An examination of earlier views yields an account of theoretic change on which changes in theory which do involve changes in meanings of terms are classified as a special (and by no means exhaustive) case of theoretic change which, latter, is construed as a more general phenomenon. Only the general problem is given detailed consideration here. The account given considers the problem of how replacement of intensional theories by extensional ones may be treated within the general framework provided. Among its results is the conclusion that rational changes in a scientific theory may be cogently construed as determined by warranted decisions that a new theory is more adequate (than the old one it replaces) with regard to purposes for which a theory is sought.

For the case of statistical theories, the criteria of explanation, prediction, and testability can all be viewed as particular instances of a more general evaluation scheme. Using the ideas of a gain matrix and expected gain from statistical decision theory, these three criteria can be compared in terms of the elements in their associated gain matrices. This analysis leads to (1) further understanding of the interrelationship between the current criteria, (2) the proposal of an ordering for the criteria, and (3) the suggestion of a new criterion.

In Parts I, II, and III of the paper, the authors show that an argument essential to Alan White's defense of the Correspondence Theory of truth is unsuccessful. They argue that some of the premises of White's argument are false, and others incoherent. They show, further, that certain widely accepted assumptions in the philosophy of language, which underlie White's argument, must also be abandoned. In Part IV, they attempt to say something new about ‘true’, ‘false’, truth and falsity, and related notions. They do not offer a competing theory to White's, but instead stress features of the use of these words and concepts which philosophers have either ignored or insufficiently emphasized.

In this essay I present a statement of Quine's indeterminacy thesis in its general form. It is shown that the thesis is not about difficulties peculiar to so-called “radical translation.” It is a general thesis about meaning and reference with important consequences for any theory of our theories and beliefs. It is claimed that the thesis is inconsistent with Quine's realism, his doctrine of the relativity of reference, and that the argument for the thesis has the consequence that the concept of stimulus meaning is empty.

The sense in which linguistic science, as a branch of behavioral science, is “part of physics” is discussed. An alternative to Quine's view of the nature and content of linguistic science is proposed. It is shown to be consistent with Quine's assumptions concerning the legitimate scope of behavioral science and not to involve the notions of analyticity, synonymy and “prevalent attitudes toward meaning, idea and proposition” rejected by Quine.

My thesis is that biology is most plausibly regarded as a universal, as distinct from a provincial, science. First, I develop the general notion of a provincial science, formulate three criteria for applying the concept, and present brief examples illustrating their use. Second, I argue that a consideration of population genetics as a characteristic example of a basic biological theory strengthens the prior presumption that biology is not a provincial science. Finally, I examine two arguments to the effect that biology is a provincial science. The first concerns biology's exclusively terrestrial evidence base, the second the logical character of its laws. I introduce considerations that weaken the persuasiveness of the first argument and then show that the second one rests upon a false premise and so should be rejected.

The area of investigation known as general systems theory or research features the study of systems as interesting in its own right or one fruitful approach to the study of science in general. This leads to an interesting and still open problem, namely, explicating the concept of a system that seems to unify the interests of researchers in this area. Contrary to received opinion, I argue that there is a unique and interesting concept of a system that underlies the expressed interests of general systems researchers and that it can be given a satisfactory explication. The concept in question has systems as extralinguistic entities that we theorize about, namely, certain sorts of sets of re-related elements. Criteria for its explication are suggested; examples of systems, earlier analyses, and various objections are all considered in leading up to a partial formal explication of the concept and a statement of additional open problems.