierke, op. cit., p. 46.

^{Note 10 in page 28} See, however, the remarkable assertions of Manegold of Lautenbach, an 11th century Alsatian priest, in Reginald L. Poole's Illustrations of the History of Medieval Learning (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), pp. 203–204.

^{Note 11 in page 29} Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, ed. C. W. Previté-Orton (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1928), p. 89.

^{Note 12 in page 29} In this respect, also, he is like Marsilius of Padua, whose “demonstration . . . is chiefly legal.” C. W. Previté-Orton, “Marsilius of Padua,” Proceedings of the British Academy, xxii (1935), 18. Cf. also James Brown Scott, op. cit., i, 271–277.

^{Note 13 in page 29} Tractatus de Officio Regis, ed. A. W. Pollard and Charles Sayle (London: Trübner & Co., 1887), pp. 189–193. Wycliffe's objections are that Roman Civil Law is an obstacle to theology, that all that is true in Roman Law is found in the Scriptures, that Roman Law permits many things contrary to religion. As for the argument that Roman Law is superior to English Law he says: “Sed non credo quod plus viget in Romana civilitate subtilitas racionis sive iusticia quam in civilitate Anglicana.“

^{Note 14 in page 29} P. 74, 11. 1619–20, 1624–25.

^{Note 15 in page 30} “Common Law,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed. (1937), vi, 123. For a discussion of “The Influence of Roman Law in England” see James Brown Scott, op. cit., i, 252–264.

^{Note 16 in page 30} P. 74, 1. 1622.

^{Note 17 in page 30} Cf. Otto von Gierke, op. cit., pp. 30 ff. Though Wycliffe believes that the best form of government in theory is a rule by judges and by divine law alone, as in Old Testament days, he, too, says that in practice monarchy is best, for almost every reason: it is approved by God, by reason, and by philosophy; the Body Politic must have one Head; Aristotle thought monarchy best, and so did Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory. De Civili Dominio, ed. Reginald L. Poole (London: Trübner & Co., 1885), pp. 192 ff., 205; also Tractatus de Officio Regis, ed. Pollard and Sayle, p. 246.

^{Note 18 in page 31} P. 74, 11. 1630–33.

^{Note 19 in page 31} P. 74, 1. 1635.

^{Note 20 in page 31} J. N. Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed. (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1934), p. 30.

^{Note 21 in page 31} P. 5, 1. 52.

^{Note 22 in page 31} P. 5, 1. 70.

^{Note 23 in page 31} P. 49, 11. 763–764 and p. 69, 1. 1472.

^{Note 24 in page 31} Polycraticus, ed. Webb, v, c.6, c.9, c.10, c.11; vi, c.1, c.20. c.25.

^{Note 25 in page 32} Opera Omnia, Vol. xiv, Concordanlia Catholica, ed. Gerhardus Kallen (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1939), Book i.

^{Note 26 in page 32} The author of Mum, using Bartholomew the Englishman's Bestiary as his source, translates rex as “king” instead of “queen,” apparently in a generic sense for “ruler.” This argument for monarchy, as well as other arguments drawn from natural phenomena, is a common one. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, transl. G. B. Phelan, pp. 40–42. In Shakespeare's Henry V, i, ii, 187–204, the lesson of the bees is drawn again, and the bees' ruler is called a “king.“

^{Note 27 in page 32} P. 56, 1. 999.

^{Note 28 in page 32} P. 57, 11. 1036–37.

^{Note 29 in page 32} P. 58, 1. 1078. The reason for government is often discussed in medieval political theory. To John of Salisbury it is “aequitas” or “iustitia.” To Marsilius of Padua it is “vita sufficiens.” To William of Ockham it is, as here, the “utilitas communis.” To Thomas Aquinas it is “unity,” “order,” “peace,” “delight in prosperity.“

^{Note 30 in page 32} P. 68, 1. 1413 to p. 69, 1. 1456. His source was probably Mandeville's Voyages. See text, Appendix ii.

^{Note 31 in page 32} P. 68, 1. 1429.

^{Note 32 in page 32} P. 69, 11. 1451–52.

^{Note 33 in page 33} Cf. Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 2.

^{Note 34 in page 33} Dante, De Monarchia, ed. Moore, p. 344.

^{Note 35 in page 33} John of Salisbury, Polycraticus, ed. Webb, i, 235.

^{Note 36 in page 33} Ibid. Also Wycliffe, De Civili Dominio, ed. Poole, p. 188, and Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, transi. G. B. Phelan, pp. 75, 89.

^{Note 37 in page 33} De Civili Dominio, ed Poole, pp. 125–128. Cf. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., vi, 51–62, and William A. Dunning, op. cit., pp. 260–265.

^{Note 38 in page 33} De Officio Regis, ed. Pollard and Sayle, p. 95.

^{Note 33 in page 33} Ibid., p. 96.

^{Note 40 in page 33} Ibid.

^{Note 41 in page 33} De Civili Dominio, ed Poole, p. 188.

