1. Foreword. Man's every act is an act of faith; generally, an unconscious faith; seldom, an examined faith; never, a faith that by taking thought could have been replaced by assured certainties. All this appears whenever we stop to “rationalize” our conduct. Whatever that conduct may have been, it can be made to appear reasonable only if some propositions are taken to be true, others false. Or, perhaps the more experienced and less exacting mind would feel the reasonableness of its actions to have been as well established as might be, if it could show the premises with which its acts were consistent to be more likely true than false; those with whose truth they were inconsistent, more likely false than true. Either way of putting it points to the one moral; namely, that, apart from incalculable chance, there is nothing but one's judgment in the matter of premises to determine all that one's life can come to know of fruition or frustration. Nothing, then, can be more important to any man than to do all he can to assure the soundness of his reasons for the faith that is in him; i.e. to test the weight of evidence supporting the working hypotheses on which he is willing to act. But to have considered the evidence for the hypotheses on which he has acted or is prepared to act, could be practically useful only to one who had in one way or another come by a sound idea of the evidence on which one should act, if one's actions are not to end in disappointment. The result at which a man's thought on this matter of evidence may have arrived, will constitute his theory of evidence; and the task of constructing the soundest possible theory of evidence is the undertaking of philosophy.

The old quarrel between the logical empiricists or pragmatists and the defenders of metaphysics is still far from being settled. This situation is at least partly due to the fact that neither of the two antagonists has a clear insight in the historical background, the systematical validity, and the practical purposes of the concepts and methods used in traditional philosophy. Therefore further clarification is needed.

The following paper does not claim to give final definitions and decisions. It will rather try to draw the attention to certain ways of reasoning still very widespread in metaphysics and moral theory. Their careful analysis may throw light on some of the so-called eternal philosophical problems.

“We get wise by asking questions, and even if these are not answered, we get wise; for a well packed question carries its answer on its back as a snail carries its shell.” These lines from James Stephens’ Irish Fairy Tales are an appropriate introduction, for Singer takes the question, ‘How shall I live if I would have of life the best it has to offer?’ as the departure for his ethics, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, for his reflections on ethical matters. This brief essay is expository and interpretive rather than critical and brings together material from various essays, particularly “Progress,” “On The Contented Life,” and “Old Ways and New Beginnings of Science and of Morals.”

The nature of time is one of the crucial problems in the philosophy of science and it cannot be solved by an appraisal of past formulations of the time concept, nor by introspective examination of our awareness of time. Among the philosopher's tasks is the seemingly thankless one of scrutinizing the advance of modern science for significant facts and ideas, and to integrate these into the larger notions he has formed of time. Recent physics bears suggestions of peculiar interest in this regard; chief among them is the theory of quantum electrodynamics developed by Feynman which involves reversals in the course of time and thereby cherishes, in the minds of many, an age-old phantasy of more than scientific appeal. To appraise that theory in philosophic terms is the purpose of this note.

4. The Mind's Lawmaking: Critical Idealism. Pleased with something dramatic in the phrase, we often characterize experiment as “a question put to Nature.” But if there be anything flattering to our state in Nature's submission to our questioning, there can be nothing grateful to our heart in her manner of answering. “Are we all to die?” Nature answers, “Yes.” “Will the sun that warmed our fathers last out our children?” Nature answers, “No.” Thus Nature giveth and Nature taketh away; her complaisance ends with letting us know her way with us.

Corrigibility has generally been designated as the major qualification of a scientific law. Although various other characteristics of a scientific law have been questioned, corrigibility has usually been accepted as one of its essential features. On this basis scientists, positivists, and pragmatists have frequently distinguished between genuine empirical laws and all other assertions that only seem to be laws. The mark of a genuine law in the scientific sense is its corrigibility; the mark of a pseudo law is its non-corrigibility. In this paper I should like to reopen philosophic inquiry into the nature of corrigibility as it is supposedly exemplified in law and to call attention to some of the peculiar difficulties and conclusions attendant on any such inquiry.

In moments of daring, some physical scientists consider problems of social inquiry, hoping naively that the methods of physical inquiry will provide them with special insight. In my own work on problems of industrial production where I am searching for “practical” means for optimizing production in some socially satisfactory sense, I find that the physical scientist cannot escape the responsibility for social inquiry. So far as I can understand the nature of this work, it requires for its fruitful pursuit a methodology which leans heavily on the concepts of statistical control of Shewhart (1, 2, 3), of cybernetics of Wiener (4, 5) and of experimentalism of Singer (6, 7, 8, 9), Churchman (10, 11) and Ackoff (11).

Biological science does not try to distinguish between health and disease. Biology is concerned with the interaction between living organisms and their environment. What we call health or disease is quite irrelevant.

