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Ontology and the Theory of Meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Richard L. Cartwright
Richard L. Cartwright*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Extract

In a number of essays published over the last decade or so, W. V. Quine has made some interesting suggestions concerning the ontology of theories. (3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 9; 10) If I understand him correctly, one of his principal objects has been to formulate a criterion by means of which one can correctly decide what are the ontological commitments of any given theory. My aim in this paper is to reveal what I think are inadequacies in Quine's criterion and to indicate the direction in which a proper formulation lies.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , October 1954 , pp. 316 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1954

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References

1. Church, A., “The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis,” Proc. of American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. LXXX (1951), pp. 100–108.Google Scholar
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