It is a curious fact that in the many writings on the theory of probability, one rarely finds an instance of a clear cut definition of the fundamental problem of the subject. On intuitive grounds, one grasps the intent of most of the authors: it is to define the concept of probability and to show its relationship to the other concepts of science; and yet since the criterion of adequacy in the answering of this question is rarely stated, one must feel that the problem itself has remained undefined.

The use of the word “possible” without qualification invariably leads us to the endless, or at least well beyond our finite powers of analysis. Yet, to qualify possibility may itself become an endless task, if only because of the multitude of the available modes of approach. Somewhere in the middle of the realm of possibility one must parachute down and start ordering the scattered riches for our finite purposes with our limited and only newly acquired perspectives. What we have glimpsed of the realms of possibility before our descent may still be of use, but our immediate tasks will bind us to the sternly empirical gravitational pulls of what happens to have erupted in the historical fields of discovery.

Scientific data are often subjected to two contradictory over-simplifications. People who have no personal experience in science often say that a certain idea has been scientifically established and feel that the question is therewith settled. They do not distinguish among methods, or generalizations in different fields. This implies that all science is infallible. The other oversimplification comes from the specialist; he may dismiss the work of men who study the problems approaching his own but who use methods different from his. This view implies that only one type of scientific investigation is really sound. Both groups are wrong, for science is neither infallible nor wholly untrustworthy. In fact, science as an abstract whole is nothing; it is the name given collectively to all methods which men have used to explore natural processes and the results obtained by the use of such methods. Some problems are sufficiently simple and accessible to be explored in detail while others can be treated only after a set of postulates have been set as a starting point. A mechanism must be established within which it is possible to deal with the problems at hand. In other words, there are levels of scientific research which may be arranged in a series based on increasing assumptions. The more complex levels are formed by assuming the data and methods of those simpler and adding to them a new set of assumptions with the aid of which it is possible to treat the phenomena to be studied. Material cannot be carried directly from one level to another unless attention is given to the premises on which the conclusions have been drawn. Since such attention is not always given, entire fields of research have sometimes been brought into suspicion on the part of those working in what they themselves style “a more fundamental field.” Yet there may be data available at a different level which, when properly used, would be of value in their own work.

During these five war years science has proclaimed and demonstrated its role as Hercules. It has employed as its loudspeaker the bursting bomb, and as its courier the swift vehicle. Its blows have been instantly lethal.

Next, science has shown its skill as the fabricator of useable goods. And, lastly the giant has revealed some of its mild and even compassionate moods as the binder of man's mortal wounds and the healer of his fevers and mental abberations.

This article is an attempt to: (a) outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; (b) indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; (c) state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.

Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.

Recently I was asked by a somewhat disillusioned but well informed official of one of the important Foundations how long I thought it would be before we attained Utopia. My reply was that I thought we would make substantial progress toward a better world within the next one hundred years.

The reply to this, as the reader may surmise, was that my estimate was much too optimistic, the intimation being that anyone who hopes for such rapid progress in this world must be rather naive in practical matters. Such a judgment represents a widely prevailing view, but one which is supposed to be “realistic.” According to this view, social advancement is a slow business. It will be said that there is no evidence that we are much better off than the ancients. Rather than that we have progressed beyond antiquity, we find that we, as of old, have our evidences of social degradation and maladjustment. Crimes, wars, unemployment, divorce, racial and religious conflicts, even W. P. A. projects—all these are as old as recorded history. Man cannot hope to go far in the next one hundred years because in the last one thousand years he has not improved his lot in terms of fundamental human values. All he has done is multiply his gadgets and invent some new ones. Perhaps—my critic opined—we can make some headway in the next thousand years, but it will be a slow and painful process.

In order adequately to refute the charge that relativism makes against any absolute answer to problems of science, it will be necessary for us to generalize upon the principal theme and attempt a characterization of experimental methodology. Only by thus determining what constitutes experimental inquiry in general can we hope to define that particular aspect of it which involves the concept of probability.

