¹ During recent years several books and articles have been devoted to at least some phases of this same general project. Among these the following may be regarded as worthy of particular consideration: (In the course of this article others will also be examined.)

R. Das, The Philosophy of Whitehead; Dorothy M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism; E. J. Lintz, The Unity of the Universe According to Alfred North Whitehead; D. L. Miller and G. V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead; The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.); S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, July, 1941, January, 1942, November, 1943, July 1944; Jean Wahl, La philosophie spéculative de Whitehead, Revue Philosophique, Tome CXI (1931); John W. Blyth, Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge; J. Ratner, Introduction, John Dewey's Philosophy (Modern Library Giant); E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects? The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII (1930); D. C. Moxley, The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Whitehead, Aristotelian Society Proceedings (1933–4); H. S. Fries, The Function of Whitehead's God, The Monist, Vol. XLVI (1936); S. Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God; B. M. Loomer, Ely on Whitehead's God, The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXIV (1944).

However, despite the value of these studies, all suffer from various deficiencies as will be indicated in the body of this article.

The following articles, which were devoted chiefly to a consideration of some of the implications and applications of Whitehead's metaphysics, have some bearing on the project involved in this article: A. H. Johnson, A Criticism of D. Bidney's “Spinoza and Whitehead“, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVII (1938); The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Vol. X (1943); The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943); “Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI (1944); Whitehead's Philosophy of History, Journal of the History of Ideas (forthcoming issue); Whitehead and the Making of To-morrow, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. V (1945); The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

² A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929, p. 4. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “P. R.“

³ P. R., p. vi.

⁴ A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 290. Hereafter this book will be referred as “A. I.“

⁵ A. I., pp. 233–5.

⁶ P. R., p. 12 (material in brackets mine. See later, intensive, discussion of this point).

⁷ P. R., p. 7 (material in brackets mine).

⁸ P. R., p. 8.

⁹ P. R., p. 19 (material in brackets and emphasis mine).

¹⁰ Percy Hughes, Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate? The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 298. See also: W. H. Sheldon, America's Progressive Philosophy, p. 131; D. L. Miller and G. V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, pp. 100–1; 142.

¹¹ Arthur E. Murphy, Whitehead and the Method of Speculative Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 369–70. See also p. 368 and Symposium: Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended? W. T. Stace, Ralph M. Blake, Arthur E. Murphy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. LII (1943), note particularly p. 138.

¹² P. R., p. 25.

¹³ J. Ratner, Introduction, John Dewey's Philosophy (Modern Library Giant) pp. 230, 207–8. Hereafter this article will be designated “Ratner“.

¹⁴ Dorothy M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, p. viii. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Emmet“.

¹⁵ Victor Lowe, The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 103. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Lowe“.

¹⁶ Lowe, p. 104 (emphasis mine).

¹⁷ Lowe, pp. 104 and 103.

¹⁸ This theory of mathematics is apparently stated by Dewey. See The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI (1937), p. 174. For a brief statement of other theories of mathematics see Bertrand Russell, My Mental Development, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 12–14.

¹⁹ See P. R., pp. 12; 15–16.

²⁰ See W. T. Stace, Critical Notice: The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), Mind, Vol. LII (1943), pp. 58–9.

²¹ See later discussion, particularly criticism No. 3.

²² P. R., pp. 252–3. See also J. Dewey, The Philosophy of Whitehead, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 648.

²³ A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Macmillan co. New York, 1926, pp. 104–5. (See also E. A. Burtt, Types of Religious Philosophy, pp. 424–5.)

²⁴ P. R., p. 427.

²⁵ A. I., p. 237.

²⁶ S. E. Hooper calls attention to this argument in what appears to be a quotation from Whitehead. (However, it is “unlocated” as to book and page.) Actually it is only partially a quotation. The rest is an inaccurate attempt at restatement by Hooper. See Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, July 1941, p. 296.

²⁷ P. R., p. 268.