^{Note 42 in page 33} De Officio Regis, ed. Pollard and Sayle, p. 94. The conflict in later centuries as to the monarch's position under the law was the result of a misunderstanding of Bracton, who did not fail to assert that the king was “sub deo et sub lege quia lex facit regem,” Bracton de Legibus et Consuettidinibus Angliae, ed. George E. Woodbine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915–42), ii, 33.

^{Note 43 in page 34} Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, transi. G. B. Phelan, Bk. i, chaps. 10–13. On “Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Law and Justice” see William A. Dunning, op. cit., pp. 189–207.

^{Note 44 in page 34} Ibid., pp. 56–60.

^{Note 45 in page 34} Ibid., p. 74.

^{Note 46 in page 34} P. 20, 1. 267.

^{Note 47 in page 34} P. 1, 11. 23–26; p. 2, 11. 47–49; p. 4, 1. 24; p. 9, 11. 67–68; p. 33, 11. 193–195, etc.

^{Note 48 in page 34} P. 3, 1. 1 to p. 4, 1. 24; p. 12, 11. 190–192; p. 14, 1. 55 to p. 15, 1. 85.

^{Note 49 in page 35} Cf. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 7–12, 40–51 and William A. Dunning, op. cit., pp. 238–253. See also C. W. Previté-Orton's “Marsilius of Padua,” loc. cit., where Marsilius' modernity is stressed as that of “the most radical of the theorists on Church and State in the Middle Ages” (p. 1).

^{Note 50 in page 35} Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, ed. Previté-Orton, p. 48.

^{Note 51 in page 35} Ibid.

^{Note 52 in page 35} Ibid., pp. 15, 40–41, 49, and elsewhere.

^{Note 53 in page 35} Ibid., p. 49.

^{Note 54 in page 35} Ibid., p. 15.

^{Note 55 in page 35} Reginald L. Poole, “William of Ockham,” DNB (London: Oxford University Press, 1921–22), xiv, 802.

^{Note 56 in page 35} Defensor Pacis, ed. Previté-Orton, p. 15.

^{Note 57 in page 35} Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 59, refers the reader to Ockham's Dialogus, i, 6, c. 85, in Goldast's Monarchia s. Romani Imperii, Frankfort, 1614, ii, 398 ff. The Dialogus, however, has not been reprinted and is therefore inaccessible to most readers.

^{Note 58 in page 35} De Concordantia Catholica, ed. Gerhardus Kallen, Books ii and iii. Though Books ii and iii are not included in Volume xiv of the Opera Omnia and the plans for printing and distributing those books have no doubt been interrupted by the war, the Registrum of the first three books is included and is remarkable for its indication of the author's democratic ideas. The following chapter headings are especially significant: ii, cap. viii—“Quod auctoritas in conciliis non dependet a capite concilii, sed communi omnium consensu”; ii, cap. xiv—“Quod omnis constitutio ex radice naturalis iuris locum habet, et quod omnis coerctio, cum natura aeque liberi simus, ex electione et consensu subiectorum sit”; ii, cap. xix—“Quod libertas electionis est radix, per quam omnis ordinata potestas consti-tuitur”; and iii, cap. xii—“Quod rex aut princeps leges et statuta generalia provinciam respicientia in generalibus utriusque status sui regni conciliis per consensum edere habet et illa salva epikeia exequi et defensare, et quod cotidianum concilium de electis ex tota provincia subiecta de consensu universalis sui concilii habere debeat.”

^{Note 59 in page 36} A good idea of the degree of democracy achieved in representation in Parliament in the fifteenth century may be secured from the History of Parliament. Biographies of the Members of the Commons House 1439–1509 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1936), vol. i, intro. by Josiah C. Wedgwood. Since elections were mainly by acclamation and there was “no scrutiny of a man's right to shout,” (p. xlvii); since every kind of trade except soap boilers had members sitting in Parliament (p. xxxvi); and since Parliament was a place where Ministers and people mingled informally on equal terms, while they told each other their grievances (p. v), it would seem that representation had a pretty important place in the government—unless it was interfered with by bribery.

^{Note 60 in page 36} P. 24, 1. 20 to p. 26, 1. 93.

^{Note 61 in page 36} P. 60, 11. 1129—40. The History of Parliament, loc. cit., intro., p. v, provides vivid corroboration of this charge.

^{Note 62 in page 36} P. 60, 11. 1141–48; p. 70, 1. 1489 to p. 77, 1. 1722.

^{Note 63 in page 36} P. 75, 11. 1646–47.

^{Note 64 in page 36} P. 19, 11. 241–242.

^{Note 65 in page 37} See eds.' intro., p. xvi.

^{Note 66 in page 37} P. 67, 11. 1389–1488.

^{Note 67 in page 37} P. 69, 11. 1457–59.

^{Note 68 in page 37} P. 69, 1. 1460.

^{Note 69 in page 37} Eds'. intro., p. xvi.

^{Note 70 in page 37} P. 67, 1. 1405 to p. 68, 1. 1406.

^{Note 71 in page 37} P. 9, 11. 72–75.

^{Note 72 in page 38} Cf. J. N. Figgis, op. cit., p. 31; also Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, transi. S. B. Chrimes (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1939), pp. 121–122; also R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, op. cit., ii, 74.

