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The Bifurcation of Scientific Theories and Indeterminacy of Translation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Donald Hockney
Donald Hockney*
Affiliation:
Boston University Center for the Philosophy of Science
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Abstract

In this essay I present a statement of Quine's indeterminacy thesis in its general form. It is shown that the thesis is not about difficulties peculiar to so-called “radical translation.” It is a general thesis about meaning and reference with important consequences for any theory of our theories and beliefs. It is claimed that the thesis is inconsistent with Quine's realism, his doctrine of the relativity of reference, and that the argument for the thesis has the consequence that the concept of stimulus meaning is empty.

The sense in which linguistic science, as a branch of behavioral science, is “part of physics” is discussed. An alternative to Quine's view of the nature and content of linguistic science is proposed. It is shown to be consistent with Quine's assumptions concerning the legitimate scope of behavioral science and not to involve the notions of analyticity, synonymy and “prevalent attitudes toward meaning, idea and proposition” rejected by Quine.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 42 , Issue 4 , December 1975 , pp. 411 - 427
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This research was supported, in part, by Canada Council (grant no. W73–0455). I wish to thank Noam Chomsky for stimulating discussions and criticisms of an earlier draft of this essay. I am grateful to this Journal's referees for their valuable suggestions which provided much food for thought and resulted in several changes in this essay.

References

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