²⁸ P. R., p. 178. See also P. R., p. 177, and in general, part IV of P. R. See also Hartshorne's arguments in support of Whitehead's pan-psychism in The Philosophical Review: “On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy” (July 1935); and “The Interpretation of Whitehead” (July 1939).

²⁹ A. I., p. 111.

³⁰ A. I., p. 198.

³¹ A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Macmillan Co., New York, p. 268, 1931 Ed. Hereafter this book will be referred to as S. M. W.

³² A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1938; pp. 25–6. Hereafter this book will be referred to as M. T.

³³ A. I., p. 198.

³⁴ Ratner, p. 64.

³⁵ Ratner, p. 64.

³⁶ A. I., pp. 227–8.

³⁷ R. Das, The Philosophy of Whitehead, p. 190. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Das“.

³⁸ Das, p. 194.

³⁹ P. R., pp. 12 and x.

⁴⁰ P. R., p. 27. It is interesting to note Hartshorne's suggestion that this statement should not be taken too seriously. He contends that “Whitehead is not essentially or without far-reaching qualifications committed to the view that occasions are more fundamental than enduring individuals (i.e., a society).” (Whitehead's idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, P. A. Schilpp, Ed., p. 547). (Material in brackets mine.) Despite the arguments which Hartshorne offers in support of his contention, Whitehead's position seems to support the quoted statement concerning the “final” reality of actual entities. (See a discussion of the meaning of the term “final” in: A. H. Johnson, The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), p. 267.)

⁴¹ M. T., p. 228.

⁴² Whitehead points out that in contemporary physical science there is a strong tendency to displace the notion that ultimate reality is completely atomic—each bit of reality self-sufficient and exclusive. “The modern point of view is expressed in terms of energy, activity and the vibratory differentiations of space-time. Any local agitation shakes the whole universe. The distant effects are minute but they are there.—The environment enters into the nature of each thing.” (M. T., p. 188.) Thus for modern physics, a thing is not an inert mass occupying a certain definite space. A thing is what it does, a stream of influence which permeates to the utmost recesses of space-time. It is evident that when we speak of a thing being specifically located at a certain place we refer only to its focal region. Whitehead's point of view is supported by W. H. Sheldon when he remarks: “There may well be in nature, inorganic as well as living, a slow tendency to combine more and more of what seem to us now, or have seemed, to be incompatible conditions. Liquid air, fire that feeds on water, the fusing of proton and electron in the sun, offer suggestive instances. Particularly the notion of statistical laws inclines in the same direction; as if nature had an intrinsic tendency to vary in all possible ways in any given situation.” We could also point to the “Mendelian” facts of heredity where the various possible combinations of genes seem to recur. There is. then, a body of decidedly specific evidence in favor of “Whitehead's thesis of incremental process in the inorganic realm: and he might well have used more of this evidence than he did.” (America's Progressive Philosophy, p. 150.)

⁴³ P. R., pp. 33; 113.

⁴⁴ P. R., pp. 337–9.

⁴⁵ P. R., p. 35.

⁴⁶ P. R., p. 366.

⁴⁷ P. R., p. 35.

⁴⁸ P. R., pp. 68–73; 101–2.

⁴⁹ P. R., p. 136; A. I., p. 297.

⁵⁰ P. R., p. 321.

⁵¹ P. R., pp. 38; 129.

⁵² P. R., p. 35.

⁵³ P. R., p. 32.

⁵⁴ P. R., p. 29.

⁵⁵ P. R., p. 32.

⁵⁶ P. R., p. 70.

⁵⁷ See: Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 60. Also M. T., pp. 92–7. It should be noted that Whitehead also uses the term “universal” in a rather confused fashion—confusing in the sense that it is unusual: P. R., p. 76. However, it is understandable, and hardly merits Stebbings’ comment, Mind, Vol. XXXIX (1930), p. 471.

⁵⁸ Das, pp. 183–4.

⁵⁹ S. M. W., p. 230 (material in brackets mine).

⁶⁰ Das, p. 184.

⁶¹ S. M. W., pp. 230–1.