Among the issues before the American People today none are of greater importance than that of National Planning. The gradual evolution of the processes of civilization to their present state has brought National Planning to public attention as the next logical step. No one can explore the facts of our natural resources, our tool-power and our man-power without becoming aware of their interdependences and the need of intelligent coordinated action concerning them, if an orderly progressive society is to be established and maintained. If planning is to be incorporated in National Policy, the very nature of the problem itself and the facts and relationships to be dealt with should command the sincere and devoted attention of all groups of scientific workers in every field of human interest. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue this point. It will be assumed, before this group, that the planning process is a scientific process and therefore should be of great interest to the members of this association. In the short period assigned to the consideration of this subject, all that can be accomplished is to indicate what are some of the problems involved in scientific social planning. The inadequacies of the type of planning such as attempted by the German, Italian and Japanese Governments, to mention a few, and its comparison with the types of planning from which evolves a democratic social power, must be left for consideration at another time. The planning process as related to democratic social objectives is concerned with setting up a framework of relationships among the processes of civilization which has a high probability of attaining optimum social satisfactions. Modern civilization is founded on three primary dynamic systems each having its own characteristics. These dynamic systems will be termed “Systems of Power” and are:

1. Systems of Resources Power

2. Systems of Tool-Power

3. Systems of Man-Power

We must begin by distinguishing between sciences and empirical fields. The empirical fields are the elementary divisions of the natural world into levels for purposes of examination. The sciences consist in the method of examining those fields, together with the presuppositions and findings of such a method. Throughout this essay, we shall consider only the empirical fields as the subject-matter of the sciences, and the way in which the sciences describe their subject-matter, but not the sciences themselves. Thus the adjective “physical” will be employed, for instance, to describe the physical empirical field, and not “physics” to describe the science.

It is widely stated that a hypothesis is necessary to the execution of a scientific investigation. However, the dogmatic acceptance of this, as of every other proposition, is to be condemned until its implications have been adequately explored.

It is the writer's view that hypotheses are not prerequisite to every study which contributes to organized and systematic knowledge of the observable world. It is also concluded that the recognition of a problem requiring a solution or a question deserving an answer is a step that must be taken in every sort of systematic study, and, therefore, that a problem is a more important characteristic of scientific method than a hypothesis.

Medical research is still in its infancy. Within the memory of many of us, medical knowledge has made more progress than had been achieved in all the preceding time since the beginning of history. We have witnessed the reduction of our death rate, the extension of our life span and the achievement of a general state of health hitherto unknown.

The reader will be a patient one indeed who has not long since raised in his mind what appear to be pertinent and pressing problems concerning the description of experimental method that has so far been given. These questions are mainly concerned with matters of omission: for example, we have said that if a lack of control is shown, then the image should be changed. But how changed? What principle or method guides the selection of a new image of nature when the old is no longer permissible? Or again, we have said that “observations should be made“. But what is an observation? What principle or method guides the experimenter in deciding which of his activities are observations?

What is the relationship between the field of science and the philosophy of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union? Ninety-five per cent of the fears and misgivings expressed by American writers in regard to this subject are quite unwarranted. They have been arrived at, not by any use of the scientific method of carefully examining observable facts, but by accepting the superficialities and distortions of the sensational press, and by making sweeping “deductions” from wholly unverified premises, or from isolated and exceptional instances. Some scientists who would not dream of approaching their own field of specialty in any such manner apparently feel that the complex problem of the relations between science and a certain philosophy within a new society can be so approached.

“All experience is an arch wherethro’ gleams” an untravell'd world and through which come the joyous adventures of life and also grief and pain. Since all that we know and hope to know and think we know must come through this arch and since the primary task of science is the validation and enlargement of knowledge, science is vitally interested in this experience and its interpretation. This interest stems not from the philosopher's epistemology but it is strictly operational. We want to know what kind of experience yields reliable knowledge when checked against other experience and applied in practical adjustment to things as they are and to prediction of the probable future course of events. In short, the field of natural science (empirical as distinguished from normative science like mathematics) embraces everything that comes within the range of human experience. Its specific functions are to codify this mixed experience, to search out those uniformities which yield classification, verification and prediction, and from these observed uniformities to construct by sound reasoning verifiable laws, hypotheses and theories, that is, to find the meaning of the experiences had. First we want to know the facts, but what we are after in the upshot is the interpretation of the facts.