These reactions between the individual and his environment are complex. The individual and his surroundings form an integrated system which we can arbitrarily divide into two parts. There is an “external” component, by which we mean such factors as light, heat, percentage of oxygen in the air, quantity of minerals or vitamins in food, micro-organisms in food or air, and so on. These can induce changes in what we arbitrarily call the “internal” component. Here we include such crude factors as anatomical structures, or finer details like composition of intercellular fluid, or secretions of glands, or changes of electrical potential in nerve or muscle.

1. It seems plausible to say that a language is a system of expressions the use of which is subject to certain rules. It would seem, thus, that learning to use a language is learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. However, taken as it stands, this thesis is subject to an obvious and devastating refutation. After formulating this refutation, I shall turn to the constructive task of attempting to restate the thesis in a way which avoids it. In doing so, I shall draw certain distinctions the theoretical elaboration of which will, I believe, yield new insight into the psychology of language and of what might be called “norm conforming behavior” generally. The present paper contains an initial attempt along these lines.

This essay proposes to differentiate between science and philosophy on the evidence that the truth of scientific, or, more generally, empirical, statements is perspectival whereas the truth of a philosophical statement is not. A perspectival truth depends upon a perspective in the sense that it may no longer be acceptable after the point of view which determines a perspective has been changed to another. Accordingly, the admission of perspectival truth requires the existence of alternative perspectives. The existence of alternative perspectives does not mean that every statement which is true in one of them is false in another. Some statements, to be called perspectivally invariant, remain true regardless of the perspective. But the admission of perspectival truth requires at least one statement to be true in one perspective but false in an alternative perspective. Two perspectives, no matter how different in other respects, will not be called alternative unless they involve perspectival truth. The point is important. For no one denies that perspectives differ with regard to their heuristic value, i.e. no one would deny that a certain point of view may lead us to findings which from a different point of view might remain indiscernible and therefore undiscovered. But the opponents of perspectival truth and of alternative perspectives argue, with W. R. Dennes, that once a truth has been established the same finding can be acknowledged by a true statement in any other perspective although the acknowledgment may call for a restatement in a different idiom or language (1). The issue is between the admission of perspectival truth, on the one hand, and the contention of interperspectival translatability of truth, on the other.

In a number of essays published over the last decade or so, W. V. Quine has made some interesting suggestions concerning the ontology of theories. (3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 9; 10) If I understand him correctly, one of his principal objects has been to formulate a criterion by means of which one can correctly decide what are the ontological commitments of any given theory. My aim in this paper is to reveal what I think are inadequacies in Quine's criterion and to indicate the direction in which a proper formulation lies.

1. Objective of the Paper. This is an exercise in formalism; an attempt to see what a certain hypothesis would look like if it were spelled out in more detail than it has so far received. The object is to frame a self-consistent hypothesis that includes certain contributions of both optimism and pessimism. We would like to save the moral advantages of each position; at first glance they seem logically exclusive.

1. Introduction. Cultural relativity is one of the most important conceptions to which anthropology and sociology have devoted much attention in recent years. It is a theory of human conduct based upon observational studies of different cultures and different societies. Many of the leaders in the various social sciences are currently among the advocates of this viewpoint. The burden of these pages, however, is that cultural relativity is flying under false colors: it claims to be empirical but is illogical; it claims to be objective but is surreptitiously moral; it claims to be reasonable but elevates irrationalism; it claims to be scientific but prevents the development of an experimental science of sociocultural conduct. These are serious charges to lodge against leading social scientists; to detail them all would require much more space than is here available. Therefore this paper will be devoted to an incomplete exposition of only two points, namely, that cultural relativity is surreptitiously moral, and, that it deprives man of rational grounds for decision in certain crucial areas. To put the matter bluntly, the advocates of cultural relativity, while they allege themselves to be scientifically amoral, sneak in through the back door a peculiarly crude form of ethnocentric morality which is clearly contrary to the observable facts of human behavior; and, while presenting a presumably scientific analysis of human conduct, leave us only with personal taste as the basis for making certain important decisions.

2. Cultural Relativity Defined. Cultural relativity, briefly stated, asserts that any set of customs and institutions, or way of life, is as valid as any other. It may be well to let some representative cultural relativists speak for themselves at this point, in order to show that the summary statement of their position, just given, is correct. The author of an excellent and widely adopted textbook in cultural anthropology stresses the dignity inherent in every body of custom, and abjures us to be tolerant of the ways of other people:

… cultural relativism is a philosophy which … lays stress on the dignity inherent in every body of custom, and on the need for tolerance of conventions though they may differ from one's own … the relativistic point of view brings into relief the validity of every set of norms for those people whose lives are guided by them, and the values these represent. … The very core of cultural relativism is the social discipline that comes of respect for differences—of mutual respect. Emphasis on the worth of many ways of life, not one, is an affirmation of the values of each culture. Such emphasis seeks to understand and to harmonize goals, not to judge and destroy those that do not dovetail with our own, (4, pp. 76–77).