⁶² P. R., p. 34.

⁶³ P. R., p. 63.

⁶⁴ The platonic term “participation” is also used. “The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal“. (P. R., p. 63.) It has been claimed (see, for example, Emmet, p. 106) that Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects is very similar to Plato's theory of “ideas”. It is true that there is some similarity. Both refer to abstract entities which must be apprehended by reason. They are not objects of sensory experience. However, Whitehead stresses several fundamental differences which serve to distinguish his eternal objects from Plato's ideas. (The reference is to Plato's theory of ideas as expressed in The Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus) (a) Plato's ideas have no necessary relationship to the concrete world of actual entities. Whitehead's eternal objects are essentially related to actual entities. (b) Plato's ideas are assigned the exalted status of sole reality. For Whitehead actual entities are the ultimate realities.

⁶⁵ P. R., p. 82.

⁶⁶ S. M. W., p. 239.

⁶⁷ P. R., p. 174.

⁶⁸ S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Jan., 1942, p. 53. See also Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Nov., 1943, pp. 205–7.

⁶⁹ See S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Jan. 1942, pp. 47–8.

⁷⁰ R. W. Sellars, Philosophy of Organism and Physical Realism, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 411. See also p. 433.

⁷¹ See, for example, S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Vol. XVII (1942), pp. 59–62.

⁷² P. R., p. 446 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

⁷³ Emmet, p. 133.

⁷⁴ John Dewey, Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI (1937), pp. 175–6.

⁷⁵ A. N. Whitehead, Remarks, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI (1937), p. 179.

⁷⁶ P. R., p. 35. It is important to note that in formulating his theory of prehension, Whitehead acknowledges a debt to Bradley. He states “It is interesting to make a few citations from Bradley illustrating my general adherence to his doctrine of Feeling.” (A. I., p. 297.) He then proceeds to show how he accepts Bradley's analysis but prefers to use different technical terms.

⁷⁷ P. R., p. 66.

⁷⁸ E. J. Lintz, The Unity of the Universe According to Alfred North Whitehead, F.R.S., Sc.D., LL.D., p. 50. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Lintz“. Note: the contents of this book were published in The Thomist, Vol. VI (1943).

⁷⁹ A. P. Ushenko, Negative Prehension, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIV (1937), p. 266.

⁸⁰ See P. R., pp. 35; 66; 337–8. Note subsequent discussion of the distinction between initial and objective data.

⁸¹ P. R., pp. 34–5.

⁸² P. R., p. 66.

⁸³ P. R., p. 38 (material in brackets mine).

⁸⁴ P. R., p. 246.

⁸⁵ A. I., pp. 235–6.

⁸⁶ Whitehead claims that the essentials of his theory of prehension were noted but not stressed by previous thinkers. For example, Berkeley in Alciphron (fourth dialogue) has Euphanor pointing out to Alciphron: “It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud, and the planet (distant in space) which are grasped into unity (by the percipient occasion) here.” S. M. W., p. 102 (material in brackets mine). Thus Whitehead seems to think that Berkeley recognizes that perception involves a transfer of content—the sort of process which Whitehead calls prehension.

⁸⁷ Bertram Morris, The Art-process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 479.

⁸⁸ P. R., 336.

⁸⁹ P. R., p. 44 (material in brackets mine).

⁹⁰ P. R., p. 364.

⁹¹ S. E. Hooper, Whitehead's Philosophy: Actual Entities, Philosophy, Vol. XVI (1941), p. 297. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Hooper I.” (The same mistaken notion is expressed in Das, p. 105.)

⁹² P. R., p. 363.

⁹³ E. B. McGilvary, Space-Time, Simple Location, and Prehension, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 236–7.

⁹⁴ P. R., p. 362 (material in brackets mine).

⁹⁵ A. I., pp. 255–6, and P. R., p. 321.

⁹⁶ P. R., pp. 337–8.

⁹⁷ D. L. Miller and G. V. Gentry, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, p. 106. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Gentry“.

