It is argued that neither the “theory-informity” of observations nor the Quine-Duhem thesis pose any in principle threat to the objectivity of theory evaluation. The employment of exploratory theories does not generate incommensurability, but on the contrary is responsible for the mensurability and commensurability of explanatory theories, since exploratory theories enable scientists to make observations which are critical in the evaluation of explanatory theories. The employment of exploratory theories and other auxiliary hypotheses does not enable a theory to always accommodate recalcitrant observations to preserve evidential equivalence with a rival theory. Explanatory theories become rapidly degenerating if exploratory theories or other auxiliary hypotheses which inform the original confirmation base are modified to accommodate recalcitrant observations.

Advances in molecular biology have generally been taken to support the claim that biology is reducible to chemistry. I argue against that claim by looking in detail at a number of central results from molecular biology and showing that none of them supports reduction because (1) their basic predicates have multiple realizations, (2) their chemical realization is context-sensitive and (3) their explanations often presuppose biological facts rather than eliminate them. I then consider the heuristic and confirmational implications of irreducibility and argue that purely biochemical approaches are likely to be unsound and to be unable to confirm an important range of statements. I conclude by sketching criteria for scientific unity that do not entail reducibility and yet leave an important place for identifying underlying mechanisms. Molecular biology, properly understood, provides an excellent paradigm of non-reductive unity between different explanatory levels.

This paper digests technical commonplaces of quantum field theory to present an informal interpretation of the theory by emphasizing its connections with the harmonic oscillator. The resulting “harmonic oscillator interpretation” enables newcomers to the subject to get some intuitive feel for the theory. The interpretation clarifies how the theory relates to observation and to quantum mechanical problems connected with observation. Finally the interpretation moves some way towards helping us see what the theory comes to physically.

The paper also argues that, in important respects, interpretive problems of quantum field theory are problems we know well from conventional quantum mechanics. An important exception concerns extending the puzzles surrounding the superposition of properties in conventional quantum mechanics to an exactly parallel notion of superposition of particles. Conventional quantum mechanics seems incompatible with a classical notion of property on which all quantities always have definite values. Quantum field theory presents an exactly analogous problem with saying that the number of “particles” is always definite.

The literary and poetic turn in philosophy exudes contempt for science and hostility against technology, both allegedly justified on grounds established by Nietzsche and Heidegger. I try to show that these grounds instead call for an extremely positive assessment of science and technology. It turns out that what Nietzsche and Heidegger describe as our highest achievement, namely, human autonomy, is really made possible by modern experimental physics. And I show how this assessment is borne out by what Heisenberg describes as the lesson of quantum physics.

In Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (1978), G. A. Cohen has developed a distinctively functionalist interpretation of historical materialism. In this paper I outline Cohen's novel reconstruction of Marx and subject it to two independent internal criticisms. I first argue that explanations cannot conform to Cohen's functionalist model. I then suggest that even if there could be explanations having the structure he has proposed, they would fail to be helpful in illuminating the causal kernel of Marx's theory. Finally I sketch a neglected but more promising approach to clarifying historical materialism, due to Geoffrey Hellman.

The main appeal of the currently popular “bootstrap” account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to theories. Finally, I argue that there is little reason to think that even such drastic modifications will lead to a satisfactory account of relevance.

In this note a recently developed quantum oscillating finite space cosmological model is described. The principle novelty of the model is that there is a quantum blurring of the classical singularity between cycles, instead of a singularity free bounce. Recently, Quentin Smith (1988) has argued that present theoretical and observational evidence justifies the belief that the past history of the universe is finite. The relevance of this cosmological model to Smith's arguments is discussed.