There are two parts to the paper. The first is concerned with the question: “are there law statements in any of the social sciences?” In order to answer this question two explanations drawn from the literature of anthropology and sociology are considered in detail. It is shown that these are “explanation sketches” rather than logically complete explanations. Both of these “sketches” presuppose but do not state tendency laws. These law statements are then made explicit by the writer, and thus it is shown that the use of law statements is assumed in at least some of the social sciences.

1. Some Preliminary Distinctions. The relation between the natural and the social sciences, as it bears on their respective subject-matters, methods, and propositions, has long been a source of problems for the philosophy of science. The title of this paper is intended to indicate one of the most basic of these problems. Before developing my point, however, I wish to guard against a possible misinterpretation. I am not questioning the accepted fact that as knowledge in any field advances men may come to recognize the incorrectness of what they had previously regarded as “laws” in that field, and may consequently “change” these laws to take account of such increased knowledge. Let me call this kind of change of laws doctrinal change. The kind of change about which I am asking is rather a change in the subject-matter itself insofar as it is subject to laws—i.e., a change in the causal relations among the facts, objects, properties, events, or whatever they may be called, with which the science deals. Let me call this kind of change of laws factual change. Now, without inquiring more fully at the moment into the nature of scientific laws as such, we may say that the history of science shows that men can and do effect doctrinal changes in the laws of any science, natural as well as social, and formal as well as empirical. And it is recognized also, with minor exceptions to be noted later, that men cannot effect factual changes in the laws of the natural sciences, since these are independent of human volition or decision. The question I am asking, then, is whether men can effect factual changes in the laws of the social sciences.

This paper attempts to present a formal model for the science of decision where “science of decision” is restricted to the work that has been done in formal models and not those aspects connected with the gathering of empirical data and development of measures for the data. One of the difficulties in treating such a phenomenon as decision-making has been to give a precise statement of the problem. The literature of numerous fields is filled with models and talk about models where various restrictions are imposed. Among all of these it seems that the formalistic or logical, game-theoretic, and statistical decision function conceptual schemas have solved some decision problems largely due to the fact that they could give a mathematical formulation of the problem and its solution. The result is that in these three fields the decision problem can be fed into a computer which grinds out an answer for each particular set of parameters.

H. S. Sullivan's approach to the study of psychiatry reflects the fact that his conception of scientific method was derived from work in physics rather than in the biological sciences. His definition of psychiatry as the study of “interpersonal process” appears to have been influenced partly by his previous training in physics, and also by his conclusion that the most significant aspects of personality could be revealed only through an understanding of the person's actual behavior in relation to others.

What sort of subject is the philosophy of science? It would be difficult to find any sort of agreement on the answer to this question. There are a large number of physicists who have promoted the idea that the subject is a kind of cosmic journalism: any new major discoveries in physics warrant an up-to-the-minute, catch-as-catch-can analysis of the boundaries of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the Oxonian sirens of ordinary language tell us that any careful scrutiny of technical scientific matters is not proper philosophical activity. I want to argue that the philosopher of science need be neither a journalist of science nor merely an acute man of common sense eternally restricted to contemplating the general meaning of such notions as those of mind, free will, cause and determinism.

The purpose of this note is to examine a recent axiomatization of classical particle mechanics, and its relation to an alternative axiomatization I had earlier proposed. A comparison of the two proposals casts some interesting light on the problems of operationalism in classical celestial mechanics.

1. Comparison of the Two Axiomatizations. The basic differences between the two proposals arise from the nature of the undefined terms. Both systems take the set of particles, time, and position as primitive notions. Both systems assume that there exists a set of particles having continuous, twice-differentiable paths over some time interval. In addition, CPM takes mass and force as primitive notions, and assumes that with each particle there is associated a mass and a set of forces such that Newton's Second Law is satisfied (Axiom P6). A system with these properties is called in CPM “a system of particle mechanics.” If, in addition, the set of forces in the system satisfies Newton's Third Law, the system is called in CPM “Newtonian.”

In an effort to ease the task of developing new ideas, whether in research, development or some other endeavor, it is generally accepted to resort to a method of problem solving. Although the use of such a method may, in many cases, be done without the realization of the individual, it does not detract from the fact that such methods play a part in our mental processes and research techniques. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the methods and to arbitrarily classify them so that they can be consciously applied. Inasmuch as all methods must to some extent ultimately define the problem, the division presented here is obviously arbitrary, based on the degree of specificity with which the problem must be defined.