⁹⁸ Gentry, p. 111.

⁹⁹ The same contradictory procedure is found in E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27 (1930), pp. 32–3, contrasted with p. 35.

¹⁰⁰ Gentry, pp. 145–6.

¹⁰¹ See Gentry, pp. 117, 151, 156, 168.

¹⁰² Gentry, pp. 151–3.

¹⁰³ Gentry, p. 191.

¹⁰⁴ Gentry, p. 120.

¹⁰⁵ Gentry, p. 129.

¹⁰⁶ See Gentry, pp. 138–9.

¹⁰⁷ P. R., p. 38.

¹⁰⁸ P. R. p. 66 (material in brackets mine).

¹⁰⁹ See Gentry, pp. 163–4.

¹¹⁰ Gentry, p. 130.

¹¹¹ Gentry, p. 121.

¹¹² Emmet, p. 96.

¹¹³ P. R., pp. 337–8.

¹¹⁴ See Lintz, p. 59; Gentry, p. 189.

¹¹⁵ A. M. Dunham, Animism and Materialism in Whitehead's Organic Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29 (1932), p. 45.

¹¹⁶ W. T. Stace, Critical Notice, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), Mind, Vol. LII (1943), p. 61.

¹¹⁷ Charles Hartshorne, On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIV (1935), p. 336.

¹¹⁸ P. R., pp. 133–4.

¹¹⁹ P. R., p. 249.

¹²⁰ P. R., p. 93.

¹²¹ P. R., p. 249.

¹²² Among those overlooking this point are: Gentry, pp. 114–15; Hooper I, p. 289; DeW. H. Parker, Substance and Experience, pp. 67–8.

¹²³ See P. R., pp. 34, 63. It is to be noted that sometimes Whitehead uses the term realization, not in the sense of ingression, but rather in the sense of conceptual prehension. (P. R., p. 392.)

¹²⁴ Gentry, p. 199 (material in brackets mine).

¹²⁵ P. R., p. 343.

¹²⁶ Emmet, p. 148.

¹²⁷ Emmet, p. 149.

¹²⁸ S. E. Hooper, Telepathy in the Light of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XLII (1944).

¹²⁹ See P. R., pp. 35; 37; 338.

¹³⁰ P. R., p. 286. See also: A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

¹³¹ John W. Blyth, Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge, p. 9. See also p. 23. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Blyth“.

¹³² P. R., p. 37.

¹³³ Jean Wahl, La philosophie spéculative de Whitehead, Revue Philosophique, Tome CXI, Nos. 7, 8, 1931, p. 117. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Wahl“.

¹³⁴ See P. R., pp. 134; 320.

¹³⁵ A. I., p. 298 (emphasis mine).

¹³⁶ P. R., p. 343.

¹³⁷ Mary L. Coolidge, Purposiveness Without Purpose in a New Context, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. III (1943), p. 87.

¹³⁸ Gentry, p. 103.

¹³⁹ P. R., p. 135; see also p. 373.

¹⁴⁰ Percy Hughes, Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate? The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 299. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Hughes“.

¹⁴¹ See preceding discussion of “subjective aim“.

¹⁴² P. R., p. 134.

¹⁴³ Lintz, pp. 11–13.

¹⁴⁴ P. R., p. 134.

¹⁴⁵ Lintz, p. 13 (material in brackets mine).

¹⁴⁶ Lintz, p. 51.

¹⁴⁷ Lintz, p. 59.

¹⁴⁸ Gentry, p. 157.

¹⁴⁹ P. R., p. 202.

¹⁵⁰ P. R., p. 135 (material in brackets mine).

¹⁵¹ See later discussion.

¹⁵² Charles Hartshorne, On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIV (1935), p. 334.

¹⁵³ A. I., p. 252 (material in brackets mine).

¹⁵⁴ Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 545.

¹⁵⁵ Charles W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind, p. 188.

¹⁵⁶ P. R., p. 79.

¹⁵⁷ P. R., p. 224.