The classic charge against Freudian theory is that the therapeutic success of psychoanalysis can be explained without appeal to the mechanisms of repression and insight. Whatever therapeutic success psychoanalysis might enjoy would then provide no support for the diagnostic claim that psychological disorders are due to repressed desires or for the therapeutic claim that the gains in psychoanalysis are due to insight into repressed causes. Adolf Grünbaum has repeated the charge in The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984), arguing that Freud's response to it in what he calls the “Tally Argument” is woefully inadequate. Grünbaum claims that Freud's defense depends on the view that only psychoanalytic techniques can yield therapeutic effects, and therefore that the transience of some psychoanalytic “cures”, the existence of alternative treatment modalities, and the frequency of spontaneous remission undermine Freud's defense of psychoanalysis. I argue that, whatever the merits of psychoanalysis, Freud is not logically committed to any view as extreme as that attributed to him by Grünbaum; and, furthermore, Grünbaum's rendering of Freud is historically inaccurate.

Doren Recker has criticized the prevailing accounts of Darwin's argument for the theory of natural selection in the Origin of Species. In this note I argue that Recker fails to distinguish between a deductive short argument for the principle of natural selection, and a non-deductive, long argument which aims at establishing that the principle has explanatory power in the various domains of application. I shall try to show that the semantic view of theories, especially in its structuralist form, makes it easy to distinguish between the two arguments and to explain how Darwin's long argument counts as one argument. I also raise a question about Recker's views on Darwin's mid-Victorian background, arguing that Newton's First Rule of Reasoning was not just a constraint on hypotheses involving unobservables, but a general request to keep conjecture and certainty apart.

In an earlier paper (Dupré 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background conditions (the “contextual unanimity thesis”). I also suggested that a more promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statistical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections of his own to my positive claims. In this paper I defend and amplify both my objections to the contextual unanimity thesis and my constructive suggestion.

In his paper, “Explanations of Irrelevance” (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended version of hypothetico-deductivism, (H-D*). In this discussion note it is shown that (H-D*) has the consequence that “A is a non-black raven” confirms “All ravens are black” relative to any tautology! It is noted that Horwich's (H-D*) bears a strong resemblance to Hempel's prediction criterion of confirmation and that the prediction criterion faces the same obstacle. A related problem for hypothetico-deductivism in its simplest form—that is, E confirms H iff E is an (observational) consequence of H—is displayed. The discussion concludes with a suggestion about how (H-D*) and simple hypothetico-deductivism might be amended in order to avoid these results.

Previous articles on Russell's hypothesis and on criteria for scientific explanations are used as a springboard for analyzing some modern trends in science. Specifically, recent suggestions of the concept of “creation from nothing” in Big-Bang cosmology are compared to Russell's hypothesis, in light of James Woodward's criteria for an explanation purporting to be scientific. The discussion is then extended to the broader question of the direction of scientific theorizing, through examples showing that one generation's science may not build conformably upon the mindset of the previous generation.

Historians of relativity theory have puzzled over the fact that, while Einstein regarded Ernst Mach as his chief philosophical mentor, Mach himself publicly rejected relativity in the preface to Die Prinzipien der physikalischen Optik. This work was first published by Mach's son Ludwig in 1921, five years after Mach's death, but the preface is dated “July 1913”, when Einstein was working on general relativity and believing not only that he had Mach's “friendly interest” and support, but also that his project was the working-out of some of Mach's suggestions. To Einstein, whose sympathy for Mach's overall philosophy of science had already begun to wane by 1921, the posthumous appearance of the preface seemed to underscore the inconsistency between Machian positivism and his own program to construct an abstract and geometrical physics; this interpretation appears in important modern analyses like Blackmore (1972), Holton (1988), and Zahar (1989), and it has frequently served the purposes of the philosophical reaction against logical positivism in general. Now Gereon Wolters' book (translation: Mach I, Mach II, Einstein, and the Theory of Relativity. A Forgery and its Consequences) challenges the usual interpretation with a startling claim: that Ernst Mach never wrote the preface, which in fact is a forgery by his son Ludwig. The words “A Forgery and its Consequences” suggest the sweeping consequences that the preface has had for our understanding of the relation between Mach and Einstein; the point of the book is not only to document the dramatic story of the forgery, but also to defend an equally sweeping reconsideration, indeed a rehabilitation, of Mach's philosophy and its role in the history of relativity.