Classical mechanics is empirically successful because the probabilistic mean values of quantum mechanical observables follow the classical equations of motion to a good approximation (Messiah 1970, 215). We examine this claim for the one-dimensional motion of a particle in a box, and extend the idea by deriving a special case of the ideal gas law in terms of the mean value of a generalized force used to define “pressure.” The examples illustrate the importance of probabilistic averaging as a method of abstracting away from the messy details of microphenomena, not only in physics, but in other sciences as well.

This article investigates the nature of entangled correlations in algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT). We define a notion of local disentanglement, expressing the possibility of destroying entanglement by means of local operations. Contrary to the case of ordinary quantum mechanics, local disentanglement cannot be achieved in general in relativistic quantum field theory. However, we show that if the split property holds, there exists a local operation that can destroy entanglement between spacelike-separated quantum field systems.

Larry Wright's analysis of teleological description of goal-directed behavior, though ingenious and insightful, errs in the following ways: it incorrectly claims that intentional human action exhibits consequence-etiology, making it impossible, contrary to his claim, for reference to consequence-etiology to be metaphorically transmitted to teleological descriptions of nonhuman behavior; it does not remove the threat of reverse causation for nonhuman behavior; it assumes in the face of contrary evidence that reference to purpose drops out in metaphorical extension; and it cannot account for unrequired behavior directed toward impossible goals.

Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. In this article, we refute Forster’s arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples. We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More important, we show that contrary to Forster’s contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable within the framework of the likelihood theory of evidence.

Foss's critique of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is shown to be completely wide of the mark (Foss 1984, van Fraassen 1980). Foss misunderstands van Fraassen's use of the terms ‘observable’, ‘phenomena’, ‘empirical adequacy’, and ‘epistemic community’. He misconstrues constructive empiricism as making knowledge, and perhaps existence, dependent on the observer. On the basis of this error, he attempts to reduce constructive empiricism to skepticism. None of his criticisms are to the point.

The main problem with the many-worlds theory is that it is not clear how the notion of probability should be understood in a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. In this paper, I argue for the following theses concerning the many-worlds theory: (1) If probability can be applied at all to measurement outcomes, it must function as a measure of an agent's self-location uncertainty. (2) Such probabilities typically violate reflection. (3) Many-worlds branching does not have sufficient structure to admit self-location probabilities. (4) Decision-theoretic arguments do not solve this problem.

I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populations can cause the behavior of members of the populations. Such emergent population-level causation is metaphysically impossible on the orthodoxy.

This paper takes issue with Tyler Burge's claim that intentional states are nonindividualistically individuated in cognitive psychology. A discussion of current models of children's acquisition of semantic knowledge is used to motivate a thought-experiment which shows that psychologists working in this area are not committed to describing the concepts children attach to words in terms of the concepts standardly attached to those words in the child's community. The content of the child's representational states are thus not individuated with reference to linguistic environment in the manner that Burge's nonindividualistic view requires. The paper concludes that the explanatory states of cognitive psychology are sometimes individualistically individuated.

Evidence of the pervasiveness of neural reuse in the human brain has forced a revision of the standard conception of modularity in the cognitive sciences. One persistent line of argument against such revision, however, cites the evidence of cognitive dissociations. While this article takes the dissociations seriously, it contends that the traditional modular account is not the best explanation. The key to the puzzle is neural redundancy. The article offers both a philosophical analysis of the relation between reuse and redundancy as well as a plausible solution to the problem of dissociations.

The question “what is (are) the unit(s) of selection” can be interpreted in three different ways. These interpretations are discussed and it is shown that they prompt different answers; such units are shown to be individuals in the context of the given interpretation. One of these interpretations is argued, by examples, not always to have an unambiguously correct answer. An alternative approach to this question is sketched.

Weak and strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It is proved that the Abstract Principal Principle is both weakly and strongly consistent. The Abstract Principal Principle is strengthened by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are defined. It is shown that the Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent. Strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle remains an open question.

Recent discussions of experimental tests of the Sum Rule have been carried out in the context of the special circumstances attending the Cross-Ramsey experiment. A more general analysis of possible tests is presented. A technical mistake of Fine and Glymour concerned with a misunderstanding of the physics of the Cross-Ramsey experiment is explained and a detailed analysis of a thought experiment based on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen wave function is given. It is concluded, in agreement with Fine, that scattering experiments do not test the Sum Rule as a principle which supplements standard quantum mechanics.

Roman Frigg and others have developed a general epistemological argument designed to cast doubt on the capacity of a broad range of mathematical models (including many climate models) to generate “decision relevant predictions.” In this article, we lay out the structure of their argument—an argument by analogy—with an eye to identifying points at which certain epistemically significant distinctions might limit the force of the analogy. Finally, some of these epistemically significant distinctions are introduced and defended as relevant to a great many of the predictive mathematical modeling projects employed in contemporary climate science.

The original stimulus for the choice of this topic was a book on intellectual history. One of the most brilliant authors in this field, Carl Becker, claims that the most important event in the intellectual history of modern time was the shift in the place of logic in science. According to Becker, the high esteem for logic which the scientist had in the age of St. Thomas Aquinas and through all the Middle Ages declined in the period of Galileo and Newton. But at that time this decline was not yet fully understood. “The marriage of fact and reason” as Becker expresses himself “proved to be somewhat irksome in the nineteenth century and was altogether dissolved in the twentieth century.” The modern, twentieth century, physicist lives in an “atmosphere, which is so saturated with the actual that we can easily do with a minumum of theoretical” … “We have long since learned not to bother much with reason and logic.” To describe the spirit of twentieth century physics which emphasizes facts and minimizes reason Becker says: “Experiments seem to show that an electron may, for reasons best known to itself, be moving at two orbits at the same time. To this point Galileo's common sense method of noting the behavior of things, of sticking close to the observable facts has brought us. It has at last presented us with a fact that common sense repudiates.”

Although the construction of neo-Darwinism grew out of Thomas Hunt Morgan's melding of Darwinism and Mendelism, his evidence did not soley support a model of gradual change. To the contrary, he was confronted with observations that could have led him to a more “evo-devo” understanding of the emergence of novel features. Indeed, since Morgan was an embryologist before he became a fruit-fly geneticist, one would have predicted that the combination of these two lines of research would have resulted in early formulations of concepts relevant to evolutionary developmental biology. It is thus of interest to review Morgan's thought processes and arguments for at first rejecting both Darwinism and Mendelism, and then for later dismissing data that would have yielded a model of rapid morphological change in favor of a model of change based on the accumulation of minor mutations and their morphological consequences.