¹⁵⁸ P. R., p. 224.

¹⁵⁹ P. R., p. 366 (emphasis mine).

¹⁶⁰ P. R., p. 435.

¹⁶¹ P. R., p. 351.

¹⁶² P. R., p. 321.

¹⁶³ See P. R., pp. 351–2.

¹⁶⁴ P. R., p. 65.

¹⁶⁵ P. R., p. 136 (material in brackets mine).

¹⁶⁶ P. R., p. 234.

¹⁶⁷ P. R., pp. 135–6.

¹⁶⁸ P. R., p. 35.

¹⁶⁹ P. R., p. 338.

¹⁷⁰ P. R., p. 339.

¹⁷¹ P. R., p. 35.

¹⁷² P. R., p. 136. See also Das, p. 101; Gentry, p. 170.

¹⁷³ H (1), p. 291.

¹⁷⁴ P. R., p. 126.

¹⁷⁵ This discussion will perhaps provide at least a partial answer for cricisms offered by Das, pp. 177–183; Lintz, pp. 10, 21; Parker, Experience and Substance, p. 19. In any case Das is obviously not correct when he attributes to Whitehead the doctrine that “an actual entity leaves no remainder when it perishes” (Das, p. 181). Further, there is the suggestion that “when an actual entity perishes, we cannot say that part of it remains to be carried over into other actual entities, because part of an actual entity, not being an actual entity itself, is nothing at all, since actual entities are the ultimate metaphysical facts” (Das, p. 180). This is fallacious because he overlooks the basic point that while actual entities are the final, real, things in the universe, their components are not, for Whitehead, “nothing at all“. They are factual components which help to constitute an actual entity.

¹⁷⁶ A. I., pp. 250–1. Gentry makes the mistake of assuming that the envisagement of an eternal object and its use in guiding the process of concretion is the only instance of the future entering the present in a determining fashion (p. 201).

¹⁷⁷ Whitehead uses the term “atomic” here in the sense of (co-operating) individual—not in the sense of individual with no relations to other individuals.

¹⁷⁸ P. R., p. 71.

¹⁷⁹ H (1), p. 291.

¹⁸⁰ W. H. Sheldon, America's Progressive Philosophy, p. 147. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Sheldon“.

¹⁸¹ Sheldon, pp. 148–9.

¹⁸² Blyth, p. 17.

¹⁸³ P. R., p. 380.

¹⁸⁴ A. N. Whitehead, Time, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 61.

¹⁸⁵ P. R., p. 517.

¹⁸⁶ P. R., pp. 433–4.

¹⁸⁷ P. R., p. 434.

¹⁸⁸ P. R., p. 108.

¹⁸⁹ P. R., p. 105.

¹⁹⁰ P. R., p. 434.

¹⁹¹ P. R., p. 337.

¹⁹² P. R., pp. 184–246.

¹⁹³ P. R., p. 35.

¹⁹⁴ J. S. Bixler, Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 492.

¹⁹⁵ W. E. Hocking, Whitehead on Mind and Nature, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 394.

¹⁹⁶ J. Dewey, The Philosophy of Whitehead, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 657.

¹⁹⁷ See Emmet, p. 128. See also: E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII (1930), pp. 29–36.

¹⁹⁸ P. R., pp. 102, 226.

¹⁹⁹ Emmet, p. 97.

²⁰⁰ See P. R., p. 108.

²⁰¹ Lintz, p. 55.

²⁰² P. R., p. 521.

²⁰³ P. R., p. 134.

²⁰⁴ Das, p. 189.

²⁰⁵ P. R., pp. 522, 134.

²⁰⁶ S. L. Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God, p. 21. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Ely“. See also S. E. Hooper, Eternal Objects and God, Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy, Jan. 1942, p. 65. Hereafter this article will be referred to as Hooper (II).

²⁰⁷ Ely, p. 33.

²⁰⁸ B. M. Loonier, Ely on Whitehead's God, The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXIV (1944), p. 165. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Loomer“.

²⁰⁹ Loomer, p. 166.