^{Note 73 in page 38} P. 1, 11. 23–24.

^{Note 74 in page 38} P. 1, 11. 25–26.

^{Note 75 in page 38} P. 2, 11. 47–49.

^{Note 76 in page 38} P. 33, 11. 193–195.

^{Note 77 in page 38} P. 4, 1. 24.

^{Note 78 in page 39} P. 3, 11. 12–13.

^{Note 79 in page 39} P. 27, 1. 26.

^{Note 80 in page 39} P. 34, 11. 221–222.

^{Note 81 in page 39} Cf. Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 73; also Otto von Gierke, The Development of Political Theory, transl, by Bernard Freyd (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), pp. 299–307.

^{Note 82 in page 39} For an excellent brief review of the history of the conception of Natural Law see Otto von Gierke's Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, transl. with intro. by Ernest Barker (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1934), intro., pp. xxxiv-xlvi. Cf. also Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, ed. S. B. Chrimes, pp. 149–180; James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1901), pp. 562–597; A. J. Carlyle, Political Liberty. A History of the Conception in the Middle Ages and Modern Times (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), pp. 12–16; Max Shepard, “William of Occam and the Higher Law,” American Political Science Review, xxvi, no. 6 (1932), 1005–23.

^{Note 83 in page 39} Cf. Mum and the Sothsegger, p. 74, 11. 1617–18.

^{Note 84 in page 40} For an interesting discussion of the “Law of Nature in the Modern World” see James Brown Scott, op. cit., i, 264–270, and James Bryce, op. cit., pp. 597–606. See also the plea of Otto von Gierke for the necessary union of Natural and Positive Law in Natural Law and the Theory of Society, Appendix ii, pp. 223–226. The beneficial effects of the concept of Natural Law in medieval political theory are discussed by Ewart Lewis, “Natural Law and Expediency in Medieval Political Theory,” Ethics, I, no. 2 (1940), 144–163: “But, whatever the extent of its influence, the appeal to natural law certainly helped to break the sway of irrational custom and tradition over the medieval mind and to substitute the sovereignty of reason and utility. . . . And if such a natural law is to have any usefulness as ‘a sort of rule or measure’ in our swiftly moving world, I suggest that it might well follow the pattern of natural law in medieval theory: affirming inviolable ends for mankind but allowing the utmost flexibility in the choice of means” (pp. 162–163).

^{Note 85 in page 40} “lus naturale est quod natura, id est ipse deus docuit omnia naturalia,” says Henry de Bracton, Bracton de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. Woodbine, ii, 26.

^{Note 86 in page 40} Otto von Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, intro., pp. xxxiv–xxxvi.

^{Note 87 in page 40} Opera Omnia (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–1930), vii, 149– 222.

^{Note 88 in page 41} P. 74, 11. 1619–20.

^{Note 89 in page 41} P. 74, 11. 1621–22.

^{Note 90 in page 41} P. 74, 11. 1624–25.

^{Note 91 in page 41} P. 73, 1. 1592.

^{Note 92 in page 41} P. 75, 1. 1675.

^{Note 93 in page 42} P. 13, 1. 10.

^{Note 94 in page 42} P. 69, 1. 1458. “Cause” is used like the Latin legal causa, meaning “case.“

^{Note 95 in page 42} P. 15, 1. 92.

^{Note 96 in page 42} P. 56, 1. 999.

^{Note 97 in page 42} Cf. James Brown Scott, op. cit., i, 269: “The law natural has long been tacitly or indirectly recognized in English jurisprudence—though usually under the alias of ‘right reason’ or ‘the law of reason’.“

^{Note 98 in page 42} P. 74, 1. 1629.

^{Note 99 in page 42} P. 9, 11. 68–69.

^{Note 100 in page 42} P. 2, 1. 48.

^{Note 101 in page 42} P. 20, 1. 254.

^{Note 102 in page 42} P. 77, 1. 1740–41.

^{Note 103 in page 42} P. 78, 1. 1749.

^{Note 104 in page 42} P. 77, 1. 1739.

^{Note 105 in page 43} P. 74, 11. 1641–42.

^{Note 106 in page 43} P. 75, l. 1649.

^{Note 107 in page 43} P. 75, l. 1668.

^{Note 108 in page 43} P. 70, l. 1489 to p. 74, 1. 1625.

^{Note 109 in page 43} P. 46, l. 652.

^{Note 110 in page 43} P. 46, ll. 657–660.

^{Note 111 in page 44} P. 66, l. 1372.

^{Note 112 in page 44} P. 67, ll. 1379–80.

^{Note 113 in page 44} P. 66, l. 1352.

^{Note 114 in page 44} However, he cites the testimony of one bishop, Richard Fitzralph, Archbishop of Armagh, in his attack on the friars. Fitzralph, best known as the center of feeling against the friars in the fourteenth century, was also probably the source of Wycliffe's theory of Dominion. Wycliffe revered him as a teacher and often spoke of him with respect and admiration.

^{Note 115 in page 44} P. 6, ll. 83–84.