The large number of writers who have in recent years attacked the problem of the logical nature of commands appear generally in agreement in accepting the distinction of common grammar between imperative and declarative sentences as representing, albeit in no clear one-to-one manner, some real difference in the logical character of the two types of expression, and possibly in the psychological sign-functioning mechanism itself. The crucial logical difference adduced is that commands can apparently rot be classified as true or false. One is then, however, confronted with the problem of interpreting arguments involving imperatives which appear syllogistic in form, such as:

Keep your promises!

You promised to pay on Wednesday.

Pay on Wednesday!

A physical theory intends to provide us with a picture of a certain domain of physical phenomena. We have become accustomed to deal rather with physical pictures than with phenomena themselves. This is indispensable, even if the number of phenomena contained in the picture is so large that we cannot have them in mind all at the same time or if the phenomena are not directly accessible to our senses and cannot be studied without the help of a set of very complicated apparatus.

Among the various meanings in which the word ‘probability’ is used in everyday language, in the discussion of scientists, and in the theories of probability, there are especially two which must be clearly distinguished. We shall use for them the terms ‘probability1’ and ‘probability2'. Probability1 is a logical concept, a certain logical relation between two sentences (or, alternatively, between two propositions); it is the same as the concept of degree of confirmation. I shall write briefly “c” for “degree of confirmation,” and “c(h, e)” for “the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis h on the evidence e“; the evidence is usually a report on the results of our observations. On the other hand, probability2 is an empirical concept; it is the relative frequency in the long run of one property with respect to another. The controversy between the so-called logical conception of probability, as represented e.g. by Keynes, and Jeffreys, and others, and the frequency conception, maintained e.g. by v. Mises and Reichenbach, seems to me futile. These two theories deal with two different probability concepts which are both of great importance for science. Therefore, the theories are not incompatible, but rather supplement each other.

Anyone who has worked in Science for forty years can be much surprised to realize how little he now hears about evolution, compared with such former times. At present, evolution seems to be accepted as an axiomatic or universal principle, while the mechanism of it is not much considered, except by a small group of specialists, who work on the subject in greatly limited ways. This is practically a reversal of the former emphasis. The chemist would probably suggest that the change is due to a better realization of the chemical difficulties involved in the mechanics of evolution, and his own change in viewpoint. The chemical difficulties will have increased to an almost incredible degree in this period, and his viewpoint will have changed correspondingly. A glance at some of these changes should illuminate the progress made in both subjects in this period.

The intention and the result of a scientific inquiry is to obtain an understanding and a control of some part of the universe. This statement implies a dualistic attitude on the part of scientists. Indeed, science does and should proceed from this dualistic basis. But even though the scientist behaves dualistically, his dualism is operational and does not necessarily imply strict dualistic metaphysics.

The use of the marginal concept in academic economic theory is found to underlie a good deal of current orthodox economic analysis. The marginal concept is used by thinkers with a collectivist bent as well as thinkers of an orthodox stamp. Marginal analysis is reasonably serviceable on some occasions but fraught with difficulties on others. When the marginal concept refers to a measurable factor, such as the marginal product of an additional unit of capital, it is unquestionably useful for analysis. When it refers to a subjective situation, such as a marginal increase or decrease in satisfaction or demand, the analysis which rests upon it is often somewhat shaky. This paper is an attempt to point out some difficulties in the use of marginal analysis when such analysis refers to internal psychological states of economic men. The points made here will center about the concept of marginal satisfaction in income, that is to say, the assumption that the increment of satisfaction resulting from an additional unit of income, diminishes with size of income.