²¹⁰ P. R., p. 48. This is the so-called “ontological principle“; see P. R., p. 36.

²¹¹ P. R., pp. 374; 523.

²¹² S. M. W., p. 257.

²¹³ DeW. H. Parker, Experience and Substance, p. 68.

²¹⁴ P. Shorey, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 582.

²¹⁵ Loomer, pp. 163–4. (Emphasis mine.)

²¹⁶ P. R., p. 50.

²¹⁷ P. R., pp. 525–6.

²¹⁸ P. R., p. 343.

²¹⁹ D. C. Moxley, The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Whitehead, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Vol. XXXIV (1933–4), p. 179. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Moxley“. See also Emmet, p. 116; D. L. Miller, The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, p. 89.

²²⁰ P. R., p. 38.

²²¹ P. R., p. 164 (material in brackets mine).

²²² P. R., p. 160 (material in brackets mine). See previous discussion of this general point. Further, there may be a novel selection from available eternal objects.

²²³ Ely, p. 10–11 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

²²⁴ Ely, p. 21 (emphasis mine).

²²⁵ Ely, p. 29.

²²⁶ Ely, p. 30.

²²⁷ Ely, p. 32 (material in brackets mine).

²²⁸ Das, p. 187 (material in brackets mine).

²²⁹ R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p. 620 (material in brackets mine). Equally incorrect are Das, p. 161, and M. H. Moore, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 40; p. 270.

²³⁰ Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Idea of God, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), p. 556. Hereafter this article will be referred to as Hartshorne.

²³¹ E. W. Hall, Of What Use Are Whitehead's Eternal Objects? The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII (1930), p. 39. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Hall“.

²³² P. R., p. 70.

²³³ P. R., p. 70.

²³⁴ P. R., p. 521.

²³⁵ P. R., p. 344.

²³⁶ P. R., p. 382.

²³⁷ Hall, p. 37. See also G. Vlastos, Organic Categories in Whitehead, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXIV (1937), p. 259.

²³⁸ P. R., p. 392 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

²³⁹ Hall, p. 37 (material in brackets mine).

²⁴⁰ Lintz, pp. 40 and 52.

²⁴¹ See P. R., p. 73.

²⁴² Lintz, p. 39.

²⁴³ Mind, Vol. XXXIX (1930).

²⁴⁴ See S. M. W., p. 256.

²⁴⁵ See Emmet, p. 250.

²⁴⁶ P. R., p. 47.

²⁴⁷ Hartshorne, p. 535 (material in brackets mine).

²⁴⁸ Ely, p. 56.

²⁴⁹ P. R., p. 134.

²⁵⁰ Emmet, p. 259.

²⁵¹ Emmet, pp. 263; 270. See also Lintz, p. 36.

²⁵² P. R., p. 524.

²⁵³ P. R., p. 517.

²⁵⁴ Whitehead's contention that God is like other actual entities is open to serious question as will be shown later in this article.

²⁵⁵ See P. R., p. 73.

²⁵⁶ Lintz, p. 33. See also Ely's excellent discussion of this point, p. 33, footnote 25, and Hartshorne p. 541, Hooper (1) p. 286.

²⁵⁷ Hall, p. 40 (material in brackets mine).

²⁵⁸ Hartshorne, pp. 519; 529. Strangely enough Hartshorne offers an interpretation of how the past may be in the present which seems to contradict his claim that “God fully possesses or prehends” every past occasion in its entirety. Hartshorne states: “But perhaps it will be thought a paradox that the past should, in present experience, be still immediately given. I have elsewhere on several occasions explained this to mean that the past involves universals of which the latter events are instances” (Hartshorne, p. 543). See also Das 166–7 and Wahl, p. 133.

²⁵⁹ P. R., p. 134 (emphasis mine).

²⁶⁰ This and a preceding reference to “God's tender care” reminds one of Whitehead's contention that the terms of religious devotion can be legitimately applied to his metaphysical God. Further illustrations of this point are noted in subsequent sections of this article.

²⁶¹ P. R., p. 525. It is interesting to note that Hartshorne makes use of this quotation (Hartshorne, p. 530) without apparently realizing its full meaning.

²⁶² P. R., p. 531.

²⁶³ P. R., pp. 524–5.

²⁶⁴ P. R., p. 532.

²⁶⁵ P. R., p. 531 (material in brackets mine). See a discussion of this point in: A. H. Johnson, “Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI (1944), pp. 23–4.

²⁶⁶ Hartshorne, p. 549.

²⁶⁷ Lintz, p. 27.

²⁶⁸ Lintz, p. 61.

²⁶⁹ Lintz, p. 16.

²⁷⁰ See A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

²⁷¹ Loomer, p. 169.

²⁷² Loomer, p. 167.

²⁷³ P. R., p. 531.

²⁷⁴ Charles Hartshorne, On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLIV (1935), p. 343 (emphasis mine). See also Hartshorne, pp. 531–2.

²⁷⁵ P. R., p. 524.

²⁷⁶ W. G. de Burgh, Discussion: Professor Whitehead's “Modes of Thought“, Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1939), p. 211.

²⁷⁷ P. R., p. 286.

²⁷⁸ L. S. Stebbing, Mind, Vol. XXXIX (1930), p. 475.

²⁷⁹ For example: “In esthetic creativity, which is for Whitehead the substantial stuff of things, eternal objects are united and particular things, creatures, emerge.” (N. P. Stallknecht, Studies In The Philosophy of Creation, p. 130)—“The primal creative cause through which all coming-to-be springs and which impels everything which has become real to ever new forms and events is called by Whitehead creativity.” (R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p. 619.) (La créativite) a pour attributes de donner naissance à la multiplicité des modes contingents et aux objects éternals, — Derrière le passage des événements et derrière l'eterneté des objects, nous trouverons cette énergie éternelle de réalisation. —c'est par elle que le multiple constitue un monde. Elle fait passer de la disjonction à la conjonction” (Wahl, pp. 124–5).

²⁸⁰ S. M. W., pp. 102–3.

²⁸¹ P. R., p. 31.

²⁸² P. R., p. 339.

²⁸³ Hooper (1), p. 290 (material in brackets mine).

²⁸⁴ Hooper (1), pp. 288; 297.

²⁸⁵ Lintz, see p. 32 and pp. 35–6.

²⁸⁶ Ely, see pp. 14; 17; 20 for the incorrect statements and pp. 16; 24; 46 for correct statements.

²⁸⁷ Emmet, p. 252.

²⁸⁸ Das, p. 173.

²⁸⁹ Moxley, p. 168.

See also W. G. deBurgh, Discussion: Professor Whitehead's “Modes of Thought“, Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1939), p. 210.

²⁹⁰ Moxley, p. 167–70.

²⁹¹ Loomer, p. 165.

²⁹² P. R., p. 521.

²⁹³ Ely, p. 14. For a more detailed discussion of this point see: A. H. Johnson, A Criticism of D. Bidney's “Spinoza and Whitehead“, The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVII (1938), pp. 410–14.

²⁹⁴ Das, p. 161.

²⁹⁵ The preceding discussion provides at least a partial answer to some of the critical considerations raised by W. G. deBurgh: Discussion: Professor Whitehead's “Modes of Thought“, Philosophy, Vol. XIV (1939), pp. 210–11.

²⁹⁶ Gentry, p. 198.

²⁹⁷ P. R., pp. 521; 523; 528.

²⁹⁸ This serves to refute Ratner's contention that Whitehead “proceeds by making distinctions, and then internally involving them in each other so that at the end he has everything in everything else—which consequence also obliterates distinctions.” J. Ratner, Introduction to John Dewey's Philosophy, John Dewey's Philosophy (Modern Library Giant), p. 218.

²⁹⁹ Lintz, p. 31 (emphasis and material in brackets mine).

³⁰⁰ Lintz, p. 44.

³⁰¹ Lintz, p. 16.

³⁰² P. R., p. 532. To this phase of God's activity Whitehead applies the phrase, “The love of God“. He also suggests that “the kingdom of heaven is with us today.” God also is called the “fellow-sufferer who understands” (P. R., p. 532).

³⁰³ S. H. Fries, The functions of Whitehead's God, The Monist, Vol. XLVI (1936), pp. 35–6. Hereafter this article will be referred to as “Fries“.

³⁰⁴ Loomer, p. 166. See also Fries, p. 51.

³⁰⁵ P. R., p. 377.

³⁰⁶ Fries, p. 28.

³⁰⁷ P. R., p. vii.

³⁰⁸ F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 460, Oxford University Press, 1930. Hereafter this book will be referred to as “Bradley“.

³⁰⁹ Bradley, p. 128. See also p. 403. See also p. 432.

³¹⁰ Bradley, p. 469.

³¹¹ J. E. Boodin, Fictions in Science and Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), p. 704.

³¹² Wahl, pp. 133–4.

³¹³ This phase of God's activity is, according to Whitehead, a further manifestation of divine patience (P. R., p. 525).

³¹⁴ P. R., p. 12.

³¹⁵ P. R., pp. 470–1 (emphasis mine).

³¹⁶ A. I., pp. 258–9.

³¹⁷ A. I., p. 261.

³¹⁸ A. I., p. 261.

³¹⁹ A. I., p. 261.

³²⁰ A. I., p. 260.

³²¹ A. I., p. 263.

³²² P. R., p. 52.

³²³ A. I., p. 264.

³²⁴ See P. R., p. 166 and in general the discussion of the “autonomy” of actual entities.

³²⁵ P. R., p. 116.

³²⁶ P. R., p. 516. See a more complete discussion of this topic in; A. H. Johnson, The Psychology of A. N. Whitehead, The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 32 (1945).

³²⁷ See A. I., pp. 260–1.

³²⁸ Sheldon, pp. 129–30.

³²⁹ Sheldon, p. 130.

³³⁰ Emmet, p. 186 (material in brackets mine). See also Lintz, p. 63.

³³¹ A. E. Murphy, Symposium: Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended? The Philosophical Review, Vol. LII, (1943), p. 138 (material in brackets mine).

³³² P. R., p. 103.

³³³ Blyth, pp. 33–4.

³³⁴ Gentry, p. 194.

³³⁵ S. M. W., p. 157. Joseph Needham: A Biologist's View of Whitehead's Philosophy, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), pp. 255–8.

³³⁶ A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 215–16.

³³⁷ See Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, Chap. 1.

³³⁸ P. R., p. 327.

³³⁹ P. R., p. 327 (emphasis mine).

³⁴⁰ A. I., p. 264; Modes of Thought, p. 31.

³⁴¹ P. R., p. 126.

³⁴² P. R., p. 524.

³⁴³ P. R., p. 134.

³⁴⁴ P. R., p. 521.

³⁴⁵ See C. Lloyd Morgan, Subjective Aim in Professor Whitehead's Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 6 (1931), pp. 285–9. Sheldon, pp. 142–5; J. E. Boodin, Fictions in Science and Philosophy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 703–4; M. W. Gross, Book Review: The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL (1943), p. 276.

³⁴⁶ For other expositions of this theory see references in: A. H. Johnson, The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Vol. X (1943), pp. 52–3.

³⁴⁷ See Gentry, p. 176; Das, p. 185; Lintz, p. 51; and in particular, J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, Chaps. 19–20.

³⁴⁸ See Gentry, pp. 178–9.

³⁴⁹ See P. R., p. 29.

³⁵⁰ Here I disagree with Pratt who suggests that the self is “already real in the first conscious stirrings of the new born, or the unborn infant. “Personal Realism”, p. 298.

³⁵¹ See J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 282.

³⁵² P. R., p. 28.

³⁵³ A. H. Johnson, “Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, Philosophy of Science, Vol. XI (1944), particularly pp. 14–15.